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ABSTRACT 
"What Meaneth This?" 
A Postmodern 'Theory' of African American Religious Experience 
by 
Torin Dru Alexander 
It is the intention of this dissertation to provide a 'theory' of African American 
religious experience that is guided by postmodern critical thought, with particular 
emphasis on methodologies attempting to grasp what is referred to as the quotidian, the 
ordinary, but primarily as "everyday life." It is my contention that this constitutes a 
promising approach that African American religionists should consider. Indeed, for 
almost forty years, there has been one dominant interpretative lens for the study of 
African American religious experience, often referred to as a hermeneutics of liberation. 
It is my contention that this orientation, with its emphasis on the macroscopic, is 
markedly inadequate. I maintain that what is needed is a focus on the microscopic. 
Moreover, I also assert that if there is to be a locus for opposition to oppression, it is to be 
found on the level of the "everyday" - that which is often passed over as insignificant or 
irrelevant. 
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Introduction 
Bewildered we are, and passion-tost, mad with the madness of a mobbed and 
mocked and murdered people; straining at the armposts of Thy Throne, we raise our 
shackled hands and charge Thee, God, by the bones of our stolen fathers, by the tears of 
our dead mothers, by the very blood of Thy crucified Christ: What meaneth this? Tell us 
the Plan; give us the Sign! 
Keep not thou silence, O God! 
Sit no longer blind, Lord God, deaf to our prayer and dumb to our dumb suffering. 
Surely, Thou too art not white, O Lord, a pale, bloodless, heartless thing? 
From "A Litany at Atlanta" by W. E. B. Du Bois1 
It is the intention of this dissertation to provide a 'theory' of African American 
religious experience that is guided by postmodern critical thought, with particular 
emphasis on methodologies attempting to grasp what is referred to as the quotidian, the 
ordinary, but primarily as "everyday life." It is my contention that this constitutes a 
promising approach that African American religionists should consider. Indeed, for 
almost forty years, there has been one dominant interpretative lens for the study of 
African American religious experience, often referred to as a hermeneutics of liberation. 
It is my contention that this orientation, with its emphasis on the macroscopic, is 
markedly inadequate. I maintain that what is needed is a focus on the microscopic. 
Moreover, I also assert that if there is to be a locus for resistance or opposition to 
1W. E. B. Du Bois, Darkwater : Voices from within the Veil, Dover Thrift Editions (Mineola, NY: Dover 
Publications, 1999), 14. 
2 21 am uncomfortable with the term "theory" due to what Mikhail Bakhtin calls "theoreticism" [M. M. 
Bakhtin, Michael Holquist, and Vadim Liapunov, Toward a Philosophy of the Act, 1st ed., University of 
Texas Press Slavic Series ; No. 10 (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1993), 11-27] which is the reduction 
of human creativity to a system. Theory, in this sense, impoverishes the truth of human life by 
subordinating all the complexity and messiness to a static system. Yet, the use of the term "theory" persists 
even among those who oppose the conventional meaning. I considered having the word appear written 
under erasure, i.e. theory. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak describes erasure as "the strategy of using the only 
available language while not subscribing to its premises. . . . Since the word is inaccurate, it is crossed out. 
Since it is necessary it remains legible" [Spivak's introduction to Jacques Derrida, Of Grammatology, 
corrected ed. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998), Xiv]. I have opted here and in the title of 
the dissertation to use single quotes. 
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oppression, it is to be found on the level of the "everyday," that which is often passed 
over as insignificant or irrelevant. 
Unfortunately, an intentional engagement with theory and method has not been 
characteristic of African religionists. Indeed, I would contend that a review of African 
American religious scholarship from Carter G. Woodson, E. Franklin Frazier, W.E.B. Du 
Bois, and Benjamin E. Mays to more contemporary scholars such as C. Eric Lincoln, J. 
Deotis Roberts, or James Hal Cone would substantiate this claim. This assertion is not 
meant to denigrate the work of previous generations of scholars of African American 
religion, nor should it be interpreted as a vulgar valorization of theory qua theory, or 
method qua method. It is my contention, however, that conscientious scholars would 
want to know the strengths as well as the deficiencies associated with the tools they bring 
to bear in their research. Moreover, I maintain that African American religious scholars' 
lack of serious engagement with issues of a theoretical and methodological nature have 
led to a rather anemic analysis of African American religious experience. 
The dominant method utilized in the study of African American religious 
experience over the course of the last several decades has been a "hermeneutic of 
liberation" with liberation construed as a collective, communal, coherent, and 
coordinated endeavor over against oppressive forms of power that are macroscopic, often 
monolithic and hierarchical. Such power is associated with issues of white supremacy, 
industrial capitalism, sexism, and imperialism. Yet, as one looks at various African 
American religious communities, in the main they are devoid of revolutionary or militant 
theologies. As groups, they are neither chiliastic nor ascetic world-transforming. An 
3 
As various scholars have noted, particularly in such studies as Hans A. Baer and Merrill Singer, African 
American Religion : Varieties of Protest and Accommodation, 2nd ed. (Knoxville: University of Tennessee 
3 
interpretive and diagnostic challenge for the religious scholar involves understanding 
these religious communities' engagement with the world, whether it is the quite limited 
possibilities that many accord to the improvement of the present world, or the tendency 
toward the development of theodicies of reconciliation or redemptive suffering. 
Context 
The argument presented here will be important to those engaged in the study of 
religious experience in general and African American religious experience in particular. 
Moreover, it is the author's hope that those engaged in fields and/or disciplines such as 
philosophy, sociology, anthropology, and critical and cultural theory would find the work 
edifying. 
In my review of the literature on African American religion, I have yet to come 
across the use of theories of "everyday life and practice" in the study of African 
American religious experience. Indeed, it appears that little scholarship has been done 
with respect to the concept of "everyday life" and religion.4 For the most part, these 
Press, 2002) or C. Eric Lincoln and Lawrence H. Mamiya, The Black Church in the African-American 
Experience (Durham: Duke University Press, 1990). A number of different topologies can be mapped out 
for African American religion, depending on the schematization one wishes to apply. In the case of Baer 
and Singer, they have a two-dimensional grid, one axis being attitudinal (accommodationist or rejectionist) 
and the other in terms social strategies (material/social needs vs. emotional needs). Each of the four 
categories in which they classified the different religious bodies occupied a different quadrant: Mainline 
churches; Conversionist, Pentecostal, and Holiness Churches; Messianic/Nationalists bodies; and 
Thaumaturgical/Spiritualist tradition 
In the case of Lincoln and Mamiya, they engaged in what they called a "dialectics" with three 
oppositional relationships, which they defined as the priestly vs. the prophetic, the this-worldly vs. the 
other-worldly, and the universal vs. the particular. It is interesting to note that the first two pairings 
resemble those of Baer and Singer. In is clear in both instances that these scholars also see their work as 
refuting claims by their previous scholars, such as E. Franklin Frazier and his sociological work on the 
Negro church and the Negro family, as well the famous study of Gary T. Marx that came out during the 
sixties. Both Frazier and Marx paint Black religion as otherworldly. 
4
 Two exceptions are in the work of Arnold M. Eisen and Gregory Kaplan, such as Arnold M. Eisen's, 
Rethinking Modern Judaism : Ritual, Commandment, Community, Chicago Studies in the History of 
Judaism (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998). 
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theories are closely identified with various trajectories in continental thought; e.g. the 
phenomenological tradition, the Marxist and Critical Theory tradition, and the 
structuralist/post-structuralist/postmodern tradition. While it is the case that numerous 
scholars in the field of religious studies have availed themselves of the larger continental 
tradition, for the most part this has not been true of those engaged in the study of African 
American religion.5 
In appropriating the work of theorists of the everyday and the ordinary, one is 
confronted with that which we are the most familiar, but when carefully scrutinized, often 
appears strange if not unfathomable. The everyday is characterized by ambiguities, 
instabilities, and equivocation. For a thinker like Lefebvre, this involves the refusal to 
reduce everyday life to an arena for the reproduction of dominant social relations; for a 
scholar such as de Certeau, the everyday is precisely the sight of substantive resistance, 
revolution and transformation.6 
Another possible benefit of this project might be providing some insight into why 
Black theology has largely failed to grab the imagination and to quicken the spirits of 
significant portions of the African American community. Moreover, a more robust 
understanding of what constitutes African American religion and African American 
religious experience is important in the contemporary context as it relates to questions of 
historicity and continuity of African American culture and its associate religious practices 
and expressions. Again, it is my desire that theories and methods proffered here will lead 
5
 See Chapter 3 on African American religionists. 
6
 Michael Sheringham, Everyday Life : Theories and Practices from Surrealism to the Present (Oxford and 
New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), 17. 
5 
to a new way of understanding African American religious experience broadly construed. 
n 
Indeed, it is my aspiration that this work might be part of a new paradigm. 
An Overview 
Chapter 1 provides critical reflection on the manner in which religious studies has 
explored the nature and meaning of religious experience. In this chapter, I will define 
what I mean by religious experience and then go on to assert that an analysis that 
accentuates a functional (explanatory) construal supplemented with the substantive 
(interpretative) is to be preferred to strict functional or substantive construal. 
Chapter 2 presents three examples of African American religious experience that 
will constitute the data upon which the theories and methodologies under consideration 
will be brought to bear in subsequent chapters. Here, the descriptive methodology 
deployed for this purpose is phenomenological. It is my contention that such an approach 
best facilitates an encounter with the world of experience as it reveals itself, in its 
givenness. It is my intention to provide a fuller, more complex description of the 
everyday, and subsequently, a better picture of how religious experience shapes, alters, 
modifies, or affects the everyday of African Americans. 
Chapter 3 provides critical reflection on the manner in which African American 
religious studies, principally the disciplines of theology, philosophy, and history of 7
 An archetype of such a shift is that involving Newtonian physics at the end of the nineteenth century, 
which represented a degenerating tradition unable to solve the problems it was creating. Another research 
approach was needed, namely quantum mechanics. For a discussion on the nature of scientific revolutions 
and changing paradigms, see Thomas S. Kuhn's, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 3rd ed. (Chicago, 
IL: University of Chicago Press, 1996), as well as the discourses between Kuhn and Imre Lakatos. The 
interesting aspect for me with respect to the "revolution" that took place in physics is one of scale. 
Newtonian mechanics deals with the macroscopic while quantum mechanics applies to the domain of the 
microscopic. It is my contention that the dichotomy of macroscopic and microscopic applies to 
cultural/critical theory as well. 
religion, have explored the nature and meaning of African American religious 
experience. Through this review of the literature, the weaknesses with respect to theory 
and method in African American religious studies are noted - particularly as they relate 
to the overwhelming concern with collective transformation over and against "everyday" 
practices on the individual level. 
In Chapter 4, it is my intention to present a theoretical and methodological 
approach to the study of African American religious experience that emphasizes the lived 
"everyday" experiences of black folk. Methodologically and theoretically, I believe that 
there is an intellectual tradition - the tradition of Heidegger, Bakhtin, Lefebvre, and de 
o 
Certeau and their concentration on everydayness, coping practices, technologies of self, 
habits, strategies and tactics - which is particularly useful. 
As mentioned above, the dominant theoretical and methodological posture 
adopted in the study of African American religion has been a hermeneutics of liberation, 
which emphasizes forms of power that are macroscopic, often monolithic and 
hierarchical. Subsequently, less attention has been given to power on the level of the 
microscopic, e.g., the microphysics of power and the micro-political. 
In Chapter 5,1 demonstrate the advantage of an analysis of African American 
religious experience in terms of "everydayness" as opposed to the macroscopic liberative 
hermeneutical norm used by most African American religionists in the study of such 
8
 One of the challenges in deploying such theories is how encompassing is the concept of everydayness. It 
is certainly the case that the theorists in question do not have in mind the social lives of African Americans. 
Their referents or data are drawn in most instances from twentieth century Europeans. Part of the goal of 
this project, therefore, is to show that these theories do indeed address the issues of African Americans and 
are not simply other broad categories that suffer from the same or similar defects as what I have called the 
dominant interpretive model in African American religion. 
7 
experiences. I achieve this by way of applying the approaches to the descriptive data 
associated with the case studies presented in Chapter 2. 
In Chapter 6,1 offer concluding observations and remarks related to the research 
presented in the dissertation. I assert that theories and methodologies associated with 
"everydayness" as I have presented might open new horizons of meaning and explanation 
for African American religious studies. Indeed, I maintain that their appropriation should 
be part of a needed paradigm shift within the discourse that is African American religious 
studies. 
8 
Chapter 1 - An Overview of Religious Experience 
Objective 
In this chapter, "An Overview of Religious Experience," I shall provide critical 
reflection on the manner in which religious studies has explored the nature and meaning 
of religious experience. I will first provide a history of the dominant approach to the 
phenomenon in question. I will then point out various problems associated with this 
intellectual tradition - problems that are primarily theoretical and methodological, but 
also which ultimately result in a fundamental mischaracterization of the phenomenon 
called religious experience. I will then give my definition of religious experience, going 
on to assert what I contend is an appropriate theoretical and methodological perspective 
that is interdisciplinary and that privileges functional explanation over, but not at the 
exclusion of, substantive interpretation. This will set the foundation for Chapter 2, 
"Current Approaches to the Study of African American Religious Experience," which to 
the extent that theory and methodology have been matters of concern among African 
American religionists; a substantive interpretive orientation has been de rigueur in terms 
of attempting to comprehend African American religious experience. 
As I stated in my introduction to the dissertation, the central problem that has 
beleaguered and invigorated my intellectual curiosity to date involves the nature of 
African American religious experience. But before one deals with the specific 
phenomenon as it relates to persons of African Americans, it behooves one to ask, "What 
is this 'experience' that people - scholars and lay - refer to as 'religious'?" Theologians 
and philosophers, as well as scholars associated with such disciplines as sociology, 
9 
psychology, anthropology, and history have wrestled with an assortment of experiences, 
events, incidents, and occasions to which they have affixed the nomenclature of 'the 
religious'. Not surprisingly, they have arrived at a variety of theories. Also not surprising, 
these theories are formed and informed by the particular methodological dispositions 
associated with their particular field or discipline. Subsequently, there have been 
schematizations attempting to describe, explain, and interpret these events, experiences, 
and expressions. 
Introduction 
According to James Alfred Martin, Jr. in the article "Religious Experience" in the 
Encyclopedia of Religion, the concept of religious experience is logically and practically 
complex. Further, it is rich in various nuances allied with those who have sought to study 
it. It reflects both general theories of experience and specific theories of religion.9 In his 
essay entitled "Experience" in Mark Taylor's Critical Terms for Religious Studies, 
Robert H. Sharf also notes that term and category of experience is quite complex and is 
fraught with numerous difficulties.10 Wayne Proudfoot notes in his seminal text Religious 
Experience,11 that while as a phenomenon religious experience may be ubiquitous, as a 
concept or idea it is relatively new. Indeed, the concepts religious and experience are 
really products of the Enlightenment. Moreover, as a category, it is rather broad, its 
boundaries undefined, porous, and elusive. 
9
 James A. Martin, Jr. "Religious Experience" in The Encyclopedia of Religion, ed. Mircea Eliade. 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967), 330. 
10
 Robert H. Sharf. "Experience", in Critical Terms for Religious Studies, ed. Mark C. Taylor (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1998), 94-116. 
11
 Wayne Proudfoot, Religious Experience (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1985). 
10 
As one attempts to develop an understanding of religious experience, I maintain 
that the researcher is confronted with at least two significant issues. The first issue is the 
epistemological issue. Epistemology is the branch of philosophy that studies the nature of 
knowledge, its presuppositions and foundations, and its extent and validity. In other 
words it deals with the question of how we know what we know, and what qualifies as 
knowledge. In terms of the relationship of experience to knowledge, it is common to 
frame the discourse in terms of awareness, where awareness comprises a human being's 
perception and cognitive reaction to a condition or event. It is important to note, however, 
that awareness does not necessarily imply understanding, just an ability to be conscious 
of, to feel, or to perceive. 
The second issue has to do with that which is encountered when referring to 
religious experience. Phenomenologically speaking, with respect to the matter of 
intentionality, one is always conscious of something. Intentionality is always directed. 
However, one of the challenges for a phenomenologist of religions is the nature of the 
object, entity, or 'thing' of which one is aware. An experience can come to consciousness 
in a myriad of ways. If one is seeing, they are seeing some visual object; if one is 
imagining, one's imagining or imagination presents an imaginary object; if one is 
engaged in remembering, one is intentioning a past object; and if one is judging, one is 
12 
intending a state of affairs or a fact. Moreover, when dealing with religion and the 
religious, issues of perception are often bound to arguments of justification. In other 
words, in terms of religion, what one encounters or experiences is held to matter a great 
deal, to use Tillichian language, it is often a matter of ultimate concern. 
12
 Robert Sokolowski, Introduction to Phenomenology (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 8. 
11 
Through the course of this chapter I will refer to the first issue as the 
epistemological issue and the latter as the veridical issue. In tracking the history and 
nuances of the concept of religious experience, these two issues have been inextricably 
linked. After carefully rehearsing the development of the concept of religious experience 
in the field that comes to be known as religious studies, I will make a case that this 
association need not obtain. Indeed, it is my contention that it is the source of much 
confusion in attempting to schematize the phenomenon of religious experience. 
Theorists of Religious Experience 
The notion or concept of religious experience in the field of religious studies is 
perhaps most closely associated with the eighteenth and nineteenth century theologian 
Friedrich Schleiermacher. This is particularly of import as Schleiermacher is also deemed 
by most scholars of religion as the individual responsible for the course of theology in the 
modern era. Indeed, modern theology is frequently marked as beginning with the 
publication in 1799 of Schleiermacher's collection of essays entitled On Religion: 
Speeches to its Cultured Despisers. 
In On Religion, Schleiermacher offers his phenomenological description of 
religious experience in the effort to persuade his colleagues who were a part of the 
Romantic Movement in eighteenth century Germany. A community consisting of poets, 
artists, and musicians, they, for the most part, rejected religion. Indeed, it is they who are 
the cultured despisers. 
12 
Schlciermacher wished to show his associates that what they truly reviled was not 
religion but dogma and institutions that result from mistaking external forms for the inner 
life of the spirit. These critics 
(S)eek knowledge; their wisdom is only directed toward a lamentable 
empiricism, and thus religion can be nothing else for them than a dead 
letter, a holy article in the constitution in which nothing is real.13 
Conversely, real piety or faith was associated with the spiritual integrity and sense of 
harmony with the universe which they sought in the aesthetic and cultural life. His 
argument over the course of several essays is that the characterization of religion as 
propositional truths (a position associated with Protestant orthodoxy) or grounded in 
ecclesiastical authority (conversely, the position associated with Catholicism) was not 
true religion. Rather, religion was related to experience, intuition, and a sensibility that 
was much more akin to an artistic sensibility. Schleiermacher characterized this as the 
sense or taste of the infinite. 
True science is complete vision; true practice is culture and art self-
produced; true religion is sense and taste for the Infinite. To wish to have 
true science or true practice without religion, or to imagine it is possessed, 
is obstinate, arrogant delusion, and culpable error.14 
The contemplation of the pious is the immediate consciousness of the 
universal existence of all finite things in and through the Infinite, and all 
temporal things in and through the Eternal... Religion is to seek this and 
find it in all that lives and moves, in all growth and change, in all doing 
and suffering. It is to have life and to know life in immediate feeling, only 
as such an existence in the Infinite and Eternal... Wherefore it is a life in 
the infinite nature of the Whole, in the One and in the All, in God, having 
and possessing all things in God and God in all. Yet religion is not 
knowledge and science, either of the world or of God. Without being 
13
 Friedrich Schleiermacher, On Religion: Speeches to its Cultured Despisers, trans. John Oman (New 
York, NY: Harper and Row, 1958), 9. 
14
 Schleiermacher, On Religion, 39. 
13 
knowledge, it recognizes knowledge and science. In itself is an affection, a 
revelation of the Infinite in the finite, God being seen in it and it in God.15 
Moreover, religious experience, as an intuition of the whole, is associated with an 
immediacy that raises it above all error and misunderstanding.16 
All is immediately true in religion, for except immediately how could 
anything arise? But that only is immediate which has not yet passed 
through the stage of idea, but has grown up purely in the feeling.17 
As a sense or perception that precedes and is independent of thought, religious 
experience cannot be confused with doctrine, dogma, or practice and thus does not 
I o 
infringe upon the domain of science. This feeling or intuition is also intentional, in that 
it is directed toward an "object," the Infinite. 
Sense and object mingle and unite, then each returns to its place, and the 
object rent from sense is a perception, and you rent from the object for 
yourselves, a feeling. It is the earlier moment I mean, which you always 
experience and yet never experience... It is the holy wedlock of the 
Universe with the incarnated Reason for a creative, productive embrace. It 
is immediate, raised above all error and misunderstanding. You lie directly 
on the bosom of the infinite world. In that moment, you are its soul.19 
This understanding of religious experience will form the basis of 
Schleiermacher's later work, The Christian Faith. Therein, according to Schleiermacher, 
theology is not the product of metaphysical speculation or a set of beliefs about the 
world; rather, it is a systemization of the doctrine of a particular religious community at a 
particular time. Doctrine, moreover, is the expression of the "religious affections in that 
15
 Schleiermacher, On Religion, 36. 
16
 Schleiermacher, On Religion, 43. 
17
 Schleiermacher, On Religion, 54. 
18
 Paul Tillich reminds us that feeling for Schleiermacher is distinct from subjective emotion. According to 
Tillich, "It is the impact of the universe upon us in the depths of our being, which transcends subject and 
object." Paul Tillich, A History of Christian Thought: From Its Judaic and Hellenistic Origins to 
Existentialism, ed. Carl E. Braaten (New York, NY: Simon and Schuster, 1972), 392. 
19
 Schleiermacher, On Religion 43. 
14 
community." Thus, "Christian doctrines are accounts of the Christian religious affections 
set forth in speech."20 
Again, for Schleiermacher, the subject matter of theology is not God, but rather 
the self-consciousness of the religious believer in the context of his or her community. Or 
put in another way, it is not humans speaking about God, but rather humans reflecting on 
their own and others' experience of the infinite, the universe, the Whence. The theologian 
is a phenomenologist and a hermeneutist, who is to provide a faithful interpretation of the 
religious experiences of a particular community. 
These religious experiences are recorded in a community's language, signs and 
symbols; e.g. hymns, prayers, journals, sermons, ritual/liturgy, and art. The task of the 
theologian is then not so much to construct but rather to "describe, arrange, and 
systematize." However, the authority for particular religious claims lies in the religious 
experiences of a particular community. 
The common element in all howsoever diverse expressions of piety, by 
which these are conjointly distinguished from all other feelings, or, in 
other words, the self-identical essence of piety, is this: the consciousness 
of being absolutely dependent, or which, is the same thing, of being in 
relation to God.21 
As regards the identification of absolute dependence with 'relation to God' 
on our proposition: this is to be understood in the sense that the Whence of 
our receptive and active existence, as implied in this self-consciousness, is 
to be designated by the word 'God,' and that this is for us the really 
22 
original signification of the word. 
20
 Friedrich Schleiermacher, The Christian Faith, eds. H. R. Mackintosh and J. S. Stewart (Edinburgh: T. & 
T. Clark, 1928 | Philadelphia, PA: Fortress Press, 1976), 76. 
21
 Schleiermacher, The Christian Faith, 12. 
22
 Schleiermacher, The Christian Faith, 16. 
Schleiermacher's theory of religion and religious experience emerges in response 
to the overturning of the classic philosophical arguments for the existence of God, proofs 
dismantled by the work of Kant and Hume. Their work effectively precluded classic 
appeals to metaphysics. Indeed, to the extent that philosophy retained a concept of God, it 
was associated with Kant's limited understanding of God as a heuristic idea that served 
the purpose of science, or God as that which insures the teleological relationship of the 
'good' and the 'just' necessary for morality. 
Nevertheless, in keeping with this same tradition, Schleiermacher embraces the 
move from metaphysics to epistemology, and subsequently a turn to the subject. Yet, 
Schleiermacher's project is an apologetic in the sense that his argument is an attempt to 
regain some of the lost integrity of religion. For Schleiermacher, religion grounded in 
experience is irreducible to science or morality, and thus religious belief and practice 
should be freed from any requirement that they be justified by reference to nonreligious 
thought or action. Moreover, it was his hope that such a move would prevent conflict 
between religious doctrine and scientific knowledge. Rather, religion and doctrine were 
understood as grounded in a moment or experience intrinsically religious. 
In many respects, a successor to Schleiermacher - the American philosopher and 
psychologist William James - further popularized the concept of religious experience in 
his famous work, Varieties of Religious Experience. "'Originally composed and presented 
as twenty lectures on the subject of natural religion for the Gifford Lectures Series at 
Edinburgh University in 1901-1902, they have had an enduring impact on how religious 
scholars have come to comprehend religious experience. 
23
 William James, Varieties of Religious Experience: A Study in Human Nature, (New York: Random 
House - Modern Library, 1929). 
In what he will describe as a psychological perspective on religion, James relies 
on various literary sources. 
If the enquiry be psychological, not religious emotions, but rather religious 
feelings and religious impulses must be its subject, and I must confine 
myself to those more developed subjective phenomena recorded in 
literature produced by articulate and fully self-conscious men in works of 
piety and autobiography.24 
Indeed, James is not concerned with the ordinary religious believer, but rather the 
religious genius. The religion of the ordinary person is characterized by James as second-
hand, basically a matter of convention. On the other hand, religious geniuses are those 
exceptional individuals who are often the founders of a particular religious tradition. One 
might note that this move has several resonances with Schleiermacher's efforts to 
distinguish the source or essence of religion as religious experience, and that doctrine, 
dogma, and ritual are secondary or epiphenomenal. 
James goes on to note that there may be a correlation between such religious 
genius and psychological abnormality. Yet, he asserts, religious geniuses are the best 
subjects for an investigation into the phenomenon of religious experience. James 
contends that the study of the abnormal (or the exceptional) can provide insight into the 
normal, or rather, may better reveal the source of the phenomenon. 
The focus of James's study is what he refers to as religious feelings, which are 
distinct and different from emotion. James also chooses to focus on religion as personal 
as opposed to religion as a social manifestation. Or, as he will also characterize it, his 
concern is the individual's communion with the divine, that which is personal and 
inward. Religion for James is "the feelings, acts, and experiences of individual men in 
24
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their solitude, so far as they apprehend themselves to stand in relation to whatever they 
9 < 
may consider the divine." The divine for James is interpreted broadly as denoting any 
object that is godlike, whether it is a concrete deity or not. Thus, he includes in his 
category of religion and the religious Buddhism and Ralph Waldo Emerson's 
transcendentalism. 
James, however, does reject all forms of fetishism and magic, as well as Stoicism, 
the latter which he deems simple personal morality. For James, the truly religious person, 
as in the case of the Christian, is motivated by "the spirit of the universe" to endure life's 
trials and tribulations. The stoic/moralist, however, accepts what is because it is. Again, 
one can see in James's logic, resonances of Schleiermacher. Both James and 
Schleiermacher are rejecting the limits to which Kant circumscribed religion, and they 
are doing so by an appeal to religious experience. 
James next goes on to explore the reality of the unseen, noting that the unseen can 
have an incredible impact on a person, though it is not a matter of perception by one's 
ordinary senses. He frames his discourse, once more, in terms of experience - the 
experience of "something there." He relates this both to accounts of persons experiencing 
a presence when alone in a room and to accounts of people having mystical experiences 
where the divine seems real to them. 
Over the next several lectures, James goes on to identify two kinds of attitudes 
associated with people who have powerful religious experiences: pessimism and 
optimism, the former being of much greater interest to him. He is particularly intrigued 
by the Sick Soul, the soul that is aware of sin in his or herself as well as evil in the world. 
25
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Such individuals often experience profound depression, but it is accompanied by a desire 
to make sense of things. Such individuals, according to James, are found in the religions 
of the twice born, the religions that are non-naturalistic and associated with creeds of 
mysticism, renunciation, and inwardness. These are distinct from the religions of the once 
born, the religions of the primitive that are coarse, orgiastic, revivalist, and bloody. 
It is important to note that for generations of religion scholars who followed 
James, mysticism becomes almost synonymous with religious experience. For James and 
his intellectual successors, mysticism is the prototypical religious experience as it is 
rooted in states of consciousness, and represents something beyond our ordinary 
perception. Particularly significant for James and others are also the unitive aspects, the 
sense of being apart or at one with the transcendent. James comes to identify four 
distinct attributes or characteristics common to mystical experiences: ineffability - the 
subject of the mystical experience is not capable of describing the experience; noetic -
the subject claims to have experienced a revelation or revelations, to have acquired new 
knowledge through non-rational means, transience - the experience is relatively short 
lived, and passivity - the subject does not possess control over what transpires as a part 
of the mystical experience. However, James does note that not all mystical experiences 
are the same; rather, they may be characterized as representing a continuum with respect 
to mystical consciousness, from drug-induced states to cosmic consciousness where one 
is "one with the absolute." 
As in the case of Schleiermacher, there is veracity of feeling and intuition that 
exceeds that of reason for James. Thus, in his eighteenth lecture, he explores the 
19 
relationship between philosophy and personal religious experience. For James, the former 
is subordinate to the latter. 
I do believe that feeling is the deeper source of religion, and that 
philosophic and theological formulas are secondary products, like 
translations of a text into another tongue.27 
Subsequently, he proffers several examples to show that reason is subordinate to feeling. 
Indeed, referring to the existence of God, he goes over various philosophical proofs, and 
contends that they do no more than corroborate pre-existing belief in the matter. Thus, 
again he maintains that the essence of religion is feeling, not thought. 
The emphasis on experience would also be vital in Rudolph Otto's pioneering 
work The Idea of the Holy: An Inquiry into the Non-Rational Factor in the Idea of the 
Divine and Its Relation to the Rational.28 Once more, one can see that a principle 
antagonist in this scenario is Kant, because of the constraints he imposes on knowledge 
and reason. Thus, in his foreword, Otto proclaims that he has ventured to write "of that 
which may be called 'non-rational' or 'supra-rational' in the depths of the divine nature." 
He goes on to state that his book is "a serious attempt to analyse exactly the feeling which 
remains where the concept fails, and to introduce a terminology which is not any more 
9Q 
loose or indeterminate for having necessarily to make use of symbols." Otto goes on to 
say that religion is not exclusively contained and exhaustively comprised in any series of 
"rational" assertions. 
Otto goes on to assert that religion is born in a personal experience of the 
'Numen,' the 'sacred,' or the "the holy." This experience for Otto is one that he describes 
27
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as a "unique original feeling-response which can be in itself ethically neutral and claims 
consideration in its own right." As was the case with Schleiermacher and James, the 
ethical aspects as well as the rational schematization of religion as dogma and doctrine 
comes later. Otto goes on to describe this experience in terms of creature feeling which 
he defines as "the emotion of a creature, submerged and overwhelmed by its own 
31 
nothingness in contrast to what is supreme above all creatures." 
32 
Phenomenologically, the numinous is felt as objective and outside the self. As to 
the nature and modes of manifestation of the sacred, Otto attempts to capture its 
complexity in the now famous nomenclature, mysterium tremendum et fascinans.33 The 
sacred has an aspect, the tremendum, that is terrifying, that is repulsive or repellent, that 
is kratophonic and awe-filled. However, as fascinans, the sacred draws one to it. It is 
attractive and compelling. 
In the twentieth century, perhaps the most prominent exponent of this tradition 
was the historian of religions and religious comparativist Mircea Eliade. Considered by 
many to have inaugurated the modern comparative study of religion as well as playing a 
most important role in the development of religious studies in the academy, his 
understanding of religion and religious experience is most prescient. 
In 1954, two years before coming to the United States at the prompting of 
Joachim Wach (director of the History of Religions department at the University of 
Chicago) to give the Haskell Lectures, and four years before actually assuming the chair 
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of the History of Religions department at Chicago, Eliade published The Myth of the 
Eternal Return: Or, Cosmos and History. In this work, which Eliade confesses the strong 
temptation to give the subtitle Introduction to a Philosophy of History, he states that it is 
his intention to examine the fundamental concepts of archaic societies. In so doing, 
however, the reader is introduced to Eliade's understanding of the sacred which 
subsequently informs his understanding of religious experience, i.e. the sacred being the 
objective of religious experience. 
Eliade maintains that archaic ontologies, or rather, the conceptions of being and 
reality associated with archaic or "primitive" human beings, are given in their myths, 
rituals, and rites. Further, it is his contention that through a concerted effort of discerning 
and interpretation - the task of the historian of religions - a certain metaphysical position 
is presented. Indeed, though not couched in the words associated with philosophy, some 
thing is revealed.34 
Eliade goes on to assert that for the archaic or primitive man, objects and actions 
are only real to the extent that they participate in a transcendent reality. For example, 
Eliade states 
Among countless stones, one stone becomes sacred - and hence instantly 
becomes saturated with being - because it constitutes a hierophany... The 
object appears as the receptacle of an exterior force that differentiates it 
from its milieu and gives it meaning and value. This force may reside in 
35 the substance of the object or in its form. 
For Eliade, a hierophany is the breakthrough of the sacred into human experience, 
i.e. a revelation. Such appearances or eruptions of the sacred define spatial and temporal 
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reality. The human beings capacity to apprehend such events leads Eliade to characterize 
them as homo religiosus. Indeed, for Eliade, there is the real sense that human beings do 
not construct their world so much as they discover, recognize, and orient themselves in 
relation to the sacred, the real, and the transcendent.36 
As stated earlier, such understandings are held and conveyed in terms of myths, 
rituals, and symbols. The sacred is associated with primordial reality that is allied with 
the gods, ancestors, or heroes of archaic peoples. Eliade ascribes to these deities and 
divines the nomenclature of archetypes. It is these beings who are held to have ordered 
the world. Human time and space, if they are to be meaningful, must reflect and be 
oriented in relation to the given. Conformity to archetypes is what constitutes being and 
the real. 
The outstanding reality is the sacred; for only the sacred is in an absolute 
fashion, acts effectively, creates things and makes them endure. The 
innumerable gestures of consecration - of tracts and territories, of objects, 
of men, etc. - reveal the primitive's obsession with the real, his thirst for 
being.37 
In terms of the spatial or territoriality, Eliade emphasizes the concept of the 
center. He asserts that the center is the preeminent zone of the sacred, the zone of 
absolute reality, and the axis mundi, the place where heaven and earth meet. Sacred 
places such as mountains, temples, even communities and homes are oriented in terms of 
the sacred center. 
With respect to time, Eliade characterizes archaic and primitive societies in many 
respects as atemporal. The sacred coincides with the mythical time of the beginning {in 
illo tempore, ab origine). Rituals and rites are understood to connect and return one to the 
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beginning. This is clearly seen for Eliade in myths of eternal return and myths of the 
Golden Age. It is also reflected in the sacrality of various periods and seasons. Again, the 
human's way of being in the world is legitimized through adherence to and replication of 
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an extrahuman model. For example, the sacrifice performed at the building of the house 
is simply the imitation, on the human plane, of the sacrifice performed in illo tempore to 
give birth to the world. 
According to Eliade, that which opposes the sacred is the profane, defined as all 
that has no mythical meaning, which lacks exemplary models, and in some sense, lacks 
reality. It is for this reason, notes Eliade, that archaic peoples set themselves in 
opposition, by every means in their power, to the idea of history as a succession of events 
that are irreversible, unforeseeable, possessed of autonomous value. To be a part of 
history is not to follow the exemplary model; it is to enter the realm of the profane, of 
chaos, of despair, amor fati, and pessimism. 
Critics of the Tradition 
Over the course of the last several decades, there has been a growing body of 
scholarship that has come to challenge the classical interpretation of religious experience 
articulated above, the tradition that stretches from Schleiermacher to Eliade. Of particular 
concern is the assertion that these experiences can be characterized as immediate 
perceptions of "something" and that this something is universally and unambiguously 
identified as the sacred, the numinous, the holy, or the infinite. One example of some 
note is the work of Steven T. Katz, Mysticism and Philosophical Analysis. Another, and 
for the purpose of my project perhaps the most influential is Wayne Proudfoot and his 
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seminal text Religious Experience. In this work, Proudfoot deconstructs one of the central 
tenets of the classical tradition, namely the notion of unmediated experiences. 
Beginning with Schleiermacher, Proudfoot notes that his methodology has had a 
profound impact on modern religious thought (theology, philosophy of religion, the 
history of religions), an impact/influence that persists to this day. Even those scholars 
who reject his construction of religion as autonomous and associated with a 
sense/intuition of the infinite or as a feeling of absolute dependence utilize similar 
arguments to defend "the irreducible character of religious experience construed as the 
experience of the sacred, or as limit experience, or of religious language, practice, or 
doctrine."39 
According to Proudfoot, Schleiermacher was the earliest and most systematic 
proponent of the autonomy of religious experience. Schleiermacher contributes to the 
tradition in which religious experience is understood primarily as affective experience 
and is differentiated from both intellect and will, the tradition that is carried forward in 
the work of William James and Rudolf Otto.40 Indeed, according to Proudfoot, 
Schleiermacher wants to distinguish religion as a third autonomous region of human 
experience - different from science and morality. In this sense, I would assert that 
Schleiermacher presages Mircea Eliade's attribution of the human being as homo 
religiosus. 
Piety, does indeed, linger with satisfaction on every action that is from 
God, and every activity that reveals the Infinite in the finite, and yet it is 
not itself this activity. Only by keeping quite outside the range both of 
science and of practice can it maintain its proper sphere and character. 
Only when piety takes its place alongside of science and practice, as a 
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necessary, an indispensable third, as their natural counterpart, not less in 
worth and in splendour than either, will the common field be altogether 
occupied and human nature on this side complete.41 
Proudfoot notes, however, that Schleiermacher's understanding of the nature of 
religious experience as independent, has come under serious scrutiny by philosophers and 
psychologists who have shown that the extent to which one ascribes emotions as well as 
identifying one's own mental or bodily state is dependent on "a complex set of beliefs 
and grammatical rules."42 In other words, moments of experience are dependent on 
particular concepts, beliefs, practices, and grammar (language). Informed here 
particularly by the philosophical tradition of Wittgenstein, Proudfoot is effectively 
arguing that all experiences are mediated, that we do not come to any experience as 
tabula rasa, that we are always already situated historically, culturally, socially, and that 
this shapes all of our experiences. There is no such thing as a raw or pure experience. 
This critique directly addresses what I refer to earlier as the epistemological issue 
with respect to the phenomenon of religious experience. How does one know what he/she 
knows? What actually transpires in the event of perception of the sacred, in the 
experience of the religious? I note that the epistemological issue pertaining to human 
experience is also a concern in the continental philosophical tradition and is eloquently 
expressed in the work of Martin Heidegger. In his monumental work, Being and Time, 
Heidegger states that one of the existential/essential structures of Dasein (human 
beingness) is throwness. Dasein finds itself already in a world. It is always already 
enmeshed in a history, a culture, engaged in practices, pursuing projects. There is no 
pure, unmediated experience. 
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Proudfoot notes that this failing of Schleiermacher's program is not due to naivete 
but rather on the confusion and ambiguity of descriptive analysis and explanatory 
commitments with respect to religious experience. The insistence on describing religious 
experience from the subject's point of view, the stress on the reality of the intentional 
object of an experience for the person who has the experience (the veridical issue to 
which I shall return to again later), the avoidance of reductionism, and the distinction 
between descriptive and explanatory tasks are all critical for the study of religion.43 
Again, insistence on immediacy of religious experience may be descriptively 
accurate, but not theoretically (explanatorily) inaccurate. From the perspective of the 
subject, the experience appears to be immediate and noninferential, but it is dependent on 
the availability of particular concepts, beliefs, and practices. Unfortunately, "[t]his 
confusion between the phenomenological and theoretical senses of immediate is central 
to Schleiermacher's program."44 
This is not to say that there is not much to commend in Schleiermacher's analysis 
of religious experience. For example, Schleiermacher's theory of religious experience is 
amenable to polytheistic, pantheistic, as well as non-theistic perspectives or at least is 
open to an understanding of ultimate reality that is heterogeneous and variegated. Further, 
in the description of religious experience, Schleiermacher's language is extremely 
evocative, embracing a range of human experience from joy to sorrow, ecstasy and 
suffering, freedom and constraint. Indeed, Tillich observes that Schleiermacher captures 
even the erotic dimension of religious experience.45 
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Moreover, from Schleiermacher, one is introduced to the notion that religious 
statements are neither prepositional truth nor do they represent some ultimate 
transcendent norm. Rather they are relative and particular. This means there is no generic 
form of religion and each form religion takes needs to be understood in its historical, 
social, cultural, and geographical contexts.46 
Schleiermacher's failure, as mentioned earlier, is his commitment to unmediated 
experience. This has been challenged, in my opinion successfully. There is no such thing 
as an unmediated experience, at least in the sense that Schleiermacher sought. We bring 
to all experience a metanarrative through which we encounter and interpret the world. We 
then come to understanding or making meaning in relation to this narrative. 
Proudfoot asserts that the move to experience as witness in the likes of 
Schleiermacher, James, Otto, and Eliade, was an attempt to protect and provide a defense 
for religion as such a significant aspect of human beingness against various forms 
scientific and philosophical critique, and to secure religion's claim to being sui generis A1 
Yet, I hold with Proudfoot, that explanative reduction is unavoidable with respect to 
religious experience, even among adherents and participants. Proudfoot shows that the 
very language used to describe such experiences is predicated on preexisting concepts 
such as "the infinite" or "absolute dependence." To the extent that they are not, one can 
say that the nomenclature is empty, meaningless, serving as a little more than a 
placeholder. 
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However, Proudfoot does make what I find to be an important distinction between 
explanative reduction and descriptive reduction. According to Proudfoot, 
Descriptive reduction is the failure to identify an emotion, practice, or 
experience under the description by which the subject identifies it. This is 
indeed unacceptable. To describe an experience in nonreligious terms 
when the subject himself [sic] describes it in religious terms is to 
misidentify the experience or to attend to another experience altogether. . . 
. To describe the experience of a mystic by reference only to alpha waves, 
altered heart rate, and changes in bodily temperature is to misdescribe it. 
To characterize the experience of a Hindu mystic in terms drawn from the 
Christian tradition is to misidentify it. In each of these instances, the 
subject's identifying experience has been reduced to something other than 
48 that experienced by the subject. 
Conversely, 
Explanatory reduction consists in offering an explanation of an 
experience in terms that are not those of the subject and that might not 
meet with his [or her] approval. This is perfectly justifiable and is, in fact, 
normal procedure. The explanandum is set in a new context, whether that 
be one of covering laws and initial conditions, narrative structure, or some 
other explanatory model. The terms of the explanation need not be 
familiar or acceptable to the subject. Historians offer explanations of past 
events by employing such concepts as socialization, ideology, means of 
production, and feudal economy. Seldom can these concepts properly be 
ascribed to the people whose behavior is the object of the historian's study. 
But that poses no problem. The explanation stands or falls according to 
how well it can account for all the available evidence.49 
In other words, in investigating religious experience, how an event or 
phenomenon appears to the participant must be taken seriously, thereby avoiding 
descriptive reduction. On the other hand, the scholar/investigator is free to give her/his 
own explanation with respect to the phenomenon or event in question.50 
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This I see as an appropriate via media with respect to the analysis of this complex 
category of experience. Human beingness as well as religion is always fundamentally 
social and historically and culturally situated, and this must be taken into consideration in 
the analysis of experience just as other critical tools from history, sociology, 
anthropology, and literature, have been useful analyzing, interpreting, and explaining this 
religion. 
Substantive Understanding vs. Functionalist Explanation 
It is interesting to note that the failings pointed out by Proudfoot are particular 
associated with what might be referred to as a strictly substantive understanding of 
religion as opposed to functional explanative theories of religion. As articulated by 
Daniel L. Pals, in his classic text, Seven Theories of Religion,51 theories that tend to 
explain religion intellectually, in terms of ideas that motivate, move, and inspire people 
are substantive. In such theories, religion is understood in terms of the conceptual 
content, or ideas to which persons profess allegiance. "People are religious...because 
certain ideas strike them as true and valuable." Religions are accepted by people; "they 
53 
are about things that 'have meaning' to human selves." Thus, interpretations taking into 
account human intent/volition provide the best understanding of the phenomenon. 
Explanatory approaches are deemed inappropriate because they appeal to seemingly 
impersonal processes rather than human purpose, volition, or consciousness. 
description is translatable. To state it differently, the participant should be able to identify the scholars 
account as faithful to event in which they partook. 
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Conversely, functional theories involve explanatory approaches to understanding 
human phenomena. Indeed, theorists in this tradition would assert that their 
methodologies are able to "look beneath and behind the conscious thoughts of religious 
people to find something deeper and hidden."54 Theorists that fall within this category are 
those who look at social structures and/or psychological factors that they contend are the 
underpinnings of religious behavior. 
In the field of religious studies, substantive theories are associated with names 
such as Schleiermacher, James, Otto, and Eliade. Among African American religionists, 
who are the focus of Chapter 2, the designation of substantive theorist would apply to 
both a theologian like James H. Cone, as well as a historian of religion like Charles H. 
Long. As I have begun to demonstrate, however, such theories are fraught with numerous 
pitfalls whether one is making claims about some transcendent Other or human 
consciousness. 
With respect to the functionalist approaches, it has been most closely associated 
with social scientist such as Emile Durkheim but is also applicable to a scholar such as 
Sigmund Freud. In the case of Durkheim, religion is understood as a unified system of 
beliefs and practices relative to sacred things, that is to say, things set apart and 
forbidden, which unite all those who adhere to them into a moral community called a 
"church." Durkheim referred to the mood associated with the attendant feeling of 
belonging as effervescence. On the other hand, Freud characterized religion as the 
universal, obsessional neurosis of humankind - the fulfillment of the oldest, strongest, 
and most urgent of humanity's wishes. Perhaps two of the classic examples that are 
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associated with functionalism, however, are the approaches to the study of religion and 
religious experience of Karl Marx and Georges Bataille. 
Marx comes from the tradition of the left Hegelians, such as Feuerbach and is 
particularly interested in the development of concepts such as alienation. As a hermeneut, 
Marx makes several moves that will separate him from Schleiermacher. First, he is a 
dialectical materialist, which means that he makes a turn to the social and the economic 
instead of consciousness. Whereas Hegel talked about alienation of Geist, and Feuerbach 
talked about alienation of species consciousness, Marx talks about how people are 
alienated from their labor. This is the primary social phenomenon for him, where a matter 
like religion is epiphenomenal, and a component of the social superstructure. Thus for 
Marx, religion and religious experience are effects or manifestations of other social 
forces. 
When Marx looks at how religion functions in society, he categorizes it as an 
ideology, one which often legitimizes the status quo. In addition, Marx famously 
characterizes religion as the sigh of the oppressed creature, the heart of a heartless world, 
and the spirit of a spiritless condition. It is "the opium of the people (des Volkes)." In 
other words, it often fulfills the role of a palliative. It can make life bearable, but, for 
Marx, this is a negative, because the masses do not challenge the system of oppression. 
As an experience then, it is the experience that perpetuates social and economic 
alienation. 
In Theory o f Religion, written in 1948 but first published in 1973, Georges 
Bataille defines the essence of religion as the search for lost intimacy. This impulse, this 
quest to "return to intimacy" is associated with a desire to (re)establish "immanence 
between man and the world, between subject and object."55 With the development of a 
capacity to make distinctions, human beings perceive a discontinuity between themselves 
and some other, some thing. Thus, asserts Bataille the world of animality is now forever 
closed to human beings. Yet, it grasps them with "all the fascination of the sacred world, 
as against the poverty of the profane."56 Simultaneously, humans also oppose the "opaque 
aggregate" of the sacred, preferring instead a "clear world" of things. 
Thus for Bataille, the sacred is associated with immanence and intimacy for 
which there is kind of nostalgia for human beings, as well as the undifferentiated, and 
chaotic which elicits dread. Reminiscent of Otto's mysterium tremendum et fascinans, 
there is that about the sacred for Bataille that both attracts and repels. Notes Bataille, 
.. .man feels a kind of impotent horror in the sense of the sacred. This 
horror is ambiguous. Undoubtedly, what is sacred attracts and possess an 
incomparable value, but at the same time, it appears vertiginously 
dangerous for that clear and profane world where mankind situates its 
57 
privileged domain. 
Bataille goes on to assert that there is a general economy structured around the 
human beings attempt to regain this lost intimacy. It is in this context that Bataille 
explores the function of sacrifice, festival, carnival, and potlatch. According to Bataille, 
such rituals are associated with the consumption or waste of that which has use value. In 
such free, excessive, even violent and destructive acts, archaic humans attempted to 
transcend the profane realm, to cross over from the order of things to the intimate order. 
As noted by Jill Robbins, it is helpful here to place Bataille in the context of his reading 
of Hegel, especially as it came to him through the lectures of Alexandre Kojeve, which 
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interpreted Hegel's concept of negativity as a "passage through death." Such 
transcendence, notes Bataille, is provisional and inconclusive. 
With the rise of the military order, and the move toward empire, Bataille 
maintains that there is a change in consciousness that brings about a "profound alteration 
in the representation of the world" in dualism. Reflective thought, notes Bataille, creates 
moral rules that insure the order of things. It thus opposes destruction and useless 
consumption. This necessitates a "shifting of the borders of the sacred and the profane. 
Whereas the sacred realm of the intimate order possessed both beneficent/pure elements 
as well as malefic/impure elements [as sacer which has the connotation of soiled as well 
as holy]59, both distant from the profane; the malefic becomes associated with the 
profane. It is here that Bataille introduces the notion of a secondary transcendence that 
involves the breaking away from the sensuous world. 
As a theory of religion, Bataille's is explanatory. In this, it bears much in common 
with Marx, as one would expect of a theory predicated on a general economy. Further, 
there are clearly structuralist influences present in Bataille that might trace to the 
inspiration of Marcel Mauss on his thought. Such structuralism places Bataille in 
opposition to the "phenomenological" tradition's trust in the evidence of consciousness; 
e.g., Schleiermacher, Otto, James, and Eliade. Indeed, with structuralists such as Louis 
Althusser and Claude Levi-Strauss, I would contend that Bataille holds to the position 
that invariant unconscious structures underlie human experience. 
Thus, the sacred is not a thing for Bataille, i.e., there is no there there for Bataille. 
With Bataille, one is clearly not dealing with the Kant's noumenon, the thing-in-itself, or 
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being as such. Nor is one dealing with Schleiermacher's ' Whence' or Otto's 'sacred' or 
'holy.' Rather, for Bataille, the sacred is an 'artifact' of how human beings construct 
meaning in their encounter with the world. 
It is important at this juncture, however, for me to note that the schematization of 
substantive interpretation and functional explanation is by no means absolute. As a 
system of categorization, its impact is not ubiquitous across disciplines that engage in the 
study of religion and religious experience. Indeed, while there continues to often be a 
sharp line of demarcation between the two in the field of religious studies and theology, 
the same is not the case for anthropologists and sociologists of religion. 
For example, one of the fore parents of the social sciences, Max Weber, is often 
characterized by those in the field of religious studies as the quintessential functionalists. 
However, this is not consistent with how Weber himself saw his own work. In reality, in 
his study of the role of religion in sweeping social and cultural transformation, Weber 
often dealt with conceptual issues in addition to social practices.60 The same is certainly 
the case of one of the greatest sociologists of religion in the twentieth century, Clifford 
Geertz. Geertz's is well-known for his assertion of religion as 
a system of symbols that act to establish powerful, pervasive, and long-
lasting moods and motivations in men [sic] ... by formulating conceptions 
of a general order of existence and ... clothing these conceptions with 
such an aura of factuality that ... the mood and motivations seem uniquely 
realistic.61 
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Indeed, one of the most troubling aspects of the study of religious experience 
within the field of religious studies has been what I feel to be a premature dismissal of 
what other methodological approaches from the social sciences. Indeed, in many respects, 
religious studies remains mired in a debate between humanities and social sciences as the 
proper domain for the study of religion. 
It was Wilhelm Dilthey who was the first to assert or attempt to describe the 
different ways and approaches to investigation of the so-called Geisteswissenschaften, the 
human sciences, over against the Naturwissenschaften or the natural sciences. It was his 
contention that the former differed from the latter in that they were engaged in 
interpretation while the latter was to be concerned with explanation. In the German, the 
distinction is often characterized as the distinction between Verstehen (understanding 
obtained through the tools of interpretation such as hermeneutics to arrive at meaning) 
and Erklarung (explanation obtained through the functional analysis). 
However, utilizing the work of Proudfoot, I believe it is the case that apparent that 
"explanation" is unavoidable whether one purports to be a substantivist or functionalist. 
Moreover, the social sciences need not be viewed as anymore reductionist than the 
humanities. Thus, it is my contention that the best in the sense of being the most 
comprehensive as well as compelling theories of religious experience, must take into 
consideration the material conditions and social forces that impinge upon one's 
community of concern, i.e., functional theories of religion. 
In looking at various theories of religious experience, it is also the case that very 
few deal with the concept of the body. Again, perhaps owing to a tradition that is 
enmeshed in idealism of spirit, mind, and consciousness, and thus more comfortable with 
36 
concepts and questions of perception, the role of the body in terms of religious 
experience has been overlooked. 
One exception of note is the work of Paula Cooey and her important work 
entitled, Religious Imagination and the Body: A Feminists Analysis.62 Paula Cooey 
defines religion functionally as a reciprocating artifact of human culture that is a product 
of human imagination that in turn shapes future ways of imagining. She notes that 
religious adherents attribute extra-cultural or supernatural origin, power, and reality to the 
central symbols governing religious systems. This introduces the substantive element into 
an otherwise functional definition. The introduction of transcendence associated with 
religious symbol systems distinguishes them from other such systems that are studied by 
other disciplines. Yet, religious systems are thoroughly embedded in the cultures in 
which they are located. 
It is here that Cooey introduces turns to the body and the role it plays as object of 
and vehicle for the social construction of reality. Indeed, the more one studies the role of 
the body, the clearer the inseparability of knowledge, value, and power becomes. 
This inseparability makes inescapable the perspectival character of all 
claims to knowledge; it intimately links knower and known to the 
particular historical, material context in which the knowing relation 
occurs.63 
Relying on the work of various sociologists of knowledge, particularly Elaine 
Scarry's The Body in Pain, Cooey defines the body as a social construct that provides the 
framework for the way we experience the world. 
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Thus, 
Any claims to a knowledge gained directly through sentience or 
experience in ways that circumvent culture or society arise from 
misunderstanding not only the inseparability of our experience from the 
social context in which it occurs, but also the dominance of social or 
cultural symbol in the relation between experience and historical context.64 
She goes on to note how scholars as well as adherents wrestle with the issue of the 
epistemological authority of the body as it relates to religious experience, particularly 
religious feeling. Cooey shows the role of religion in mapping the relationship between 
the body as a "site" (location or medium for the production of knowledge) and "sign" 
(culturally generated artifact). Mapping here is understood as "a metaphor for a highly 
pluri-vocal and reciprocal social process in which individual persons participate. The 
process is furthermore multidirectional and includes potential and actual resistance at all 
levels as one of its features."651 will make reference again to Cooey later in my 
characterization of African American religious experience as oppositional practice. 
Justification 
In the wake of the critique of the classical traditions understanding of religious 
experience, one would think that both the epistemological issue as well as the veridical 
issue would be essentially moot, at least with respect to philosophy of religion. However, 
there has been resurgence in the study of religious experience from a somewhat 
64
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surprising area, namely analytical philosophy. Over the last decade, there have been a 
number of books written by analytic philosophers that look at religious experience as 
evidence for the existence of God. These works include: William Alston's Perceiving 
God: The Epistemology of Religious Experienced Richard Swinburne's Is There a God61 
(TO 
and The Existence of God, Caroline Franks Davis's The Evidential Force of Religious 
Experience,69 Keith E. Yandell's The Epistemology of Religious Experience,70 and 
Jerome Gellman's Experience of God and the Rationality ofTheistic Belief71 
As noted by William P. Alston, philosophy of religion as well as philosophy of 
the mind is interested in religious experience as a possible source of knowledge of the 
existence, nature and doings of God. While the experiences in question seem to their 
possessors to be direct, perceptual awareness of God, they may be wrong. Indeed, many 
philosophers would hold that such is the case. According to Alston, many philosophers 
judge such experiences with great skepticism, asserting that no one has a "veridical 
experience of the presence and/or activity of God." Alston notes, however, that within 
philosophical convention, such experiences may be deemed veridical following the 
principle that any apparent experience of something is to be regarded as veridical unless 
one has sufficient reasons to the contrary. Alston comments, "If we do not accept that 
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principle, we will never have sufficient grounds for taking any experience to be veridical 
72 
- religious, sensory or whatever." 
Conversely, critics of this perspective contend that one does not have the same 
capacity for intersubjective checks of religious experiences that obtain with sense 
perceptions. To such an assertion, however, Alston challenges the supposition that sense 
perception represents the only way in which we can achieve genuine cognitive contact 
with objective reality. Other scholars assert that religious experience can be adequately 
explained by psychological and social factors, without bringing God into the picture. 
Again, Alston challenges the supposition by positing, "even if this-worldly factors are the 
only immediate causes of the experience, God could figure as a cause farther back in the 
causal chain." Finally, there are those who maintain that inconsistencies and/or 
contradictions between alleged experiences of God provide sufficient reason for doubting 
the "object" of religious experience. Yet, again, Alston raises the possibility that any 
number of people may well be experiencing a common reality, though they disagree in 
their characterization of their experience. Indeed, Alston notes that such is not an 
uncommon occurrence in the realm of sense perception. 
One of the most eloquent responses to the contemporary challenge to coming 
from analytic philosophers and philosophers of mind is that of Matthew Bagger. A 
student of Wayne Proudfoot, in his work, Religious Experience, Justification, and 
History73, Bagger deals with religious experience in terms of its relation to explanation 
" William P. Alston, "Religious Experience" in Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, vol. 8. Edited by 
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but also the validity of its use with respect to providing information about God or the 
sacred, and the justification of belief there in. 
Bagger is particularly interested in the use of extraordinary experiences; which 
goes back to Schleiermacher, James, Otto, and Eliade; being appropriated by 
contemporary scholars to defend theistic beliefs. As in the case with Proudfoot, Bagger 
notes that there is a difference between phenomenological immediacy and epistemic 
immediacy.74 
Bagger's refutation regarding the use of religious experiences as rationally 
justifying religious beliefs is predicated on what he maintains is the proper understanding 
of experience and justification. As one would suspect, from a student of Proudfoot, the 
issue at least in part is associated again with perception and explanation. Moreover, 
Bagger goes on to add the issue of historical context as something that is ignored in the 
newer philosophical approaches to religious experience. 
As in the case of his mentor, Bagger maintains that much of the newer scholarship 
seems to be of an apologetic character, and subsequently there is once more that 
marginalization of explanation (explanatory reduction). Bagger asserts this scholarship 
evinces the view that attending to explanatory element in religious phenomena provides a 
window of opportunity to unsympathetic characterizations of religion or the religious. 
Bagger also contends that the analytical style of the afore mentioned scholarship 
in part explains the absence and lack of attention give to historical, linguistic, and cultural 
context. Bagger makes an important claim and commitment to historicism. Though 
cognizant that this term is fraught with difficulty and is often quite misunderstood due to 
the various ways in which it is deployed, Bagger's understanding is similar to that of 
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Jeffrey Stout, namely "the rationality of a given person's beliefs or actions is relative to 
the reasons or reasoning available to the person. And the availability of reasons and 
reasoning varies with historical and social context."75 
Indeed, Bagger maintains that explanation is the paramount factor in both the 
production of experience and the justification of beliefs. Explanation is fundamental to 
the epistemic character of an era. Thus, Bagger argues that while religious experience 
might have justified religious beliefs in the past, this cannot obtain in the modern or 
postmodern context. It is the case, however, that this may contradict a culture or 
communities expressed commitments and values. Nevertheless, he proffers, "The implicit 
religious explanation of religious experience no longer represents the best explanation of 
the event experience religiously."76 While it may be the case that supernatural 
explanations may be acceptable in some context or setting, it is certainly not to be the 
case in all. 
What is more, Bagger goes on to make the claim that the supernatural has become 
77 
explanatorily otiose. In other words, as a category, it has no legitimate application as an 
explanation of particular events within the mundane order, within the world of the 
everyday. He therefore views its recent reappearance among philosophers of religion as 
at best intellectual laziness, and at worse, cowardice. Invoking Charles Pierce's "integrity 
of belief is more wholesome than any particular belief one might give up", Bagger holds 
that we should not seek to protect one subset of our beliefs and values from others. 
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With respect to use of religious experience as justification for the existence of 
some transcendent, supernatural, reality or entity, I am in agreement with Bagger. Thus, 
for the purpose of this study, the veridical nature of religious experience will not be a 
matter of examination or dispute. With respect to the objective of this study, religious 
experience is inclusive of all events which I refer to as primordial experiences of reality, 
or that which is deemed to be "the real" or "true." It is also for this reason that this project 
is not theological in any of conventional sense of the word. By this I mean that 
methodologically, I am adopting agnostic position with respect to the profession of 
attributes of the real or the sacred. Indeed, it is my contention that real is opaque. One 
may study religious dogma, doctrine, symbols, or ritual, but no matter how they are 
represented, construed, and interpreted, one cannot fully grasp or apprehend them. In this 
sense, as mentioned earlier, the sacred or the real is excessive, full, abundant, highly 
charged, and power-full. 
Faith vs. Religious Experience 
A term which is somewhat related to the concept of religious experience is that of 
faith. Unfortunately, it is a concept that in many respects is just as complex and varied in 
definition. John Hicks, in Faith and Knowledge, states the study of the nature of faith 
refers to study of the "epistemological character of man's cognition or delusion, 
apprehension or misapprehension of God." In this sense, faith is used to represent the 
manner and structure of a person's supposed awareness of the ultimate reality, the 
infinite, the divine, or "God."78 
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Important in Hick's articulation of the nature of faith is that he once more 
introduces the concept of experience. As such, his query, as well as the orientation of I 
adopt in my own line of argumentation, is one distinct from and relatively independent of 
the ontological question about the existence of God. In this sense, it is a 
phenomenological discourse. Whether or not there exists a God, a great portion of 
humanity report having experienced and/or encountered "God." Thus, while for the 
theist, inquiry into the nature of faith may fall within the classic articulation fides 
quaerens intellectum, Hick notes that this inquiry is possible whatever the disposition 
7Q 
(agnostic, atheist, or humanist) of the scholar involved. 
According to Hicks, faith is employed both as an epistemological and 
nonepistemological expression. Hick notes that the words fides and fiducia "provide 80 
conveniently self-explanatory labels for the two uses. Further, Hick asserts that as he 
articulates it, this phenomenon obtains for theists and nontheists alike. 
While the term faith has its proponents, for the purpose of my discourse and in 
keeping with the convention in the field, I will retain the use of the term religious 
experience. However, given the observations and insights gained in the discourse thus 
far, I proffer the following definition: religious experience is best defined as any 
experience (understood as an event that one lives through either as a participant or an 
observer and about which one is conscious or aware) in which what is experienced by the 
person is taken to be an encounter with the "real" or "true. " Depending on one's 
79
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tradition, this is may be referred to as God (a representative of God, or other 
81 
theophanies), Nature, the Ground, the Ultimate, the Infinite, or the self 
Summary 
In this chapter, as the title would suggest, it has been my intent to provide an 
overview of the religious experience as it has come to be understood in religious studies. 
In so doing, I have raised two important issues which I have referred to as the 
epistemological issue and the veridical issue that have to a great extent formed and 
informed the discourse around the phenomenon of religious experience. I subsequently 
rehearsed the development of what I refer to as the classic tradition's understanding of 
religious experience through the major historical figures of Schleiermacher, James, Otto, 
and Eliade as well as making reference to what I characterized as a contemporary 
resurgence of interest in religious experience from an unlikely quarter, namely analytic 
philosophy. 
I then offered a critique of the classic tradition as well as the contemporary 
variation, utilizing the work of Proudfoot and Bagger. I also attempted to address the 
specter of "reductionism" raised by Proudfoot, but whose roots go back further to the 
distinction made between the humanities and the social sciences. In particular, I called 
attention to the supposed sharp line of demarcation between the substantive interpretive 
form of inquire and investigation and the functional explanative form of analysis. Once 
more, a careful examination of not only the history of the supposed dispute reveals that to 
a great extent no such schism is held universally to exist, moreover, I would contend that 
81
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a more robust and comprehensive understanding of religious experience comes by 
utilizing the theoretical and methodological insights associated with both approaches. 
The benefit of such an orientation is evinced in the work of Paula Cooey. Finally, after a 
quick reference to the term faith, I presented my definition of religious experience, the 
definition that will be the referent for all subsequent discussion on religious experience to 
follow. 
Further, the principle function of this chapter is as groundwork for the discourse 
ahead. While much more will be said in subsequent chapters with respect to the 
questions of theory and methodology, the trajectory of this project, namely the 
development of a postmodern 'theory" of African American religious experience must be 
framed with respect to the larger tradition. For example, as I mentioned in the section of 
this chapter dealing with substantive interpretation as opposed to functional explanation, 
the dominant orientation among African American religionist who have reflected on 
religious experience has been informed by the former, and therefore suffer from many if 
not all the failings pointed out above. Conversely, my approach is fundamentally 
interdisciplinary and heterological. Indeed, counter to most of my predecessors in African 
American religious studies, a majority of my analysis is indebted to functionalist theories 
and methodologies associated with the social sciences, while also deploying tools 
associated with humanistic approaches (interpretive, hermeneutical), and philosophical 
reasoning. 
As mentioned in the introduction my research is guided by a continental tradition 
associated with names such as Martin Heidegger, Maurice Blanchot, George Perec, 
Theodore Adorno, Michel Foucault, Pierre Bourdieu, Henri Lefebvre, and Michel de 
Certeau. For the most part, these schematizations are closely identified with various 
intellectual and scholarly trajectories; e.g., the phenomenological tradition, the Marxist 
and Critical Theory tradition, and the structuralist/postmodern tradition. Yet, there are 
marked differences even in the work of these scholars. For example, Pierre Bourdieu is 
rightly characterized as a strict functionalist. As shall be seen in Chapter 5, he is 
concerned only with actions and practices of society. On the other hand, while in many 
respects a functionalist, de Certeau does bring a humanistic sensibility in his analysis of 
language and speech as they relate to matters of space and place, strategies and tactics. 
Having laid the foundation, we now move on to examine contemporary 
approaches to the study of African American religious experience in Chapter 2. 
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Chapter 2 - Examples of African American Religious Experience 
We have bricolage and nothing else, and we think we can even invent ourselves at 
random by assembling convenient and pleasing but transient identities out of the bits and 
pieces we find around us. We pick up fragments to shore against our ruin. 
83 
Blacks are reluctant philosophers. 
Introduction 
In Chapter 2, it is my intention to present several examples of African American 
religious experience. These examples will constitute the data upon which the theories and 
methodologies under consideration will be brought to bear in the following chapter. Thus 
far, I have discussed the history of the concept of religious experience, and stipulated a 
working definition that has and will be applied throughout this thesis. From there, I 
offered a survey of how the phenomenon of religious experience has been addressed by 
differing disciplinary approaches among scholars of African American religion; e.g. 
theology, philosophy, ethics, history of religions/comparative religion, sociology, history, 
and biblical studies. In so doing, I noted the strengths as well as the weaknesses 
associated with each of these traditions and the need for new theoretical and 
methodological tools that grasp the phenomenon of African American religious 
experience in a much fuller and compelling fashion, which I define as possessing more 
explanatory power.84 
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The method chosen to present the examples shall be that of phenomenological 
descriptions. While the term has been used in Chapter 1 in association with religious 
studies, I intend in this chapter to use the term in a more restrictive fashion, in keeping 
with its use in philosophy. As Diogenes Allen notes in Philosophy for Understanding 
o c 
Theology , frequently the word phenomenology is associated with a study that claims to 
be purely descriptive, without the issue of truth or falsity being raised. While such 
circumstances do obtain for the case studies I wish to present, as a description of the 
method itself it is insufficient. Phenomenology as a discipline attempts to encounter pure 
phenomena. Again, Allen is helpful in stating that pure phenomena are not to be equated 
with sense impressions or one's stream of consciousness. Phenomenology maintains that 
by considering objects, by which is meant the contents of awareness (it is in this sense 
that phenomenologist use the term object and objective), that one can "intuit the essences 
o/r 
and grasp essential connections between those essences." Thus, while phenomenology 
looks at the same things as other disciplines, it asserts that it is able to encounter the 
world of experience as it reveals itself, in its givenness. The various subtleties of this 
approach will be addressed in the next section before they are applied to the three cases 
presented for consideration. 
Encountering Phenomenology Again for the First Time 
In Chapter 1,1 introduced the phenomenological method in my efforts to offer a 
description of religious experience. Phenomenology is the study of human experience and 
This is not to say that other approaches are moribund, but rather, that they are more circumscribed than 
other accounts. 
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of the way things present themselves to us in and through such experience. Stated slightly 
differently, phenomenology is the study of structures of consciousness as experienced 
from the first-person point of view. The central structure of an experience is its 
intentionality, its being directed toward something, as it is an experience of or about some 
object. An experience is directed toward an object by virtue of its content or meaning. 
on 
Phenomenology then deals with the conditions for the possibility of meaning. 
Subsequently, phenomenological description, with its emphasis on recording the 
phenomenal constitution of objectivities in consciousness, has been a persuasive model 
for historians, sociologists and cultural historians wishing to investigate the experience of 
historical, social, and cultural processes, and the meanings conferred on them by the 
88 historical, social, and cultural actors who produce them, and are produced by them. 
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Whereas the original objectives of phenomenological description are totalizing 
and systematic, over the last several decades, a challenge to such assumptions have been 
raised by various non-European scholars as well as other intellectuals who have been 
critical of the universal/normative claims that arose during the Enlightenment and have 
become part of the nomos of modernity. Many of these individuals have become 
advocates of phenomenological approaches that are culturally conditioned, i.e. that take 
OQ 
cultural particularities and distinctiveness into consideration. 
As a discursive practice, phenomenology attempts to grasp the constituting 
activities of consciousness through the act of bracketing the natural attitude, by which is 
meant the focus one has when he/she is involved or ordinarily engaged in the world, i.e., 
intending things, facts, projects, situations, etc. The natural attitude might therefore, be 
described as the default human way of being in the world. It is for the most part, the 
2008). There is also the hermeneutical phenomenological tradition associated with the likes of Hans Hans-
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kind of Phanomenologie des Schwarzen Geiste, inspired by Georg Wilhelm Freidrich Hegel's 
Phenomenology of Spirit. 
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posture of everyday life. The phenomenological attitude, however, is associated with a 
kind of displacement, or disengagement, such that one can reflect upon all intentionalities 
of human consciousness that are within the natural attitude, but are obfuscated by it. The 
adoption of the phenomenological attitude is inferred by many names: the 
phenomenological reduction, the transcendental reduction, bracketing, or the epoche.90 
It is at this point in the discourse that critiques by the earlier mentioned advocates 
of a culturally sensitive phenomenology come into play. Is the natural attitude and 
consciousness culturally dependent or independent? Does a contextual approach to 
problems of phenomenological description avoid some of the self-contradictions involved 
in the finite description of open-ended processes? As it relates to the thesis at hand, are 
the constituting activities of the consciousness of African Americans the same as that of 
European Americans? Further, what of the natural attitude of African Americans? Does 
the phenomenological reduction or epoche obtain in the same way as it does for others? 
One scholar who has engaged in an extensive investigation of the 
phenomenological method as it relates to persons of African ancestry is the sociologist 
Paget Henry. Henry's task is multi-fold, and not all aspects of it are of equal importance 
to the line of argumentation that I seek to pursue in this chapter. The first goal of Henry's 
project as presented in his works about phenomenology is his assertion as to the existence 
of autochthonous Africana91 phenomenologies in which a self-reflective description of 
90
 Sokolowski, Introduction to Phenomenology. 
91The term Africana for Henry is associated with thought and cultural products of people of African 
ancestry not simply on the African continent, but also of those in Europe, North America, and Central and 
South America, inclusive of their hybridity and creolization. In many respects, it is analogous to what 
someone like a Paul Gilroy refers to as the Black Atlantic. An area of possible slippage in the use of the 
term, however, may be with respect to how inclusive it is of the African continent. It is clear in both Henry 
and Gilroy that their primary focus is on persons with some ancestral connection to West Africa in 
particular and who had some impact from European contact, which included colonization as well as the 
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the constituting activities of the consciousness of Africana peoples is accomplished by 
various indigenous ego-displacing techniques. Henry asserts that such techniques that are 
associated with or facilitate the bracketing of the natural attitude are culturally 
dependent.92 
Such a cultural approach to phenomenology is an unusual one, as it "culturally 
conditions the certainty of self-reflective knowledge and raises very explicitly the need to 
93 
do phenomenology from a comparative cultural perspective." In reality, Henry's claim 
is as an epistemic practice, this self-reflectivity is not peculiar to phenomenology and/or 
philosophy. Rather, it is an activity that can be initiated within a myriad of knowledge 
modalities, such as art, literature, and religion. Indeed, any discipline that can describe 
one's everyday practices and engage the transcendental or knowledge-constitutive ground 
that supports them might be said to be a kind of phenomenology.94 These assertions, 
however, challenge the claims and objectives of the phenomenological tradition in the 
West, specifically the form of phenomenology developed by Edmund Husserl, who 
viewed the self-reflective method he developed as disclosing the moments of a universal 
reason. As mentioned earlier, however, such assertions have been challenged by 
postcolonial and postmodern/poststructural theorists. It is their contention that what is 
revealed is not some universal reason operating at the center of the European subject, but 
slave trade. As the focus of my work is African American religious experience, I am talking about the 
descendants of enslaved West Africans. 
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rather at best the constituting activities of the consciousness of the European people. 
Husserl famously noted, "European humanity bears within itself an absolute idea 
[emphasis mine], rather than being merely an empirical anthropological type like 'China' 
or 'India.'95 
Another observation of Henry is that historically, there have been different 
occasions in which the various forms of self-reflection have taken place, and that these 
are again, best illuminated through comparative cultural phenomenologies.96 For 
example, if one's concern is the clarifying the foundations of knowledge, the construction 
of one's philosophy/phenomenology may well resemble that of Immanuel Kant's 
explorations regarding the limits of reason and the relationship between the rational and 
irrational. For Georg F.W. Hegel, the occasion appears to have been an effort to reconcile 
theological discourses (spirit) with those found in philosophy (reason) that lead to his 
phenomenology of mind/spirit in which this dialectic is revealed over the course of 
history. For Edmund Husserl, the occasion for the development of his phenomenological 
methodology was articulated in his well-known essay, The Crisis of European Sciences 
and Transcendental Phenomenology. Therein he namely sought to articulate a 
presuppositionless and rigorously formulated foundation of all discourses, an indubitable 
frame of reference. As suggested by the title of his first significant discourse on 
phenomenology, Cartesian Meditations, as in the case of Descartes, his was a quest for 
certainty. For Sartre, who was greatly influence by Husserl, it is a fundamentally 
existential crisis of mauvaise foi ("bad-faith" or self-deception) that the European subject 
95
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has consistently brought to the knowing situation in addition to self-deception's ability to 
97 
appropriate reason in the service of unreason or the irrational. For Derrida, the occasion 
of self-reflection is what he perceived to be the use of language and its remaining 
98 
dependence on metaphysics reflected in the West's logocentrism. 
With such a precedent within the phenomenological tradition, the question arises 
as to what might constitute the crisis in terms of Africana, or more specifically, African 
Americans as a people. I would suggest that the crisis is that of identity as a consequence 
of the institution of chattel slavery with its myriad of racializing discourses associated 
with their oppression. In other words, the occasion for reflection for African Americans 
has been the racist negating of their humanity. The Africana existential phenomenologist 
Lewis Gordon refers to such events as the phenomenological disappearance of Africana 
humanity." 
While such a claim may seem obvious to anyone who has studied the history and 
culture of the African American community, I believe that the complexity of their/our 
history often obfuscates the underlying psychic, spiritual, or soul-rending agon that 
inheres in African American being. Succinctly put, it is my contention that the crisis that 
occasions the kind of disciplined self-reflection of constituting activities of African 
American selves is racialization and the subsequent fragmentation of African American 
97
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being. Moreover, predicated on such an understanding, I also proffer that the telos of 
African American religious experience is wholeness.100 
By fragmentation of African American being, I am referring to what Henry refers 
to as the creation of "the Negro." For Henry, "the Negro" is the racist reduction of 
Africana humanity. It is a caricature. Moving from phenomenology to the language of 
psychology, the Negro might be characterized as the European shadow, the other.101 
Sociologically, "the Negro" made possible the external colonization of an African life-
world by a European life-world. Thus, not only was there the fragmentation of Africana 
being, but also the fragmentation of African civilizations. It was in this context of 
conquest and subjugation that Africana peoples became part of "the underside of 
] 02 
modernity," experiencing what Husserl referred to as the "Europeanization of all other 
civilizations."103 
I see many resonances with the thought of Georges Bataille. In his seminal work 
Theory of Religion, written in 1948 but first published in 1973, Bataille defines the 
essence of religion as the search for lost intimacy. This impulse, this quest to "return to 
intimacy" is associated with a desire to (re)establish "immanence between man and the 
100
 I realize that there are those who will challenge such a move with the assertion that I am advocating a 
kind of essentialism. This is a serious contention, which I believe can be addressed in a number of ways. 
• True essentialism has to do with metaphysical and ontological claims, not epistemological ones. 
The phenomenological method, brackets such questions, it deals with experiences or events in 
their givenness. 
• Essentialism assumes that entities possess characteristics that are universal and immutable, and 
thus not contextual. The analysis engaged in here is explicitly contextual and none prescriptive. 
The goal is a phenomenological description of African American religious experience. I do not 
believe in racial essentialism, but rather that the historical, cultural, and social situatedness of 
persons of African ancestry in Western society are inextricably tied to phenomenological 
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world, between subject and object."104 Through a kind of rupture (for Bataille, this is an 
evolutionary process associated with the development of a capacity to make distinctions, 
resulting in human beings perceiving a discontinuity between themselves and some other, 
some thing), the world of immanence and intimacy is forever closed. Yet, it continues to 
grasp humanity with "all the fascination of the sacred world, as against the poverty of the 
profane."105 The profane corresponds to the so-called real world, or as Bataille 
characterizes it, the order of things. Religion, in the sense of re-ligare, literally to bind or 
bind back, is the form this longing takes. Accordingly, I maintain, African American 
religion is a kind of inter-locution, something said-between, in the interstices of what has 
been lost and effaced (a culture, a life-world, a way of being), and that which was and 
continues to be full of uncertainty, ambiguity, and risk. Religion provided a 
schematization of their experience that enabled the creation of communities where life 
was possible. 
Thus again, it is my contention that wholeness is the governing telos for African 
American religious experience that is revealed in and through a culturally attuned 
phenomenological analysis. It is interesting to note that such an outcome of Africana 
phenomenological analysis is not one shared by Henry, differing most significantly in 
that my method wishes to bracket the ethical. By bracketing the ethical, I mean that the 
phenomenological method as I employ it wishes to attend simply that which is given. As 
a phenomenological category, wholeness is neither good nor bad; it is not positive or 
negative. Instead of wholeness, Henry will argue that the governing telos of Africana 
experience, which presumably would encompass religious experience, has been racial 
104
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liberation and cessation of the racial domination. While this may be an expression of 
wholeness, liberation as Henry sees it is identified with a progressive construction of 
history, in keeping with what I have characterized as his modernist orientation.106 While I 
concur with Henry that racialization displaces the problem of rationality, as the occasion 
for self-reflection racial liberation is not synonymous with the telos of wholeness. This is 
particularly significant if one wishes to examine religious phenomenon in general, and 
religious experience in particular, in their givenness. It is clear for Henry, as a 
sociologists as well as African a academic who subscribes to the "hermeneutic of 
liberation," that the pursuit of liberation is a good thing. However, in attempting to grasp 
the phenomenon of African American religion in its givenness, I will bracket such 
preferences and dispositions. 
The issue of telos becomes particularly important with respect to the everyday 
ethical/practical projects of a people as well as to their construction (or perpetual 
reconstruction) of the transcendental domain; i.e., the domain of living experience, the 
region of subjectivity.107 While Henry does acknowledge that the constructions and 
reconstructions of the transcendental domain are profoundly influenced by the nature of 
our projects, he continues to define the principle project of Africana being as racial 
equality. As I note above, I do not believe racial equality to be the true telos of Africana 
being or consciousness, but rather it is wholeness. Not only do I believe that wholeness 
106
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provides a better explanation of the occasion of crisis for African Americans, I also 
believe that it allows for greater openness and inclusivity with respect to the various 
experiences and projects that exist within and throughout the history of African 
108 Americans. 
An Africana/African American Cultural Phenomenology 
In the development of an Africana cultural phenomenology, two names stand out 
as its progenitors - W. E. B. Du Bois and Frantz Fanon. Quite independently from one 
another, one informed by the sociological and historical tradition (Du Bois) and the other 
by the psychoanalytic tradition (Fanon), their phenomenologies of the Africana subject 
have resonances that I will utilize in my own phenomenological analysis. 
Much has been written over the course of the last decade in an effort to establish 
Du Bois within the American tradition of pragmatism. For example, in his genealogical 
study of American pragmatism entitled The American Evasion of Philosophy, the 
distinguished contemporary African American philosopher Cornel West places Du Bois 
in the tradition of William James, with whom Du Bois studied at Harvard. Although West 
notes that Du Bois does not embrace James's philosophy as a whole, he nevertheless 
places Du Bois within the American pragmatist tradition. This tradition is rooted in the 
writings of Ralph Waldo Emerson; it matured in the work of William James and John 
108
 As I note in Chapter 2 and 3 ,1 am particularly concerned with the certain normative claims and ethical 
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59 
Dewey, and it is currently represented by West as well as West's philosophical mentor, 
Richard Rorty. Indeed, Du Bois is in many ways West's proto prophetic pragmatist.109 
A similar assertion is also made by Lucius T. Outlaw in his text On Race and 
Philosophy.110According to Outlaw, while historiography and empirical sociology would 
provide the primary means by which Du Bois would gather and interpret "that body of 
fact which would apply to [his] program for the Negro,"111 it would be philosophy in the 
form of his Harvard philosophy professors James, Royce, and Santayana, and the 
research methodology of Harvard historian Albert Bushnell Hart, "that Du Bois would 
112 
continue to develop and apply to the study of race relations." 
Over against this position, however, I maintain that Du Bois's philosophical, 
historical, sociological, and psychological analysis is at the very least equally indebted to 
German idealism and romanticism of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, particularly 
the work of Goethe, Heine, Schiller, and especially Hegel. David Levering Lewis does a 
wonderful job in exploring the importance of German thought upon Du Bois, particularly 
with respect to his Lehrejahre at the University of Berlin. As Lewis notes, for Du Bois 
there was no other institution worth considering for a period of study abroad. Berlin was 
the university of Johann Gottlieb Fichte, Hegel, Arthur Schopenhauer, and Leopold von 
Ranke. There Du Bois would study history, economics, politics, and the burgeoning field 
of sociology. His teachers would include Gustav von Schmoller, Adolf Wagner, Heinrich 
109
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von Treitschke and the young Max Weber who had received a temporary lectureship 
during Du Bois's second year before leaving for a sociology professorship at Freiberg. 
In Berlin, Du Bois was powerfully affected by German idealism and romanticism, 
particularly the work of Goethe, Heine, Schiller, and of course Hegel.113 From his diary, 
Lewis notes that Du Bois seemed to be particularly taken by Hegel's Phenomenology of 
the Mind [sic].114 According to Lewis, it was from this monumental work that Du Bois 
borrowed "more or less intact notions of distinct, hierarchical racial attributes." Lewis 
goes on to say that "for all [William] James's pragmatic and empirical influences upon 
him, Du Bois found in the Hegelian World-Spirit, dialectically actualizing itself through 
history, a profoundly appealing concept."115 Likewise, in Hegel's essay "Lordship and 
Bondage" that deals with the master-slave dialectic, Du Bois would read 
Just as lordship showed its essential nature to be the reverse of what it wants to 
be, so too, bondage will, when completed, pass into the opposite of what it 
immediately is: being a consciousness represses within itself, it will enter into 
itself, and change round into real and true independence.116 
As one whose people had just recently achieved their freedom after centuries of bondage, 
it is hardly surprising that such a passage would move Du Bois greatly. Indeed, Du Bois 
would express these same thoughts in his own poetic fashion in the years to come, most 
notably in the influential The Souls of Black Folk 
113
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For the early Du Bois, the Africana subject was a culturally distinct, and hence a 
non-European site of original meanings, discourses, and experiences. Du Bois derives 
this understanding from Hegel's philosophy of history and the evolution of consciousness 
among various world historical peoples, the telos being the Northern European for Hegel. 
However, while Hegel excludes African people from history, and thereby relegates them 
to the domain of nature, the domain of objects, Du Bois includes Africans in history as 
racialized subjects. As Robert S. Hartman states in his Editor's Introduction to Hegel's 
Reason in History, in Hegel, philosophy and history met. Hegel's understanding of 
history is built upon his unique metaphysics of the Idea. For Hegel, Thought is what is 
ideal in the world and the world is the concrete of the Idea.117 Further, the Idea is 
dynamic and gives rise to all existence, and all existence is the expression or 
manifestation of the Idea. Thus, there is the coming together of thought and the concrete. 
With respect to space and time, Idea develops in terms of the complements Nature 
and Spirit. Nature is the development of Idea in space and Spirit is the development of 
Idea in time. Finally, one comes to History, which is the progressing self-development of 
118 
Spirit and "embedded in the metaphysical flow of universal scope." Thus, World 
History takes place within the Realm of Spirit. Further, Spirit and the course of its 
development is the substance of history. 
Hegel goes on to say that the realm of Spirit consists in what is produced by 
humanity. 
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The realm of Spirit is all-comprehensive; it includes everything that ever 
has interested or ever will interest man. Man is active in it; whatever he 
does, he is the creature within which the Spirit works.119 
Further, Spirit has its center as itself. Another way of saying this is that Spirit is Being-
within-itself (self-contained existence) which Hegel understands to be Freedom. This 
self- contained existence of Spirit is also self-consciousness or consciousness as self.120 
This leads Hegel to assert that world history is the exhibition of Spirit striving to attain 
knowledge of its own nature, which is also the progress of the consciousness of Freedom. 
Therefore, the Spirit's consciousness of its freedom and the actualization of this Freedom 
191 
is the final purpose of the world. 
According to Hegel, 
This development [the Spirit's consciousness of its freedom and the 
actualization of this Freedom] implies a gradation — a series of 
increasingly adequate expressions or manifestations of Freedom, which 
result from its Idea. The logical, and — as still more prominent — the 
dialectical nature of the Idea in general, viz. that it is self-determined— 
that it assumes successive forms which it successively transcends; and by 
this very process of transcending its earlier stages gains an affirmative, 
and, in fact, a richer and more concrete shape; — this necessity of its 
nature, and the necessary series of pure abstract forms which the Idea 
successively assumes — is exhibited in the department of Logic. Here we 
need adopt only one of its results, viz. that every step in the process, as 
differing from any other, has its determinate peculiar principle. In history 
this principle is idiosyncrasy of Spirit — peculiar National Genius. It is 
within the limitations of this idiosyncrasy that the spirit of the nation, 
concretely manifested, expresses every aspect of its consciousness and 
will— the whole cycle of its realization. Its religion, its polity, its ethics, 
its legislation, and even its science, art, and mechanical skill, all bear its 
stamp. These special peculiarities find their key in that common 
peculiarity — the particular principle that characterizes a people; as, on 
the other hand, in the facts which History presents in detail, that common 
characteristic principle may be detected.122 
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Thus, the Spirit comes to itself and contemplates itself through certain world-historical 
peoples (Volker). In other words, the universal/world Spirit (Geist) is actualized through 
particular/national spirits (Volkgeist) dialectically. 
The principles of the national spirits progressing through a necessary succession 
of stages are only moments of the one universal Spirit, which through them 
/ 7 ? 
elevates and completes itself into a self-comprehending totality. 
For Hegel, there are six world-historical peoples or nations: Chinese, Indians, Persians, 
Greeks, Romans, and Germans.124 Hegel describes this process of world history as 
beginning with the Oriental World, which is followed by the Greek World, the Roman 
World and concluding with the German World; i.e., "the History of the World travels 
125 
from East to West, for Europe is absolutely the end of History, Asia the beginning." 
Absent from this scheme, an absence unacceptable for the likes of a Du Bois, are the 
peoples of Africa and their descendants. 
When Hegel does refer to Africans, he says the following: 
The peculiarly African character is difficult to comprehend, for the very 
reason that in reference to it, we must quite give up the principle which 
naturally accompanies all our ideas-the category of Universality. In Negro 
life, the characteristic point is the fact that consciousness has not yet 
attained to the realization of any substantial objective existence - as for 
example, God, or Law - in which the interest of man's volition is involved 
and in which he realizes his own being. This distinction between himself 
as an individual and the universality of his essential being, the African in 
the uniform, undeveloped oneness of his existence has not yet attained; so 
that the Knowledge of an absolute Being, an Other and a Higher than his 
individual self, is entirely wanting. The Negro, as already observed, 
exhibits the natural man in his completely wild and untamed state. We 
123
 Hegel, Reason in History, 95. 
124
 Actually, in Hegel's scheme, there are subgroups under the larger categories. For example, with respect 
to "Persia", Hegel lists the Zend, Assyrians, Babylonians, Medes, Persians, Syrians, Jews and Egyptians 
(Hegel, Philosophy of History, 3). 
125
 Hegel, Philosophy of History, 121. 
64 
must lay aside all thought of reverence and morality-all that we call 
feeling-if we would rightly comprehend him; there is nothing harmonious 
with humanity to be found in this type of character. The copious and 
circumstantial accounts of Missionaries completely confirm this, and 
Mahommedanism appears to be the only thing which in any way brings 
the Negroes within the range of culture. 
At this point we leave Africa, not to mention it again. For it is no historical 
part of the World; it has no movement or development to exhibit. 
Historical movements in it-that is in its northern part-belong to the Asiatic 
or European World. Carthage displayed there an important transitionary 
phase of civilization; but, as is Nahoenician colony, it belongs to Asia. 
Egypt will be considered in reference to the passage of the human mind 
from its Eastern to its Western phase, but it does not belong to the African 
Spirit. What we properly understand by Africa, is the Unhistorical, 
Undeveloped Spirit, still involved in the conditions of mere nature, and 
which had to be presented here only as on the threshold of the World's 
History.127 
It is this move of Du Bois - the addition of persons of African ancestry among world-
historical peoples — that is a key innovation to Hegel's description of consciousness; 
indeed, it calls into serious question the universality of Hegel's phenomenology. 
In the context of universal and world history, therefore, it was assumed that 
Africa and the Negro were deemed to have no part. As beings, they were part of Nature 
and not History. Thus, the study of the Negro was the purview of the natural sciences 
(Naturwissenschaften) as opposed to the human sciences (Kulturwissenschaften or 
Geisteswissenschafteri). Indeed, as Cornel West so thoroughly develops in his text 
Prophesy Deliverance in the chapter entitled "A Genealogy of Modern Racism," such an 
understanding was the consequence of "a creative fusion of scientific investigation, 
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Cartesian philosophy, Greek ocular metaphors, and classical aesthetic and cultural 
ideals."128 
By this, West means that with the Enlightenment's adoption of Greek classical 
aesthetic and culture as normative, along with the burgeoning authority of science as 
represented in the work of naturalists, anatomists, anthropologists, physiognomists, and 
phrenologists such as Francis Bernier, Carolus Linnaeus, Georg Louis Leclerc de Buffon, 
Pieter Camper, and John Kasper Lavater, there emerged the idea of European superiority 
in modern Western discourse.129 It is this idea of European superiority that Du Bois must 
face, and in a bit of almost inconceivable irony, he will rely on the work of the very 
intellectuals who would have asserted the inferiority of Du Bois and his people, die 
Schwarzen Volker; i.e. Black Folk. It is Du Bois's introduction of racialization that will 
ultimately be the key in his powerful phenomenology of African American 
consciousness, which Du Bois will come to refer to as the Black soul. Perhaps the earliest 
glimpse into the effect that German idealism had upon Du Bois can be found in an 
address he delivered to the American Negro Academy in 1897, entitled "The 
Conservation of Races." In this message, Du Bois claimed that the people of the world 
could be divided into eight identifiable groups called races. This designation bears a 
striking resemblance to Hegel's classification of world-historical peoples. Moreover, Du 
Bois's conception of race appears to have a great deal in common with the notion of 
Volk. For example, in answer to his rhetorical question about the nature of race, he states 
It is a vast family of human beings, generally of common blood and 
language, always of common history, traditions, and impulses, who are 
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both voluntarily and involuntarily striving together for the 
accomplishment of certain more or less vividly conceived ideals of life.130 
Further, 
The American Negro has always felt an intense personal interest in 
discussions as to the origins and destinies of races: primarily because 
back of most discussions of race with which he is familiar, have lurked 
certain assumptions as to his natural abilities, as to his political, 
intellectual and moral status, which he felt were wrong. He has, 
consequently, been led to deprecate and minimize race distinctions, to 
believe intensely that out of one blood God created all nations, and to 
speak of human brotherhood as though it were the possibility of an already 
dawning to-morrow. 
Nevertheless, in our calmer moments we must acknowledge that 
human beings are divided into races; that in this country the two most 
extreme types of the world's races have met, and the resulting problem as 
to the future relations of these types is not only of intense and living 
interest to us, but forms an epoch in the history of mankind... 
For it is certain that all human striving must recognize the hard 
limits of natural law, and that any striving, no matter how intense and 
earnest, which is against the constitution of the world, is vain. The 
question, then, which we must seriously consider is this: What is the real 
meaning of Race; what has, in the past, been the law of race development, 
and what lessons has the past history of race development to teach the 
rising Negro people?131 
Du Bois concludes: 
Turning to real history, there can be no doubt, first, as to the widespread, 
nay universal, prevalence of the race idea, the race spirit, the race ideal, 
and to its efficiency as the vastest and most ingenious invention for human 
132 
progress. 
Du Bois accomplishes this through a modification of Hegel's understanding of 
intersubjectivity. According to Hegel, self-consciousness exists for itself and for another 
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self-conscious, which results in a kind of dualism or doubleness.133 However, in such 
works as The Souls of Black Folk, Du Bois realizes that the 'for-itself of the racialized 
Africana subject is itself subject to doubling, to a kind of fragmentation. In the Hegelian 
encounter, there is a sense of "I" and "We." Yet, for the racialized Africana subject, there 
is another entity present, a caricature that is the Negro. As a caricature, the Negro is a 
distortion. As Fanon will later psychologize, the Negro is deemed to be the opposite of 
white humanity; it is the European shadow.134 
Du Bois's double consciousness is a phenomenological account of the self-
consciousness of African subjects whose "We" had been shattered and challenged by this 
process of "negrification." Thus, the Africana self-consciousness possesses twoness. 
Paget Henry observes that the catalyst of this fracture or fragmentation of the Africana 
consciousness is related to the external colonization of the Africana life world by that of 
the European.135 Such colonialization is not circumscribed by the occupation of physical 
spaces or resources, but includes the colonization of all apparatus by which a self is 
constituted. In the case of Africana peoples, this is associated with their encounter with 
Europeans. Prior to such an encounter, one could assume the existence of a different 
African subject. By this, I mean that the subject or self constituted by the African among 
other Africans, experienced a coherent "We-ness".136 However, especially in the case of 
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 An interesting complement to such an analysis of the African subject intersects the concern of the 
everyday or everyday life. As noted by Henry, in traditional African cultures, the spiritual was a part of 
everyday life. Indeed, what I would refer to as the domain of logos - the realm of the rational that includes 
matters of politics, economics, and production - was subject to the domain of mythos or the spiritual, 
symbolic, hierophantic and kratophonic realm. However, while Henry maintains that the spiritual 
Africans' encounter with the absurdity that was chattel slavery in the New World, the 
Africana consciousness was ruptured. They are no longer simply African, but must 
contend with this thing called the Negro.137 
The recognition of this on the part of Africana people, results in what Du Bois 
will refer to as the second-sight. This is the ability of the racialized Africana subject to 
see him/herself as a Negro, that is, through the eyes of the white other. First sight is the 
ability to see one's self through one's own eyes. It is to see one's self as an "I" and to 
experience the intersubjective consciousness as "We." The extent to which second sight 
took the ability to see one's self as an "I" as opposed to a "Negro," it constituted a major 
obstacle to any genuine Africana self consciousness, to the existence of an Africana 
subject.138 
dimension of African discourse given to the self was qualitatively different from the world of "everyday 
life" and resisted assimilation by that world (Caliban's Reason, 60). I maintain that everyday life included 
mythos. Moreover, I assert that to the extent that there was an emphasis or retention of this mythos in 
Africana or African American society, particularly as given in and through religion and the religious, it 
operates agonistically in relation to other social discourses. 
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For example, in the first essay of Souls, Du Bois - in the Hegelian tradition -
alludes to seven "distinctly different races" through whom it might be assumed that the 
developing Hegelian World-Spirit could be traced.139 
After the Egyptian and Indian, the Greek and Roman, the Teuton and 
Mongolian, the Negro is a sort of seventh son, born with a veil, and gifted 
with second-sight in this American world, - a world which yields him no 
true self-consciousness, but only lets him see himself through the 
revelation of the other world. It is a peculiar sensation, this double-
consciousness, this sense of always looking at one's self through the eyes 
of others, of measuring one's soul by the tape of a world that looks on in 
amused contempt and pity. One ever feels his twoness,—an American, a 
Negro; two souls, two thoughts, two unreconciled strivings; two warring 
ideals in one dark body, whose dogged strength alone keeps it from being 
torn asunder.140 
Through this association of the Negro with the seventh son, I assert that Du Bois wishes 
to suggest that the culmination of the Spirit's progress in history is in the Negro people. 
Almost assuredly, Du Bois is relying on the tradition of the seventh son as the most 
favored and of seven in the Judeo-Christian mind being the number of completeness. As 
Joel Williamson suggests, "Black folk's" consciousness of freedom for Du Bois is newer 
and richer than that of any previous world-historical people because of their experience 
of slavery.141 Additionally, as a "problem" and as "other," black folk had developed a 
kind of "double-consciousness." Black folk have the "sense of always looking at one's 
self through the eyes of others." This "twoness," this consciousness of "two souls, two 
thoughts, two unreconciled strivings; two warring ideals in one dark body," means that 
black folk must uniquely struggle to find true self-consciousness and self-identity. 
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The history of the American Negro is the history of this strife - this 
longing to attain self-consciousness manhood, to merge his double self 
into a better and truer self. In this merging he wishes neither of the older 
selves to be lost. He would not Africanize America, for America has too 
much to teach the world and Africa. He would not bleach his Negro soul 
in a flood of white Americanism, for he knows that Negro blood has a 
message for the world. He simply wishes to make it possible for a man to 
be both a Negro and an American, without being cursed and spit upon by 
his fellows, without having the doors of opportunity closed roughly in his 
face.142 
While it may be the case, as suggested by Cornel West, that Du Bois is 
following his mentor Albert Bushnell Hart's racialist view of history in which each 
"race" possesses certain gifts and endowments, this is also very much consistent with 
Hegel. As to the special gifts of the Negro, Du Bois is particularly fond of the 'Sorrow 
Songs,' the "echo of haunting melody from the only American music which welled up 
from black souls in the dark past."1" Later, Du Bois will go on to say that 
Before the Pilgrims landed we were here. Here we have brought our three 
gifts and mingled them with yours: a gift of story and song—soft, stirring 
melody in an ill-harmonized and unmelodious land; the gift of sweat and 
brawn to beat back the wilderness, conquer the soil, and lay the 
foundations of this vast economic empire two hundred years earlier than 
your weak hands could have done it; the third, a gift of the Spirit.144 
Unfortunately, second sight comes frequently at a dear price - the achieving of true self-
consciousness by an Africana subject as an "I" or as some "We" that was prior to the 
encounter with the European - as opposed to a projected "We" that is something called a 
Negro. However, Du Bois is clear that it does give Africana people an advantage. 
According to Paget Henry, this takes the form of special access and insight into the 
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dehumanizing "will to power" of the European imperial subject. Henry refers to this later 
utilization of second sight as "potentiated second sight." 
The potentiating of second sight is always a possibility in the racialized 
and divided consciousness of the Africana subject. This possibility can be 
activated in two basic ways: first through the recovery of a significant 
measure of first sight, that is the ability to see one's self as an African as 
opposed to "the negro" that the white mind was constantly producing and 
projecting...This ability to see one's self as an African will depend upon 
one's ability to creatively uproot the "blackface" stereotype, and to 
reconstruct self and world within the creative codes of African discourses 
and symbols.145 
While I believe that Henry is correct in the transformative possibility of 
potentiated second sight, I disagree with first sight necessitating a self that is "African." 
Once more, following the constitution of subjectivity, the real need is to see oneself as an 
"I" that is connected with a "We" in a holistic or unitive fashion. To the extent that an 
individual or groups are able to do this, there is the potential for wholeness, for agency, 
for expressions of subjectivity. Going back to de Certeau, this kind of self-creation often 
necessitates having a place or space of one's own.146 Further, the discourses, practices, 
and actions involved may vary widely, and is open to bricolage. Again, I assert that the 
telos is wholeness, which may or may not subscribe to various conventions or notions of 
liberation. An example of this first way of potentiating second sight alluded to by Henry 
is Rastafarianism.147 
The second way that potentiated second sight can be actuated involves one 
finding an independent point of self-evaluation. Henry points to Du Bois's opening essay 
in Darkwater: Voices Within The Veil, "The Souls of White Folk." 
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High in the tower, where I sit above the loud complaining of the human 
sea, I know many souls that toss and whirl and pass, but none there are 
that intrigue me more than the Souls of White Folk. 
Of them, I am singularly clairvoyant. I see in and through them. I view 
them from unusual points of vantage. Not as a foreigner do I come, for I 
am native, not foreign, bone of their thought and flesh of their language... 
I see these souls undressed and from the back and side. I see the working 
of their entrails. I know their thoughts and they know that I know.. .they 
go twisting, flying by my tired eyes and I see them ever stripped, — ugly, 
human. 148 
From his tower, Du Bois engages in a kind of transcendental reduction as self-
conscious ego. Recall once more that in Husserl's conception, phenomenology is 
primarily concerned with making the structures of consciousness and the phenomena that 
appear in acts of consciousness as objects of systematic reflection and analysis. Such 
reflection was to take place from a highly modified "first person" viewpoint, studying 
phenomena not as they appear to "my" consciousness, but to any consciousness 
whatsoever. Du Bois's poetic reflection serves here to bracket the natural attitude, 
creating what Henry refers to as a new form of first sight or a kind of third sight.149 Both 
strategies, however, offer ways to see through and implode the racist caricature, the false 
self, created through oppressive discursive practices. Moreover, both postures provide 
unique insights into the European consciousness. The irony of this process is that it 
emerges in the "subject" who has become aware of the lived self-contradiction of this 
deception.150 
Unlike Du Bois's methodology, Frantz Fanon is indebted to psychoanalysis and 
French existentialism. Yet, his articulation of the Africana self is very similar to that of 
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notes a comparable observation in the work of Fanon who notes that the absence of his interiority is 
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Du Bois. Fanon is emphatic that the African (being or consciousness) is not that of the 
Negro. "The Negro has one function, that of symbolizing the lower emotions, the baser 
inclinations, the dark side of the soul."151 Likewise, Fanon talks about a racial fissure in 
the Africana psyche, brought about by racialization or negrification. Fanon comments in 
Black Skin/White Mask on the institutional power of the white gaze. Where Du Bois 
recounts one of his most memorable instances of racial stigmatization of a white 
schoolmate that transpired in the gifting of a Valentine card, Fanon talks about an 
incident with a white child on a train. Upon seeing him, the child says, "Mama, see the 
152 
Negro! I am frightened." Fanon goes on to say that with this utterance, the psychic 
rupture became quite real. "It was no longer being aware of myself in the third person 
[normal intersubjectivity], but in a triple person [the fragmented Africana self or subject 
as with Du Bois and double consciousness]."153 
Fanon, however, was not simply attempting to schematize the Africana 
consciousness. Rather, his psychoanalytic informed approach involved the exploration of 
two trajectories: that of the Africana subject who attempts to conceal his negrification 
with the white mask versus working his way out of the state of negrification. 
For Fanon, the first course is essentially a tragic one. It is the course of self-
negation, the course of bad-faith. The second course is to reject false consciousness, and 
to affirm a self of one's own choosing. Borrowing from the existentialists, one must 
confront the zone or realm of non-being by going out of and coming back into ego 
being.154 
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If the awakened subject is to achieve denegrification and potentiated second sight, such 
events must be endured or experienced.155 For a person this is to confront the abyss of the 
existentialist, or in the words of Fanon, one must be "able to accomplish this descent into 
a real hell."156 Thus, the notion of the self for Fanon involves the fragility of the ego - an 
i en 
ego unable to launch and stabilize itself and the issue of nonbeing. 
The phenomenological method that I will deploy in my analysis is greatly 
indebted to both classical phenomenology and to an Africana cultural phenomenology. 
As the various case studies or examples will show, the occasion for the 
phenomenological reflection is the crisis of the Africana self or subject. As I mention in 
the introduction of this chapter, while other methodological approaches can be used for 
descriptive purposes, phenomenology asserts that it is able to encounter the world of 
experience as it reveals itself, in its givenness. 
The context for reflection in each of the cases presented will be the confrontation 
of African Americans with the distortions, interruptions, and deformations to their self 
produced by racists and stereotypical reductions within a projective and exploitive 
context that is America. It is also important to note that religion functions on multiple 
levels in the various narratives presented. In the move toward ontogenesis or egogenesis, 
African Americans availed themselves of various resources, e.g., religious, aesthetic, 
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economic. Each will have a particular authority depending on the context. With respect to 
the study of African American religion and religious experience, however, 
phenomenological descriptions are not common, and as such, I feel that it may be 
necessary to add the following points of clarification in relation to the language deployed 
in the descriptive process, in an effort to forestall certain misperceptions. 
Firstly, I turn to the phenomenological use of the word "consciousness." The 
many references to consciousness given above may give the false impression that I 
believe in human reality, or human beingness, as solely a mental phenomenon. This, 
however, would be in error. Human consciousness is always embodied consciousness. 
One must not forget that phenomenology in the tradition of Heidegger, Sartre, Merleau-
Ponty, et al. is an assault on the Cartesian dualism of mind/body. As noted by Lewis 
Gordon in Bad Faith and Antiblack Racism, for phenomenological descriptions such as 
Sartre's, the body stands immune from the "quagmire of reductionism and the infamous 
t f O 
mind-body problem in the history of philosophy since Descartes." The traditional 
problem results from what - phenomenologically speaking - is a case of faulty 
reductionism, i.e., that the human being is a composite of two substances, mind and body. 
But this is not the case for Dasein, nor is it the case for consciousness. The Cartesian 
reduction leads to the paradox of two different kinds of substances acting as one. 
Phenomenologically, however, consciousness is not a substance, is not a thing. Moreover, 
the very dichotomization of mind and body, in Sartrean phenomenology, is a form of bad 
faith, or what Gordon calls "the reification of consciousness."159 Calling upon the work 
of Calvin Schrag, Gordon adamantly rejects the notion that the mind possesses or has a 
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body. According to Schrag, "The body is myself in my lived concreteness. My body is 
who I am. I exist in the world as embodied."160 Thus phenomenologically, consciousness 
is always embodied, as well as "I" or "the self."161 
Secondly, the use of the phenomenological description being deployed here is an 
attempt to adhere to the methodology proffered by Wayne Proudfoot as referenced in 
Chapter 1. As a reminder, Proudfoot argues that the first step in developing an 
explanation of phenomena involves the giving of a rich description of the phenomena. 
For the purpose of description, I am relying on the phenomenological tradition. This will 
then be followed by explanation or analysis, specifically utilizing methodologies 
informed by theories of everyday life. Further, as the form of description will be 
phenomenological, I eschew descriptive or explanative models outside of that tradition. 
Thus, I will not be using or alluding to Foucault in this section as he is not a 
phenomenologist; indeed, it would probably be most accurate to categorize his 
162 intellectual project as anti-phenomenology. 
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His theorizing intersects with while distancing itself from phenomenology, structuralism, 
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Foucault's first publication on Binswanger provides the seeds of his future arguments 
against phenomenology, structuralism, and hermeneutics that together constitute the 
complexity of his critical project. Specifically, Foucault argues that (1) hermeneutics will 
miss the fact that "the imaginary world has its own laws, its specific structures"; (2) 
structuralism will miss the fact that the materiality of linguistic practices are themselves 
constitutive of meaning; and (3) phenomenology will always seek but never be adequate 
to what exceeds it and, consequently, will fail in its foundationalist ends. 
African American Religious Experiences: Three examples 
I now present case studies of three representative, expressions of African 
American religious experience. I would note that I am unaware of the type of 
phenomenological and quotidian reading that I provide here within African American 
religious scholarship. Indeed, it is my contention that the neglect of such theoretical and 
methodological tools prevails due to near pathological essentialism that persists within 
the Western intellectual tradition, pathology with deep roots in both the Greek/Hellenistic 
and the Judeo-Christian traditions that remain the underpinning of much modern 
The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/foucault/) entry on Foucault 
notes: 
... The Order of Things, which was controversial much more for its philosophical attacks 
on phenomenology (and Marxism) than for its complex and nuanced critique of the 
human sciences. 
John Protevi, professor of French Literature at Louisiana State University, makes the following claim in 
situating Foucault's thought: 
Foucault is resolutely anti-phenomenological. His early work explicitly turns from the 
study of subjectivity to the study of cultural systems. He never bothers with studying how 
a constituted subject comes to know something, but concentrates on the conceptual 
structures that allow subjects to know. His later work on subjectivizing practices is an 
outside-in study of material (discursive and non-discursive) practices that produce 
different forms of subjectivity in different historical circumstances, rather than an inside-
out study of the allegedly self constituting history of a concrete subjectivity (what 
Husserl would call genetic phenomenology). 
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'[...] liberer I'histoire de I'emprisephenomenologique...' (M. Foucault, 
L 'Archeologie du savoir) 
The relationship between the work of Michel Foucault and phenomenology is crystal-
clear, is it not? His archaeological method was all about 'freeing history from the grip of 
phenomenology' (translating the above epigraph). Foucault's rejection of 
phenomenology, as a theory and as a method, was not only part of the Zeitgeist, one of 
those things you have to do if you want to be fashionable—no, in fact it was what his 
whole complex and at times disturbing methodological construction was aiming at. 
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1 thought. The problem of essentialism and exceptionalism in Africana scholarship and 
cultural production has been noted by the likes of Paul Gilroy. In the Black Atlantic, 
Gilroy maintains that most paradigms for thinking about the cultural history of black 
people fail before the complex associations and rhizomorphic relationships (intercultural, 
intracultural, and transnational) that are a part of their collective experience.164 Gilroy 
rejects both essentialism (absolutist and nationalistic orientations) as well as anti-
essentialism (vulgar pluralism or relativistic construal) of blackness in favor of a via 
media (anti-anti-essentialism), "that sees racialised subjectivity as the product of the 
social practices that supposedly derive from it."165 Likewise, bell hooks, in her essay 
"Postmodern Blackness," states "We have too long had imposed upon us both from the 
outside and the inside a narrow, constricting notion of blackness."166 Similarly, Victor 
Anderson challenges the essentialized notions of Africana identity, through his critique of 
ontological blackness, where ontological blackness is an episteme in which black identity 
is reified, circumscribed, and homogenized. Instead of ontological blackness, Anderson is 
163
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presence of the signified. 
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an advocate for construal of black identity that embraces ambiguity and difference 
associated with what he calls the aesthetics of the grotesque.167 
Unfortunately, in the context of habituated notions, such descriptions of religious 
experiences are apt to be relegated to the domain of the anomalous because of their 
nonconformity with the conventional. Such approaches, in my estimation, have received 
less than adequate attention by those who purport concern for the everyday lived 
experience of African Americans, including experiences of the religious. 
In the selection of the case studies, I resolved that a majority - two - should 
reflect the experience of women in keeping with the disproportionately large presence 
and participation of women within African American religious communities. Moreover, it 
was also my intention to select individuals who were "everyday, ordinary people" -
persons not susceptible to labels of the exceptional, or what William James referred to as 
those in possession of religious genius; i.e. the women need not be any kind of religious 
1AR 
savants. At the same time, Helga Crane and Valeria lead quite different lives, in 
different historical, social, and cultural contexts. Not surprisingly, an initial appraisal of 
their religious experiences would reveal marked differences. 
For the one man among the case studies, however, I chose an individual who very 
well might be deemed an exceptional religious and spiritual adept - Howard Thurman. It 
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is interesting to note that scholars such as Alton Pollard,169 Luther Smith,170 Mozella 
Mitchell,171 John Bryant and Paget Henry have recognized elements of a 
phenomenological attitude within Thurman's thought.172 The form of phenomenological 
analysis deployed by these scholars, however, is not framed in terms of theories of 
"everyday life." Indeed, in their engagement with Thurman as an educator, pastor, 
theologian, mystic, and catalyst of social change, there is again the tendency to 
emphasize the exceptional, the spiritual genius. As in the case of Helga Crane and 
Valeria, however, I wish to intend Thurman on the level of the everyday for Thurman is 
very much a denizen both of the mysterious and the mundane, of the sublime and the 
banal. It is in keeping with such an assessment of Thurman that I chose religious 
experiences and events in the life of Thurman that evince such an orientation, particularly 
with respect to Thurman's attunement with his world of immanence, social and natural. It 
is these instances from which I draw in Chapter 2. Moreover, it is in these instances that I 
believe the "Apostle of Sensitiveness" has much to reveal to the mindful observer. 
Nevertheless, there is something that all three case studies share. They all convey 
what it is to be a being-in-the-world whose existence as a self is fractured, fragmented, 
episodic, and at times conflicted and paradoxical. This they share with all beings-in-the-
world, with all Dasein. However, they experience a unique kind of fragmentation, 
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associated with what it is to be African American, the fragmentation that is associated 
with the phenomenon of racialization mentioned in the earlier discourse on Africana 
phenomenology. 
In this chapter, it is my intention to show that such heterological existences are 
best explained and interpreted in terms or the theories of everyday life. And moreover, 
that such ways of being call into question many of the fundamental assumptions of the 
dominant liberative hermeneutical paradigm. 
Howard Thurman 
In his autobiography,. With Head and Heart, the African American divine and 
mystic Howard Thurman relates his intimacy with nature and the world around him. 
The ocean and the river befriended me when I was child.. .the ocean and the night 
together surrounded my little life with a reassurance that could not be affronted by 
the behavior of human beings. The ocean at night gave me a sense of 
timelessness, of existing beyond the reach of the ebb and flow of circumstances. 
Death would be a minor thing, I felt, in the sweep of that natural embrace.173 
Continuing, 
When the storms blew, the branches of the large oak tree in our backyard would 
snap and fall. But the topmost branches of the oak tree would sway, giving way 
just enough to save themselves from snapping loose. I needed the strength of that 
tree, and like it, I wanted to hold my ground. Eventually, I discovered that the oak 
tree and I had a unique relationship. I could sit, my back against its trunk, and feel 
the same peace that would come to me in my bed at night. I could reach down in 
the quiet places of my spirit, take out my bruises and my joys, unfold them, and 
talk about them. I could talk aloud to the oak tree and know that I was understood. 
It too was a part of my reality, like the woods, the night, and the pounding surf, 
my earliest companions, giving me space.174 
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One story Thurman includes in the autobiography that I find particularly intriguing is his 
encounter with a small white girl, the child of an old family with whom Thurman's 
grandmother had a relationship as their launderer. Through the familial association, 
Thurman obtained a job with the family involved raking and burning the accumulated 
leaves in their yard in the fall. It seems that this little girl, four or five years of age, 
looked forward to the arrival of Thurman as a companion for her loneliness. 
Thurman relates that one day, after he had raked the leaves into several piles, the 
little girl would scatter the piles in search of particularly colorful leaves. She continued to 
do this despite Thurman's numerous requests for her to cease and desist. Finally, he 
threatened to telLher father of her disruptive actions when he came home. At this, she 
took a pin from her pinafore and drove it into his hand. Thurman draws back in pain and 
asks the child what possessed her. According to Thurman, the girl's simple response was 
i nr 
that he was only acting injured, for as an African American, he did not feel pain. 
Thurman notes that when he came home, he told 'Grandma' about it. He 
describes her as always being there for him - "the receptacle for the little frustrations and 
hurts I brought to her."176 
A Phenomenology of Howard Thurman 
It is my contention that the three events noted above each constitute a religious 
experience. As stipulated in Chapter 1, a religious experience is best defined as any 
experience (understood as an event that one lives through either as a participant or an 
observer and about which one is conscious or aware) in which what is experienced by the 
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person is taken to be an encounter with the "real" or "true. " Depending on one's 
tradition, this is may be referred to as God (a representative of God, or other 
theophanies), Nature, the Ground, the Ultimate, the Infinite, or the self. 
In the first two examples, one has Thurman recounting his early intimacy with the 
natural world. This is Thurman, the nascent mystic, who will develop a panentheistic 
theology dealing with the immanence of the Divine in the world and human relationships. 
Such experiences are not uncommon among those who study religion. Indeed, Thurman's 
accounts are quite consistent with those referred to by the likes of Schleiermacher, Otto, 
and James, with whom I dealt in the first chapter. The feeling of absolute dependence, the 
uncanny, and the oceanic all find resonance with Thurman's words in the first two 
pericopes. 
Even more thought provoking, however, is the story of Thurman's interaction 
with the small girl. In this seemingly innocuous event, Thurman is confronted with an 
existential-ontological crisis in which his conscious self, his empirical ego is fractured 
and fragmented. Indeed, this event is reminiscent of the scenario earlier referenced in the 
first part of the chapter, from Fanon's Black Skin, White Mask. Once more, the catalyst 
for the event is a white child. In the case of Fanon, it is the discursive power of the word, 
'Negro' that shatters his perception as a ' self , as an 'I', as a 'subject.' In the case of 
Thurman, though one might be given to focus on the physical assault, i.e., the child 
sticking him with a pin from her dress, this is to miss the discursive component, that of 
the speech act of the girl. Thurman himself alludes to the girl's actions as being rooted in 
frustration and annoyance. Indeed, it does not appear to be an act of hatred, malice, or 
retaliation, for when Thurman draws back in pain and surprise and asks her what she was 
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doing, she also seems surprised. She does not respond by telling him that he was being 
punished for, say, his insolence. Rather, she is confused as to why Thurman is feigning 
being in pain. Surely they are both aware that he, as an African American, is incapable of 
such a sensation.177 
Articulated differently, she is a declaration of his lack of "humanity." She is 
saying that he is not a self or subject. As she perceives things, Thurman is not a person. 
This is not as the famous Jewish scholar Martin Buber would characterize an "I-Thou" 
relationship. As such, the intersubjective association is one that is quite complex. This is 
not simply the awareness of one's self, another, and the others perception of you, because 
"you" - "one's self ' - is not one. This is Du Bois's double consciousness - Du Bois's 
phenomenological account of the self-consciousness of Africana subjects whose "We" 
had been shattered and challenged by this process of "negrification." It is also Fanon's 
triple person [the fragmented Africana self or subject as with Du Bois and double 
consciousness person]. Interestingly, in his recollection of this incident, the last words are 
the girls. He does not respond directly to her comment. Ontologically, she is undone him, 
disassembled his consciousness as a self. Again, as Fanon notes, in his phenomenological 
analysis, Thurman is confronted with existential non-being. It is important to emphasize 
that the task here is phenomenological description, not explanation or analysis. 
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In the wake of the trauma, however, Thurman returns to his grandmother, and 
tells her what has happened. It was something that seems simple, and ordinary, but there 
is great significance in this encounter. The interaction between the old woman and her 
grandchild is a moment of restitution, of constitution, of - for some indeterminate -
period of being restored as a self. The intimacy and identification with his grandmother 
appears to afford him the opportunity to be in touch with that which is more real, more 
true, than what he had earlier experienced, bringing about a moment of wholeness and 
178 
equilibrium to the metastable self. 
Helga Crane 
The source of the next example of African American religious experience to 
which a phenomenological analysis will be deployed is the protagonist of Nella Larsen's 
1928 novel Quicksand, a young woman by the name of Helga Crane. I have selected this 
work and character for a variety of reasons. Firstly, while Larsen's work has seen a 
resurgence among scholars interested in early twentieth century African American or 
women's literature, it is my opinion that as a resource for reflection on African American 
religion and religious experience, it introduces interesting opportunities which have not 
been sufficiently explored. While references to the literature of Zora Neal Hurston - a 
contemporary of Larsen - as well as contemporary authors such as Alice Walker and 
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Toni Morrison in works such as The Color Purple, Song of Solomon, and Beloved are 
frequently invoked in the scholarship of African American religionists, Larsen's work is 
not. 
Crane is the daughter of a white Danish mother and an African American father. 
As a person of mixed ancestry, she functions in the novel as the quintessential outsider, in 
search of a place to call home, somewhere to belong. Due to her gender, her racial-ethnic 
mix, and her intellect, she occupies the status of'other' within numerous communities 
and social contexts. As 'other,' she is spurned as one who does not possess a space or 
place within the nomos of Western society, while simultaneously is an attractant as a kind 
of objet d'art. 
Indeed, the Helga Crane is indicative of a character found within African 
American literature that has come to be referred to as the "tragic mulatto/a." Dr. David 
Pilgrim, Professor of Sociology at Ferris State University, traces the origin of the persona 
to a work by Lydia Maria Child in two short stories: "The Quadroons" (1842) and 
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"Slavery's Pleasant Homes" (1843). The female hero of the first short story, Rosalie 
was born of a white slave owner and a black female slave. Unaware of her maternal 
parentage, she assumes herself to be white. Upon the death of her father, however, her 
parentage was revealed. Her lover abandoned her and she was remained to slavery, where 
she was subjected to violence and brutality. In the second story, Frederic Dalcho, master 
of a Georgian plantation, is killed by his half brother, the quadroon George, whom he 
owns. Frederic had precipitated the death of George's wife. A similar portrait is painted 
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by the African American abolitionist William Wells Brown in his novel Clotel, published 
in 1853.180 
As a literary device, the tragic mulatto/a was frequently associated with 
characteristics such as self-hatred, depression, alcoholism, sexual perversion, and suicide. 
If light enough to "pass" as White, she often did so, but passing often led to deeper self-
loathing. The mulatta pitied or despised Blacks and the "blackness" in her; she hated or 
feared Whites yet desperately sought their approval. In a racialized society, the only 
peace for the tragic mulatta was frequently the peace of the grave. Sterling Brown 
summarized the treatment of the tragic mulatto by white writers: 
To them he is the anguished victim of divided inheritance.. .they work it 
out that his intellectual strivings and self-control come from his white 
blood, and his emotional urgings, indolence and potential savagery come 
from his Negro blood. Their favorite character, the octoroon, wretched 
because of the "single drop of midnight in her veins," desires a white lover 181 
above all else, and must therefore go down to a tragic end. 
The commonly held belief that "mixed blood" brought sorrow. If only they did not have a 
"drop of Negro blood." George M. Fredrickson, author of The Black Image in the White 
Mind, claimed that many White Americans believed mulattoes were a degenerate race 
because they had "White blood" which made them ambitious and power hungry 
combined with "Black blood" which made them animalistic and savage. Mulatto women 
were depicted as emotionally troubled seducers and mulatto men as power hungry 
1 89 
criminals. 
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Vera Caspary's novel The White Girl (1929) told the story of Solaria, a beautiful 
mulatto who passes for White.183 Her secret is revealed by the appearance of her brown-
skinned brother. Depressed, and believing that her skin is becoming darker, Solaria 
drinks poison. A more realistic but equally depressing mulatto character is found in 
Geoffrey Barnes's novel Dark Lustre (1932).184 Alpine, the light-skinned "heroine," dies 
in childbirth, but her white baby continues her mother's tragic cycle. Both Solaria and 
Alpine are repulsed by African Americans, particularly those whom they perceived to be 
suitors. 
Perhaps the most famous portrayal of the tragic mulatta is that of Peola in the 
novel Imitation of Life (193 3).185 Tired of being treated as a second-class citizen, she 
decides to pass for white and begged her mother, Delilah, to understand. 
Don't come for me. If you see me in the street, don't speak to me. From 
this moment on I'm White. I am not colored. You have to give me up. 
Peola wants to live without the stigma of her African ancestry. Ultimately, Peola rejects 
her mother, runs away, and passes for white into the majority society. The novel ends 
with a tearful Peola at the funeral of her mother, who has died of a broken heart. 
Quicksand, along with Larsen's second novel Passing, is typically viewed by 
literary critics as a fictionalized and poeticized self-reflective version of the author's own 
life. This is similar to Richard Wright in Black Boy and The Outsider, where the 
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"mixed-race" or "bi-racial." The child of a Danish mother and a "colored" father, Larsen, 
187 
like Helga Crane, wrestles with issues of identity and self. 
Returning to Quicksand, the story begins with Helga as a teacher in Naxos. The 
reader is informed that when she first arrived at the school, she was filled with the desire 
to educate African American children. However, her sense of vocation is put to the test 
and her passion wanes as she confronts the parochialism and provincialism of the school 
and the greater African American community. She soon comes to feel unwelcome and 
out of place, an outcast. Even her engagement to fellow instructor James Vale does not 
bring her the acceptance that she seeks, for he comes from a prominent black family that 
disapproves of her because she does not have the proper pedigree. 
In an impulsive move, Helga boards a train to Chicago, the place of her birth and 
a place she once called home. Unfortunately, she discovers that there is no place for her 
there. This is uniquely portrayed in the changed relationship with her maternal Uncle 
Peter. The once beloved figure, and indeed, the only supportive male figure in Helga's 
life, has married a woman who wishes to have nothing to do with her. Indeed, the new 
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Mrs. Nilssen believes she is completely justified in her decision, and feels that Helga 
should understand why she is not wanted. Helga later receives a letter from her uncle 
saying that he must accede to his wife's wish and severs all ties with his niece. 
Helga is once more compelled to move, this time grasping an opportunity to make 
her way to Harlem as an assistant of a white suffragist, who is also interested in the uplift 
of African Americans. Through her employer, Helga meets Anne Grey, who befriends 
and introduces her to all the right members of "Negro society." Finally, it seems, she has 
found a place where she belongs, where she can be part of a community. Helga notes, 
[ajgain she had that strange transforming experience, this time not so 
fleetingly, that magic sense of having come home. Harlem, teeming black 
Harlem, had welcomed her and lulled her into something that was, she was 
certain, peace and contentment.188 
In Harlem, Helga becomes reacquainted with the former principal of the school at where 
she had taught in Naxos - Dr. Robert Anderson. There is clearly an attraction between 
the two, an almost palpable sexual tension present in all their interactions. Regrettably, 
the relationship is also fraught with misunderstandings, contention, and conflict, such that 
it has no future. Moreover, the same feelings begin to exist between Helga and her 
community. 
"It was as if she were shut up, boxed up, with hundreds of her race, closed 
up with that something in the racial character which had always been, to 
her, inexplicable, alien. Why [ . . . ] should she be yoked to these despised 
black folk?"189 
In an ironic twist, Anderson becomes betrothed to Helga's friend and sponsor, Alice 
Grey, and Helga once more sets flight for a place where she can belong. 
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Helga goes to Copenhagen, where from her mother came. She is welcomed and 
hosted by her Aunt Katrina and Uncle Poul. Through their efforts and social 
maneuvering, Helga gains entree among the cultural elite. Unfortunately, she soon learns 
that she is accepted as an exotic (as well as the erotic).190 Ultimately rejecting the 
proposal of one of the city's leading young artists, Helga returns to Harlem and the 
United States. 
Rejected, alone, forsaken, she nevertheless attends a society party where she runs 
into Robert Anderson. Noticing that they are alone, Anderson unconsciously kisses her 
and she is surprised by the passion it stirs within her. Later, however, Anderson 
apologizes to her and admits that he was a "fool" to have kissed her. 
She had ruined everything [. . .] because she had been so silly as to close 
her eyes to all indication that pointed to the fact that no matter what the 
intensity of his feelings or desires might be, he was not the sort of man 
who would for any reason give up one particle of his own good opinion of 
himself. Not even for her. Not even though he knew that she had wanted 
so terribly something special from him.191 
At this revelation, Helga is crestfallen and finds herself walking the street in the rain. To 
escape the deluge, she enters a Harlem church during what appears to be a revival. The 
guest preacher is one Rev. Green. In this context, Helga undergoes a religious 
conversion, believing that God has provided a means for her to find happiness. As the 
conduit of God's grace, Helga is drawn to Rev. Green, whom she quickly marries, and 
returns with him to his congregation in rural Alabama. Once more, she attempts to fit in, 
to find a place, but after giving birth to three children in two years time, she becomes 
seriously ill. It is in the midst of her bedridden status that she realizes that even this last 
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choice was not one of salvation, but rather a kind of prison in which she must somehow 
find a way to persevere. 
Everything in her mind was hot and cold, beating and swirling about. 
Within her emaciated body raged disillusion. Chaotic turmoil. With the 
obscuring curtain of religion rent, she was able to look about her and see 
with shocked eyes this thing that she had done to herself. She couldn't, she 
thought ironically, even blame God for it, now that she knew He didn't 
exist. No more than she could pray to Him for the death of her husband, 
the Reverend Mr. Pleasant Green. The white man's God. And His great 
love for all people regardless of race! What idiotic nonsense she had 
allowed herself to believe. How could she, how could anyone, have been 
so deluded? How could ten million black folk credit it when daily before 
their eyes was enacted its contradiction? Not that she at all cared about the 
ten million. But herself. Her sons. Her daughter. These would grow to 
manhood, to womanhood, in this vicious, this hypocritical land. The dark 
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eyes filled with tears. 
However, this is not Helga's sole revelation. She now sees that religion was a palliative. 
It was an analgesic, a painkiller. Yet, concurrent with such attributes, was the potential 
for religion to create a kind of bondage for African Americans. Thus, if there was a God, 
it was the white man's God, and He must find humor in the suffering of the poor and the 
oppressed. 
She had ruined her life, made it impossible ever again to do the things that 
she wanted, have the things that she loved, mingle with the people she 
liked. She had, to put it as brutally as anyone could, been a fool. The 
damnedest kind of fool. And she had paid for it. Enough. More than 
enough. 
Her mind, swaying back to the protection that religion had afforded her; 
almost she wished that it had not failed her. An illusion. Yes, but better, 
far better, than this terrible reality. Religion had after all, its uses. It 
blunted the perceptions. Robbed life of its crudest truths. Especially it had 
its uses for the poor - and the blacks. 
For the blacks. The Negroes. 
And this, Helga decided, was what ailed the whole Negro race in America, 
this fatuous belief in the white man's God, this childlike trust in full 
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compensation for all woes and privations in "kingdom come." Sary 
Jones's absolute conviction, "In de nex' worl' we' all recompense'," came 
back to her. And ten million souls were as sure of it as was Sary. How the 
white man's God must laugh at the great joke he had played on them! 
Bound them to slavery, then to poverty and insult, and made them bear it 
unresistingly, uncomplainingly almost, by sweet promises of mansions in 
the sky by and by.193 
A Phenomenology of Helga Crane 
Throughout the novel, Helga enters into various environments with the best of 
intentions and the hope that she will find a home and in so doing, find herself. Yet, 
invariably, Helga eventually deems each place inadequate. It is Helga's insecure identity 
that accounts for her perpetual discomfort in various communities. Helga's mixed race 
and unsupportive family history are the major contributing factors to her inability to 
form a strong personal identity and, subsequently, to attain contentment in her numerous 
living situations. 
Helga's first difficulty comes from her ideas about family and background, as she 
is the child of an absent black father and a white, foreign mother. Subsequently, Helga 
grows up as the sole non-white in a household that contained her mother, stepfather, and 
stepsiblings. As a young adult, to all intents and purposes, she is an orphan. As she 
considers her experience in Naxos, and her decision to release her fiance from his 
obligation, she reflects, 
No family. That was the crux of the matter. It accounted for everything. 
Her failure here in Naxos, her former loneliness in Nashville...If you 
couldn't prove your ancestry and connections, you were tolerated, but you 
didn't "belong."194 
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According to Helga, as a person with no family, she has no standing in African American 
society, and thus is expected to be "inconspicuous and conformable."195 
Helga then must face the myriad of discourses that seek to define and constitute 
her "self ' alone. Although she associates with the African American community, Helga 
never succeeds in adopting a sense of "we." Moreover, she feels that the African 
American community of Naxos unreflexively conforms to white society's expectations of 
what is appropriate behavior and in so doing, denies their cultural genius. 
Later, among the black intellectuals of Harlem, Helga for a time has a "we" sense, 
meeting other blacks "with tastes and ideas similar to her own."196 Yet this does not 
translate into personal connection. In Copenhagen, she refuses the hand of the young 
artist, claiming, 
You see, I couldn't marry a white man. I simply couldn't. It isn't just you, 
not just personal, you understand. It's deeper, broader than that. It's 
racial.. .if we were married, you might come to be ashamed of me, to hate 
me, to hate all dark people. My mother did that.197 
Helga, once more, in her struggle to be a self, a subject, in the context of a 
racialized society, is thwarted. She longs to be appreciated as an individual, as an "I," not 
in the context of being a thing, an exotic, and a color. 
Phenomenologically, Helga is confronted with the contingency of her existence. 
In the absence of a definite position, she must perpetually confront non-being. Yet she is 
not willing to conform or accept social conventions or cultural norms in order to belong, 
for that would be an act of self-deception, of bad faith. Nonetheless, there persists the 
craving for wholeness, fullness, and completeness. 
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It is my contention, however, that Helga's struggle to be, to be a "self," an "I," is 
revealed most clearly in the context of her religious experiences, the first of which is her 
conversion experience, and the second, her moment of revelation on her sick bed toward 
198 
the end of the novel. 
As noted above, Helga enters the revival in a state of distress. She feels lost, 
unable to get her bearings on anything outside herself or within herself that gives her a 
sense of identity. Her world does not make sense. As she stumbles along the street in the 
rain, she is literally blown by wind and water into a swollen gutter. Yet, it comes into her 
mind that she cannot give up, that she is not ready to die, no matter how it is often 
romanticized.199 
Therefore, Helga stumbles to her feet and enters the door of what she takes to be a 
store. As she does so, however, she is greeted by voices singing a song from some distant 
past - her past. She has walked into a church service, and those in attendance are singing 
the hymn "Showers of Blessings." She is overcome by a rush of emotion as well as the 
seeming irony and absurdity of her appearance, at that moment. Subsequently, she 
collapses on the floor in fits of crying and laughter. 
All in the hall comes to an abrupt halt, while she is assisted to a seat at the front of 
the congregation. With that, song once more rises, this time "a low wailing thing."200 The 
song has an almost hypnotic effect on her, inducing a trancelike state. 
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Oh, the bitter shame and sorrow 
That a time could ever be 
When I let the Savior's pity 
Plead in vain, and proudly answered, 
"All of self and none of Thee." 
Yet He found me; I beheld Him 
Bleeding on the accursed tree; 
Heard Him pray: 
"Forgive them, Father"; 
and my wistful heart said faintly, 
"Some of self and some of Thee." 
Day by day, His tender mercy, 
Healing, helping, full and free, 
Sweet and strong, and, oh, so patient, 
Brought me lower, while I whispered, 
"Less of self and more of Thee." 
Higher than the highest heavens, 
Deeper than the deepest sea, 
Lord, Thy love at last has conquered; 
Grant me now my soul's desire, 
"None of self and all of Thee."201 
After the song, the intensity of the congregation as a whole seems to increase. 
Ecstatic expressions of worship surrounded her, exhorting her to "come to Jesus." 
Initially viewing herself apart from the frenzy before her, Helga perceives the writhing 
and weeping with contempt and disdain. Yet, as prayers, moans, and chants proceed, 
Helga is gripped by "an indistinct horror of an unknown world." Though now repulsed by 
what surrounded her, "the horror held her." 
Soon, she too felt the urge to shout, to scream, to be one with the crowd, to share 
in the madness. Larsen describes this as the moment that she was lost - or saved. Out of 
her mouth burst the words appealing for God's mercy. She is then embraced by the 
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women around her and "The thing became real. A miraculous calm came upon her. Life 
seemed to expand, and to become very easy." 202As the service ends, Helga approaches 
the guest preacher of the evening, Rev. Mr. Pleasant Green, and accepts his offer to 
escort her back to her hotel. When she awakes the next morning, she develops a plan, 
which she believes will result in her continued happiness; namely, she decides to 
persuade the preacher to marry her. 
She arrives with her new husband in the small town in Alabama where his church 
is located. Helga threw herself into this new life with much relish. As the wife of the 
pastor, she sought to become the model of domesticity, attempting to create a place of 
beauty for herself and those around her amidst the ugliness of the poverty-stricken 
community. As the pastor's wife, she joined the other women in mission work, outreach, 
and the care and education of the children. She did all this despite being perceived as an 
outsider, as elitist, and as naive. 
As mentioned earlier, she soon found herself with three babies and with another 
on the way. Surprisingly, despite her almost constant state of exhaustion, she does her 
best to maintain a positive outlook. Finally, however, with the birth of the fourth child, 
another "little dab of amber humanity.. .contributed to a despised race," Helga entered a 
kind of catatonia. Unresponsive to all around her, she closed her eyes and remained 
lying in her bed. Larsen describes Helga as having gone down into the abyss of pain 
where, though terrifying and horrible, there was also a freeing element. It is this event 
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that I see as the other significant religious experience for Helga, her second conversion 
experience in many respects.204 
Though described as an event of peace and joy, Helga eventually leaves her sick 
state after a few weeks. When she opens her eyes, she is greeted by her nurse, Miss 
Hartley with the words, "Well, here you are!" to which Helga responded, "I'm back." 
When her husband approaches, she finds herself repulsed by him and all that he 
represents. As Helga rests in bed alone, she is able to reflect on her situation, on her 
predicament. "The cruel, unrelieved suffering had beaten down her protective wall of 
artificial faith in the infinite wisdom, in the mercy, of God."205 She had called out to God 
and God was not there, because she now knows that there is no God. Moreover, life was 
no miracle, no wonder, at least not for African Americans. 
With the obscure curtain of religion rent, she was able to look about her 
and see with shocked eyes this thing she had done to herself. She couldn't, 
she thought, even blame God for it, now that she knew that He didn't 
exist. 
It is my contention that Helga's rejection of God coincides with her finally taking 
responsibility for her choices, as well as jettisoning belief in a "true self." Thus again, 
there is the realization that the self as subject is a metastable construct. Again, in true 
Sartrean fashion, human life is absurd. We crave wholeness, fullness, and completeness, 
but it is not something that we can fully possess. Humans are both subjects and objects. 
As such, we exist as pour soi (for-itself) and as an en soi (in-itself). In her rejection of 
God and of the true self as something static and immutable, she embraces a self. Helga 
does this when, in the language of Fanon, the colonized thing can only become human 
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when it identifies the subtle colonizing tactics of ontotheological representation (the 
colonizer as God or the representative of God, i.e., a chosen or elect) and then claims its 
206 
own identity through a process of self-creation and self-definition. 
Valeria 
In an essay entitled '"Jesus is my Doctor': Healing and Religion in African 
9 0 7 
American Women's Lives," Stephanie Y. Mitchem shares the present day story of 
Valeria, a middle aged African American woman who believes in and has experienced 
faith healing. Her first experience of such healing was associated with her suffering from 
hepatitis. Later, she would call upon her faith in dealing with chronic back pain. Valeria 
currently lives in the suburbs outside of Detroit. She is employed by the state of Michigan 
in position that can be characterized as middle management. Nearing retirement, due to 
either her age or the number of years of service she has accumulated, Valeria's plans for 
the future include starting her own business. 
Valeria is a member of Great Faith Ministries International, Detroit. This 
nondenominational, predominantly black and Christian congregation is located in a poor 
part of the city - the Barton-McFarland neighborhood. The church building consists of a 
converted movie theater and several adjacent buildings at 10735 Grand River. The church 
has developed an extensive outreach via radio, TV, and the internet. They also have 
established a presence in the Atlanta, Georgia area. Under the leadership of Bishop 
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Wayne T. Jackson and his wife, Dr. Beverly Y. Jackson, the church presents a message 
that it is God's wish for his people to prosper in all areas of their lives. 
As noted above, the first instance of faith healing followed Valeria's diagnosis of 
"a type of hepatitis."208 After receiving the news of her infection status, she attended her 
church in Detroit. On a Sunday when the ministers of healing were present, parishioners 
with various diseases where invited to come forward for the laying on of hands. When the 
invitation was extended to those who had blood disorders, Valeria went forward. At her 
next blood test, Valeria states that the results came back negative, that there was no 
disease present. 
Valeria's second experience of healing also came through her church. This time, 
the church ministry was responsible for facilitating the cure of her chronic back pain. 
Valeria thus began to follow a daily morning regime of prayer and self-anointing with 
special oils. In reflecting on her interactions with Valeria and the members of Great Faith, 
Mitchem notes that they all "understand God as active in their everyday lives."209 Valeria 
shares "I stay [at Great Faith] because God has not told me to go anywhere else... also I 
91 n 
believe that God's power is demonstrated there." 
Mitchem asserts that such an understanding of the relationship between faith and 
healing reveals the continued influence of African American folk religion. Further, for 
her, this is also related to what she refers to as "ordinary theologies," which she asserts 
are to be found throughout African American communities. Mitchem says the following: 
African American women express black cultural understandings in the 
retention of an embodied spirituality, that is, a connected body-spirit view 
of self that yields culturally informed religious understandings. Valeria's 
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understanding of illness demonstrates these connections: 'Illness to me is 
when you don't have a spirit of forgiveness and you don't have joy. You 
know, just to see the sun outside, I was joyous. I was excited. I felt like I 
had some pep, some energy.211 
Mitchem notes that Valeria's faith based healing represents a common theme in 
the health/healing experience of African American women in the United States. 
Faith lies at the core of the ordinary theologies of African American 
women such as Valerie. Faith, for many black women, becomes a self-
defining center that resists socially constructed stereotypes. God is known 
as one who can make a way out of no way. Therefore, taking a problem in 
life to God is seen as an active step toward its resolution. As such, faith 
becomes a tool of resistance, rejecting limits and dehumanization. Faith 
offers the believer self-empowerment through God's power. Believing is 
an activity that taps power. "God is able" is both a statement of faith and a 
battle cry. Thus, the development of black women's faith is not merely a 
response to social conditions or a form of denial. Faith can provide the 
alternative space in which black women become self-empowered. Faith in 
this framework has the cultural groundings of the black community and 
black women's networks, but it involves a lifelong process of spiritual 
212 
maturation. 
Mitchem references Karen Baker-Fletcher and her reflections on the body-soul 
connections in black women's religious thought: 
God is present in our everyday lives, and infinite possibilities for healing 
and wholeness are in our midst... It is in our human bodies, souls, and 
minds in our everyday lives that we experience and reason about the 
sacred. Such everyday experience of and thought about the sacred enables 
humankind with powers of sustenance to practice survival, healing, and 
• i n 
liberation in the midst of oppression. 
The grounds for black women's acceptance of faith healing cannot be dismissed 
as simply a response to economic stress. That Valeria, who is in a management position, 
is not in an economically depressed situation to which she responds by believing in faith 
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healing highlights the complexities in this study. The key, Valeria stressed, is belief: 
"You gotta believe to be healed. You must have faith."214 
A Phenomenology of Valeria 
Health care has been a site of struggle for African Americans since their arrival in 
North America. How does one maintain a positive view of oneself when he/she is seen as 
an object of disdain? African Americans deeply mistrust American medicine.215 
With respect to African American's experience of traditional Western medicine 
(allopathic and osteopathic), there has been a great deal of research into its use and 
misuse within the African American community. Such is the subject that medical scholar 
Harriet Washington explores in her book Medical Apartheid: The Dark History of 
Medical Experimentation on Black Americans from Colonial Times to the Present.2'6 The 
book reveals the hidden underbelly of scientific research and the roots of the African-
American health deficit. It also examines less well-known abuses and looks at unethical 
practices and mistreatment of blacks that are still taking place in the medical 
establishment today. A new report by the American Cancer society shows that African-
Americans are still more likely than any other group to develop and die of cancer. The 
study states that socio-economic factors play the largest role in this disparity - African 
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Americans have less access to health care and information, and are less likely to get 
217 
screening and medical treatment. 
Yet the marginalization of black people resulted in spaces or locations where they 
have been able to recreate themselves, to employ agency, and to affect their communities. 
There is a long tradition of healing arts in the black community. Practitioners of folk 
medicine, conjure, root work, and faith healing have accumulated and communicated 
their knowledge across the generations. How not to stunt the growth of a child, cures for 
acne, morning sickness, headaches, nosebleeds, birth control. The well-being of 
individual bodies intersects with the well-being of families and communities. I would 
maintain that this constitutes the background or the context in which we encounter 
Valeria - a context of illness/disease and its treatment, which is highly charged for many 
in the African American community. 
Valeria's encounter with illness is that of another oppressor, an enemy, as that 
which is an assault on her. In the religious experience of healing, there are encounters 
with an "other" or "Other," her pastor and/or God. As far as her consciousness is 
concerned, there is a corrective given in this encounter. She is an "I": a person, a child of 
God. She is also part of a "we": the congregation, the Church. As far as the other that is 
the minister, this is an "other" that she perceives as open and affirming of her as an "I." 
With respect to her subjectivity, there is not the veil or consciousness of herself as a third 
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person. The racialized fracturing is not present, so the healing is one of consciousness, of 
self. The affirming "other" in this situation is not engaged in racialization, because the 
other is not signifying her and she is not signifying herself as other than an "I." 
With respect to her daily practice, again, there is the continued constitution of 
herself as an "I." Specifically, the oil of anointing that she administers daily is from her 
community; it is blessed by the ministers of healing. There is the affirmation of herself 
with the application of the consecrated oil. In addition, this practice is accompanied by 
prayer, in which she encounters an "Other," before which she is accepted as an "I," as a 
subject. This is indeed an act of healing, in that fragmentation is momentarily rectified. 
There is unity of the complex self. There is wholeness here as an "I". 
Conclusion 
As I mentioned in the beginning of this chapter, the goal was to present 
phenomenological descriptions of case studies or examples of African American religious 
experience. This phenomenological rendering will provide the data upon which the 
theories and methodologies associated with an African American hermeneutics of 
liberation - what I have characterized as a dominant posture among African American 
religionists (particularly those in theology, ethics, and philosophy of religion) - as well as 
those associated with theories and methods of the "everyday" will be applied and 
contrasted in Chapter 5. In so doing, it is my assertion that the approach informed by 
studies of the quotidian will render a more compelling and robust explanation and 
interpretation of African American religious experience than those utilized by African 
American religionists. The failing of the latter will rest on their inability to deal 
effectively with the heterological nature of African American experience, which is made 
apparent on the level of the microscopic as opposed to the macroscopic perspective, and 
normative and essentialist views associated with the dominant paradigm. 
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Chapter 3 - Current Approaches to the Study of African American Religious 
Experience 
Introduction 
In this chapter, "Current Approaches to the Study of African American Religious 
Experience," I shall turn my attention to African American religionists' exploration of the 
nature and meaning of African American religious experience. As I stated in the 
introduction to this dissertation, the central problem that has beleaguered and invigorated 
my intellectual curiosity to date involves the nature of African American religious 
experience. What is one to make of the diverse and varied experiences of God or the 
Divine among African Americans? For example, in the African American Christianity of 
the historic Black Church, God is experienced as the one who is there "in the midnight 
hour" and the one who "makes a way out of no way." Concurrently, other African 
American religious traditions experience a God that is remote, idle, or irrelevant, at least 
with respect to the affairs of humanity. In the language of comparative religionists, these 
218 
later experiences are associated with a deus abscondus or deus otiosus. How does one 
assess such religious experiences? Are such religious experiences, associated with a 
people who for much of their collective history could be counted among the poor, the 
oppressed, and the disinherited in this country, at best palliatives or prophylactics and at 
worst, forms of psychosis or props for oppression? I assert that such questions should be 
of paramount concern for those religious scholars that profess to take the lived experience 
of the African Americans seriously. 
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In a fashion similar to that in Chapter 1,1 shall provide a brief overview of the 
manner in which African American religionists have attempted to describe, interpret, 
analyze, and explain African American religious experience, particularly from the 
perspective of African American theological discourse, particularly as it has been 
associated with Black and Womanist Theologies of Liberation. Through a review of the 
literature, I will show that schematizations of African American religious experience 
associated with these traditions, despite protestations to the contrary, actually share many 
of the same theoretical assumptions as well as those prevailing traditions in North 
Atlantic theologies (Anglo- American and European) that they purport to criticize. 
Subsequently, I will reveal what I believe to be the major shortcomings of African 
American religionists' engagement and analysis of religious experience, particularly as 
they relate to the overwhelming concern with collective transformation - macroscopic 
liberation - of African Americans over against "everyday" practices on the individual 
level.219 
Historic Approaches to the Study of African American Religious Experience 
Prior to the last half of the twentieth century, the study of religion and religious 
experience in the African American community was most closely associated with 
disciplines such as history and sociology. Moreover, these early studies were almost 
exclusively concerned with the study of the Black Church. Narrowly construed, the 
nomenclature "the Black Church" refers to such historic black denominations as the 
219
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African Methodist Episcopal Church, the African Methodist Episcopal Zion Church, the 
Colored (Christian) Methodist Episcopal Church, the National Baptist Convention, USA, 
Inc., the National Baptist Convention of America, the Progressive National Baptist 
Convention, and the Church of God in Christ. However, "the Black Church" is also a 
kind of sociological and theological shorthand for the pluralism of the African American 
220 Christian community in the United States. As such, the "Black Church" might be 
conceived of as a heuristic device or may be deployed along the lines of entities 
22 1 
possessing Wittgensteinian family resemblance (Familienahnlichkeit). 
Study of the Black Church, which prior to the 1960's was often referred to as the 
Negro Church, has been carried out by such renowned African American intellectuals as 
"yyy 
William Edward Burghardt Du Bois's The Negro Church ), Carter Godwin Woodson's 
The History of the Negro Church223, Benjamin Elijah Mays and Joseph William 
224 
Nicholson's The Negro's Church , and Edward Franklin Frazier's The Negro Church in 
America225. Substantive work of more recent vintage would include that of Albert J. 
Raboteau's Slave Religion: The Invisible Institution in the Antebellum South226 and A 
227 Fire in the Bones , Gayraud S. Wilmore's Black Religion and Black Radicalism: An 
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228 Interpretation of the Religious History of African American , and C. Eric Lincoln and 
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Lawrence H. Mamiya's The Black Church in the African American Experience 
That such a state of affairs should obtain is not that odd, however, for without question 
that Black Church had been and continues to be the dominant and most significant 
historical, cultural, and social expression of the religious consciousness of African 
American people. 
A few texts of note that look to examine the African American religious legacy 
outside of expressions of Christianity include Arthur Fauset's Black Gods of the 
t i I 
Metropolis: Negro Religious Cults of the Urban North , which is predicated on his 
anthropological field work among black religious groups in Philadelphia in the early 
1940. This work was particularly ground breaking in its attentiveness to sects such as that 
of Bishop Charles (Daddy) Grace and his United House of Prayer for All People; Prophet 
William Saunders Crowdy's Church of God and Saints of Christ, a Black Hebrew 
Israelite community; the Noble (Timothy) Drew Ali's The Moorish Science Temple, and 
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Father Divine's (George Baker) International Peace Movement. Another is C. Eric 
Lincoln's The Black Muslims in America232 study of the Nation of Islam. 
Beginning around the middle of the twentieth century, however, there was a 
significant theoretical and methodological shift from sociological and historical modes of 
inquiry of African American religion and religious experience, to theological, 
hermeneutical, and philosophical methodologies, and it is to this approach that I will now 
turn. 
James Cone, Father of Black Theology 
With texts such as Black Theology and Black Power233 and A Black Theology of 
Liberation 34, the scholarship of James Hal Cone has served as a catalyst for much 
contemporary African American religious scholarship. In these works, Cone applies the 
Christian gospel to the struggle of blacks in America. In so doing, he comes to identity 
the liberation of the oppressed with the gospel of Jesus, and thus proclaims that Christian 
theology is "black theology." Indeed, in Black Theology and Black Power, Cone states, 
"Christianity is not alien to Black Power; it is Black Power." According to Cone, it 
was his want to bring this to the awareness of the black community in the hopes of 
providing theological justification for the fight for civil and human rights of the 
oppressed "by any means necessary." In viewing God as on the side of the oppressed, 
Cone states, 
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"God in Christ has revealed himself as a God whose righteousness is 
inseparable from the weak and helpless in human society. The goal of 
Black theology is to interpret God's activity as he is related to the 
oppressed black community."236 
Cone begins his analysis of the content of black theology by explaining its 
significance and application to the black community. He explicitly states that "there is 
only one principle which guides the thinking and action of Black theology: an unqualified 
commitment to the black community as that community seeks to define its existence in 
the light of God's liberating work in the world." Cone identifies black theology as an 
articulation of the "theological self-determination of black people." In its application to 
the black community, black theology becomes a survival theology. Cone points out that 
the central question for black people is "how are we going to survive in a world which 
deems black humanity as an illegitimate form of human existence?"239 Thus, God "has 
made a decision about the black condition. He has chosen to make the black condition his 
condition! It is a continuation of his incarnation in twentieth-century America."240 Cone 
subsequently maintains that black theology provides the African American community 
with theological principles that justify action in the black revolutionary struggle. 
In developing his theology, Cone identifies the several sources: black history and 
black culture, as well as revelation, scripture, and tradition. However, the primary source 
for black theology is black experience. It is this source, he maintains, which dictates that 
the norm and hermeneutical principle for engaging all other sources must be the 
liberation of black people. - in the light of black experience - Jesus Christ. Thus, "the 
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norm of all God-talk which seeks to be black -talk is the manifestation of Jesus as the 
Black Christ who provides the necessary soul for black liberation."241 
While insistent about black experience as the context for theological reflection, 
Cone goes affirm the centrality of the Christ, noting, however, that what is most 
important for blacks is what "Jesus Christ means when they are confronted with the 
brutality of white racism."242 In actual fact, for Cone, the meaning of all revelation is 
formed and informed for African Americans experience of victimization and oppression, 
literally and figuratively. In this way,, black theology attempts to make sense of black 
experience.243 Revelation is "God's self-disclosure to man [sic] in a situation of 
liberation"244 where liberation is "emancipation from the political, economic, and social 
structures of the society.. .by whatever means black people deem necessary."245 
Moreover, black theology's emphasis on revelation provides the black community with 
the understanding of freedom from the social constructs of a "white" world. Thus, God is 
not neutral in regards to the black condition. For Cone, God "has chosen blacks as his 
own.. .he has decided to make our liberation his own."246 
For Cone, this liberative activity is most uniquely revealed in Jesus Christ. 
Indeed, in relating the life of Jesus Christ to black experience, he ultimately concludes 
that Christ is black, or in the words of the late Albert Cleage (Jaramogi Abebe Agyeman), 
Jesus Christ is the "Black Messiah"247. As the Black Messiah, Christ is present in the 
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midst of the black community's struggle to achieve liberation in this life as well as a 
guarantor that "those who have died for freedom have not died in vain, they will see the 
kingdom of God." Indeed, according to Cone, "This is precisely the meaning of our 
Lord's resurrection, and why we can fight against overwhelming odds. We believe in the 
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future of God, a future that must become present." 
One challenge in dealing with Cone is that he seldom refers explicitly to black or 
African American religious experience.249 Rather, he refers simply and frequently to 
black experience. This leaves the investigator frequently having to infer whether African 
American religious experience is synonymous with black experience; i.e. that black 
experience is intrinsically or inherently religious experience, or perhaps that African 
American religious experience is subsumed under the rubric of black experience. For 
example, Cone maintains that the black experience cannot be equated with 
Schleiermacher's notion of faith as inwardness, an intuition of the infinite, or as a feeling 
of absolute dependence. 
Whatever may be said about the biblical faith and black faith derived from 
Scripture, neither was based on a feeling of inwardness separated from 
historical experience. Both Israel and later the black community took 
history seriously and continued to test the validity of their faith in the 
context of historical struggle. Indeed, the faith of Israel and of black 
people was an historical faith, that is, a trust in the faithfulness and loyalty 
of God in the midst of historical troubles. It was not from introspection, 
James H. Cone, For My People : Black Theology and the Black Church, The Bishop Henry Mcneal Turner 
Studies in North American Black Religion ; Vol. 1 (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1984). According to 
Cone, Cleage's theology is illustrates what happens when theologians "reduce the Christian gospel to a 
literal identification with the ideology of black power." (36) 
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struggle of freedom." 
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nor from mystical meditation, but from the faithful reading of history that 
Israel and later the black community came to believe that the God of the 
Exodus and of Jesus was struggling to liberate broken humanity to 
250 
wholeness. 
Here it would seem that Cone is referring to the religious dimension of black experience, 
i.e. African American religious experience. Elsewhere, Cone goes on to say that the 
perspective referred to by Schleiermacher et al, is an indulgence which black people are 
not afforded.251 
Indeed, Cone refuses the interpreting the message of liberation through the lens 
of piety. The proclamations of freedom, liberty, and salvation are events that God will 
bring about in history, in materiality. Indeed, Cone seems to be critical of the 
temptation to construe liberation in terms of the psychological or cultural. Thus, in God 
of the Oppressed, in reflecting on "Who is Jesus Christ for us Today?" says that African 
Americans encounter Christ as black "not because of some cultural or psychological need 
of black people, but because and only because Christ really enters into our world where 
7 c - j 
the poor, the despised, and the black are..." Moreover, Jesus life, death, and 
resurrection reveal that God is present in all dimensions of human liberation. Further, the 
resurrection event reveals that God's liberating work is 
for all who are enslaved by principalities and powers. The resurrection 
conveys hope in God. Nor is this the "hope" that promises a reward in 
heaven in order to ease the pain of injustice on earth. Rather it is hope 
which focuses on the future in order to make us refuse to tolerate present 
inequities. To see the future of God, as revealed in the resurrection of 
Jesus, is to see also the contradiction of any earthly injustice with 
existence in Jesus Christ254. 
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Again, in God of the Oppressed, Cone will say 
But in the experience of the cross and resurrection, we know not only that 
black suffering is wrong but that it has been overcome in Jesus Christ. 
This faith in Jesus' victory over suffering is a once-for-all event of 
liberation. No matter what happens to us in this world, God has already 
given us a perspective on humanity that cannot be taken away with guns 
and bullets. Therefore, to William Jones' question, 'What is the decisive 
even of liberation?' We respond: the event of Jesus Christ! He is our 
Alpha and Omega, the one who died on the cross and was resurrected that 
we might be free to struggle for the affirmation of black humanity.255 
Finally, Cone explicitly rejects quietism and submissiveness as attributes or 
characteristics associated with African American religious thought. According to Cone, 
the idea that Jesus made blacks passive is simply a "misreading of the black religious 
experience." He was God's active presence in their lives, helping them to know that they 
were not created for bondage but for freedom. Through various cultural and religious 
expressions, African Americans embraced visions of freedom though they were often 
bound, dominated, and subjugated. 
When everything else in their experiences said that they were nobodies, 
Jesus entered their experience as a friend and a helper of the weak and the 
helpless. His presence in the black experience was the decisive liberating 
event which bestowed dignity upon them. His presence enabled blacks to 
believe that they were on the "Lord's journey" despite the historical 
evidence that said otherwise. 
Such faith resided and resides for Cone at the center of African American religious 
257 
experience. 
Black Theology Beyond Cone 
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While James Cone is considered by many to be the founder of black theology, 
there were a number of other significant contributors among that first generation. They 
include J. Deotis Roberts, Gayraud Wilmore, Cecil Cone, Joseph Washington, Major 
Jones, William R. Jones, Charles H. Long, Lawrence Neale Jones, Preston Williams, 
Charles Shelby Rooks, Peter Paris, Vincent Harding, C. Eric Lincoln, and Albert Cleage, 
to name some but not all who where there at the birthing of this theological tradition. Not 
all of these persons where theologians. Nor did they all necessarily share the same 
understanding of African American religious experience as it relates to encounters with 
oppression and the pursuit of liberation as understood by Cone. Nevertheless, with 
respect to defining the theological tradition, it would be Cone's thought that dominated 
the trajectory of the theological tradition. 
There are a number of reasons as to why this would be the case. Firstly, few of the 
other first generation scholars matched Cone with respect to his productivity in the area 
of scholarly publications. Also, as the Charles A. Briggs Distinguished Professor of 
Theology at Union Theological Seminary in the City of New York, Cone would go on the 
train most of the African American scholars to receive doctorates in theology over the 
last four decades in this country. Cones list of students includes Dwight Hopkins, George 
C. L. Cummings, Jacquelyn Grant, Delores Williams, Josiah Young, Dianne M. Stewart, 
Mark Chapman, Joanne Terrell, etc. 
Among this second wave of black theologians, the themes of liberation as 
constitutive of African American religious experience would continue to be fostered and 
developed. During this period, there was also a concerted effort to engage African 
American historical bequest in the form of slave narratives; African American vernacular 
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culture as expressed in art and music, e.g. the spirituals and the blues, as well as more 
contemporary cultural products in the form of African American literature. Such projects 
would expand and provide some level of nuance to black theologies grounding in African 
American religious experience. Yet, for the most of the scholars engaged in this research, 
there remained an identification of African American religious experience with 
conditions of suffering and the pursuit of liberation manifest in substantive social 
transformation. Yet on occasion, it seemed that Cone, in works such as The Spirituals 
and the Blues referred to a deeper level of African American experience that 
"transcends the tools of'objective' historical research." According to Cone, "that 
experience is available only to those who share the spirit and participate in the faith of the 
people who created these songs... [Thus] to interpret the religious significance of the 
spiritual for the black community, 'academic' tools are not enough. The interpreter must 
feel the Spirit."259 While such musings bare a remarkable resemblance to the 
understanding of the divine, the sacred, and the holy as articulated by the likes of 
Schleiermacher, Otto, and James; Cone never strayed far from liking African American 
religious experience to the quest for earthly liberation. 
As I have suggested in previous discussion, the concept of heaven in black 
religion has not been interpreted rightly. Most observers have defined the 
black religious experience exclusively in terms of slaves longing for 
heaven, as if that desire was unrelated to their earthly liberation. It has 
been said that the concept of heaven served as an opiate for black slaves, 
260 
making for docility and submission... 
Heaven was to be understood as the novum of God's kingdom still to come. It was 
"the expectation of the future of God, grounded in the resurrection of 
Jesus, that was the central theological focus of the black religious 
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experience.. .hope in a radically new future, defined solely by God the 
Liberator261 
Again, it is an oversimplification to characterize all second wave black 
theologians as possessing a shared or common understanding of liberation as well as 
African American religious experience. The participants in this movement brought 
different emphasizes and concerns. Riggins R. Earl in Dark Symbols, Obscure Sign: God 
Self, and Community in the Slave Mind,262 George C L Cummings with Hopkins in Cut 
263 
Loose Your Stammering Tongue: Black Theology in the Slave Narratives, and Hopkins 
in Shoes That Fit our Feet: Sources of Constructive Black Theology264engage in 
interpretative studies of slave religion as presented in slave narratives. 
Theodore Walker in Empower the People: Social Ethics for the African American 
Church265 brings his training as an ethicist and commitment to Africentric/Afrocentric 
thought in an attempt to articulate a vision for the Black Church as radical, new 
community with a holistic positive vision of relationship among African peoples. In a 
later work, Mothership Connections: A Black Atlantic Synthesis of Neoclassical 
Metaphysics and Black Theology266, Walker joins other African American theologians 
267 
such as Henry J. Young (Hope in Process: A Theology of Social Pluralism) Karen 
Baker-Fletcher (My Sister, My Brother : Womanist andXodus God-Talk, Dancing with 
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God: The Trinity from a Womanist Perspective, Sisters of Dust, Sisters of Spirit: 
268 Womanist Wordings on God and Creation ) , and Monica Coleman (Making a Way out 
269 
of No Way : A Womanist Theology) who count among a number of African American 
scholars influenced by the philosophical tradition of Alfred North Whitehead and Charles 
Hartshorne known as process philosophy or neoclassical metaphysics. Such scholars find 
the ideas of ultimate reality understood in terms of becoming, unfolding, and growth 
coherent with the African American experience of struggle in pursuit of liberation and 
freedom.270 
Finally, one would be derelict in omitting the work of Cornel West. In Prophesy 
Deliverance: An African American Revolutionary Christianity, Cornel West proffers an 
African American philosophy which takes seriously the "Afro-American experience." As 
he states in his preface, this philosophy proposes its own cultural roots and socio-political 
realities as its domain of inquiry.271 Such philosophy is not created solely to be the 
purview of the academy, but rather to offer those engaged in the struggle for African 
American liberation vital tools of analysis that also informs a meaningful and potentially 
effective praxis. Sources for the construction of this Afro-American critical thought are to 
be evangelical and pietistic Christianity, which West believes to be the most influential 
and enduring African American intellectual tradition, and American pragmatism. Further, 
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when such thought is open to a dialogical encounter with progressive Marxism, West sees 
the possibility for a truly revolutionary Christian perspective and praxis. 
Womanist Theology 
Perhaps the most significant movement associated with second generation black 
theology has been womanist theological discourse. As a distinct discipline, womanist 
theology differs from North Atlantic, black, and feminist theologies in its emphasis on 
the lives of African American women. It is the contention of womanist theologians that 
African American women possess a deep and sophisticated religiosity that has largely 
been ignored. These religious scholars go on to assert that such experiences are 
tremendous resources for those attempting to construct a theology of liberation for 
oppressed people in general, and African American women in particular. 
Womanist theology reports as a primary source the lives and voices of ordinary 
Black women. In response to the question, "What does it mean to be a Black woman in 
the United States?" womanist scholars maintain that principally it is to be oppressed due 
to race, gender, and socio-economic situation (class). Thus, womanist theology claims to 
272 
do theology from a "tridimensional experience," of racism, sexism, and classism. 
Additionally, African American women are also "entrapped" by definitions of 
what it means to be a woman; definitions that historically excluded them while 
simultaneous purporting to be normative. In addition, black women have been saddled 
with notions of martyrdom and self-sacrifice. Womanist theology attempts to redress the 
offenses perpetrated against black women. 
272
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However, womanist theology, like black theology, defines itself as a liberation 
theology. As each liberation theology speaks to the particular realities of a group of 
people who have been silenced, womanist theology attempts to do this with respect to 
black women. As such, it is informed by the "ordinary theologies" of black women 
rooted in their spirituality and faith. These "ordinary theologies" encompass concepts and 
practices of black women, and reflect black women's comments to one another, 
especially motherhood and sisterhood; to family; and to community. 
The term womanist is beholden to the author/activist Alice Walker. According to 
Walker, it is derived from of the black folk term "womanish" that connotes a spirit of 
273 independence, strength, but also impertinence and 'sass'. 
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According to Stephanie Mitchem in Introducing Womanist Theology , womanist 
theology is rooted in ethics. Mitchem goes on to say that womanist theology and ethics 
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 Alice Walker, In Search of Our Mothers' Gardens: Womanist Prose (New York, NY: 
Harcourt, 1983), xi-xii. 
Womanist 
1. from womanish. (Opp. of "girlish," i.e. frivolous, irresponsible, not serious.) A black 
feminist of feminist of color. From the black folk expression of mothers to female 
children, "You acting womanish," i.e., like a woman. Usually referring to outrageous, 
audacious, courageous or willful behavior. Wanting to know more and in greater depth 
than is considered "god" for one. Interested in grown-up doings. Acting grown up. Being 
grown up. Interchangeable with another black folk expression: "You trying to be grown." 
Responsible. In charge. Serious. 
2. Also: A woman who loves other women, sexually and/or nonsexually. Appreciates and 
prefers women's culture, women's emotional flexibility (values tears as natural 
counterbalance of laughter), and women's strength. Sometimes loves individual men, 
sexually and/or nonsexually. Committed to survival and wholeness of entire people, male 
and female. Not a separatist, except periodically, for health. Traditionally universalist, as 
in: "Mama, why are we brown, pink, and yellow, and our cousins are white, beige and 
black?" 
Ans.: "Well you now the colored race is just like a flower garden, with every color flower 
represented." Traditionally capable, as in: "Mama, I 'm walking to Canada and I 'm taking 
you and a bunch of other slaves with me." Reply: "It wouldn't be the first time." 
3. Loves music. Loves dance. Loves the moon. Loves the Spirit. Loves love and food and 
roundness. Loves struggle. Loves the Folk. Loves herself. Regardless. 
4. Womanist is to feminist as purple is to lavender. 
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- often written in the form of a neologism, "theoethical" - relies upon a variety of tools 
from history, ethnography, literary criticism, sociology, economics, etc. in order to 
277 
explore the "rich textures and gifts" of African American women's religious lives. 
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Similarly, Stacey Floyd-Thomas in Mining the Motherlode identifies womanist 
religious scholarship with a methodological system of ethics. In so doing, Floyd-Thomas 
proffers four tenets of the womanist tradition: radical subjectivity, traditional 
communalism, redemptive self-love, and critical engagement. Floyd-Thomas also affirms 
that womanist religious thought utilizes a combination of interdisciplinary 
methodologies; e.g., literary analysis, sociological analysis, and historiography. 
Recounting the history of womanist theology, the roots seem to be most closely 
aligned with essays of Jacquelyn Grant, Delores Williams and Toinette Eugene in the late 
70's/ early 80's as the beginning of the discipline. These earliest works did not deploy the 
term womanist. It would not be until 1987 that the term was used by Williams in an essay 
for Christianity and Crisis. Their work, however, would be followed by "signal texts" of 
ethicist Katie Canon's Black Womanist Ethics279, biblical scholar Renita Weems's Just a 
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Sister Away , and theologian Jacquelyn Grant's White Women's Christ, Black Women's 
Jesus281 (1989). The 1990s would see more contributions from Emilie Townes282, Marcia 
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Riggs283, Joan Martin284, Kelly Brown Douglas285, and Cheryl Townsend Gilkes286 
among others. The 90's would also see the publication of Delores Williams's Sisters in 
the Wilderness: The Challenge of Womanist God-Talk2S1 
Built upon African American women's traditions of networking and commitment 
to community, womanists engage black and white feminists, Afrocentrists, black male 
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theologians, members of churches, students, and women across the African Diaspora. 
In so doing, womanists also generate novel approaches to theological categories such as 
redemption, salvation, Christology, the nature of God, and the Bible, and personhood. 
Womanist theologians also face new challenges in their exploration of pastoral and 
ecclesiological matters, ecumenical dialogue, traditional African religions, sexuality, 
289 
ethnography, and art. 
Outliers 
It should be noted that there are those who I would characterize as somewhat 
outliers to the liberation tradition and yet are still associated with the black theological 
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tradition, broadly construed. With respect to those involved associated with the first 
generation scholars, I proffer William R. Jones and Charles H. Long as the most 
significant and compelling. William R. Jones's Is God a White Racist? A Preamble to 
Black Theology ,290 For Jones, the first question that must be addressed by any theology 
that purports to be about liberation has to do with the why of suffering. It is Jones 
contention, however, that attempts to answer this question by black theologians has been 
seriously flawed due to an unexamined presupposition about the benevolence of the 
divine. Jones asserts that the inability or unwillingness to examine this presupposition, 
which Jones refers to as the possibility of divine racism, results in numerous 
contradictions within then extant forms of black theology. Black theologians "beg the 
question" by asserting that God is on the side of black people without substantiating this 
assertion. 
In the case of Charles H. Long, the principal African American religionist 
associated with the field history of religions the theological enterprise in itself is flawed. 
In his seminal work, Significations: Signs, Symbols, and Images in the Interpretation of 
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Religion , Long attempts to address what constitutes religion and thus the study of 
religion. Long asserts that religion is an "orientation - orientation in the ultimate sense, 
that is how one comes to terms with the ultimate significance of one's place in the 
world." Thus, the scientific study of religion involves an exploration of this pursuit for 
ultimate orientation, the quest for the meaning of human experience. This is achieved 
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through the appropriation of the hermeneutical tradition associated with the history of 
religions. 
Among second generation outliers, one of the most compelling is Delores 
Williams in her seminal text, Sisters in the Wilderness. There she proffers that the 
meaning of black religion is primarily about survival and quality of life. It is not Jesus's 
resurrection for her, which is imperative, but rather his ministry to the disinherited and 
dispossessed. Others among this number would include the likes of Theophus Smith, 
Victor Anderson, and Anthony B. Pinn, to name just a few of the most prominent. 
Conclusion 
_ -As stated in the introduction of this dissertation, it is my primary contention that 
the theoretical assumptions and methodological tools deployed by African American 
religionists fail in their attempt to grasp the breadth and complexity of African American 
religious experience, broadly construed. One of the challenges with respect to those 
engaged in the study of African American religion is that much of the scholarship has 
been done from a perspective that assumes Christian normativity. This is particularly true 
of the work of many - if not most - Black and womanist theologians. Of even greater 
concern for my line of argumentation in this work, however, is the assertion that African 
American religious experience is solely comprised of or synonymous with a 
metanarrative of cosmic liberation or deliverance, whether it is of divine or human origin. 
The desire to interpret African American religious experience in terms of 
macroscopic liberation is quite understandable given their history. Moreover, I would 
assert that relentless emphasis on black religious experience in terms of struggle for 
liberation is motivated by a desire to deny succor to expressions of black religion 
associated with quietism and submissiveness that are susceptible to the critiques 
proffered by various detractors who view religion as intrinsically ruinous and harmful. 
Indeed, I find myself in agreement with Anthony B. Pinn when he states in Terror and 
Triumph that an understanding of religion as historical manifestation of a struggle for 
liberation embedded in culture does not fully capture the nature and meaning of black 
religion.293 
Thus, in the next chapter, I will explore theories and methods that might open new 
horizons of meaning and understanding for African American religious experience, while 
at the same time allowing it to maintain a point of identity with the moral imperatives 
associated with other understandings of African American religious experience, 
particularly those associated with black theology. 
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Dissertation Chapter 4 - Theories of the Everyday: Moving Toward an Alternative 
Approach to the Study of African American Religious Experience 
Introduction 
In Chapter 3, it was my intention to lay the foundation for a theoretical and 
methodological approach to the study of African American religious experience that 
emphasizes the lived "everyday" experiences of black folk in its complexity, subtley, 
ambiguity, and ordinariness. In so doing, I will call upon a myriad of resources within a 
multifaceted and varied intellectual lineage. Contributions to the peculiar genealogy 
come from philosophers, historians, sociologists, artists, and members of the literati (e.g., 
personages as varied as Martin Heidegger, Maurice Blanchot, George Perec, Theodore 
Adorno, Henri Lefebvre, and Michel de Certeau). I do not assume, however, linearity and 
a coherent trajectory of thought among these individuals. Rather, I understand the nature 
of the various associations to be much more rhizomorphic. 
I will begin with a kind of description of the concept of the everyday. From there 
I will flesh out what I believe to be a unique relationship between the everyday and 
religion, particularly religious experience. As one will recall, I conclude the first chapter 
stipulating the following definition of religious experience: a religious experience is best 
defined as any experience (understood as an event that one lives through either as a 
participant or an observer and about which one is conscious or aware) in which what is 
experienced by the person is taken to be an encounter with the "real" or "true. " 
Depending on one's tradition, this is may be referred to as God (a representative of God, 
or other theophanies), Nature, the Ground, the Ultimate, the Infinite, or the self. 
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In this chapter, I will show that the everyday is a significant, if not the most important, 
milieu upon which to concentrate in order to understand, analyze, and explain the 
religious as it relates to lived experience. 
Following such preliminaries, I frame the conversation of everyday life in terms 
of an analysis of power, understood in terms of the agonistic relationship of autonomous 
and heteronomous forces constitutive of human beingness. This establishes a foundation 
for developing a genealogy of everyday theorists, calling attention to aspects of their 
thought I believe to be the most insightful and the most penetrating with respect to the 
particular phenomena that I am addressing, the phenomena associated with African 
American religious experience. 
The chapter will conclude by addressing some of the challenges in deploying such 
theories of the everyday, particularly regarding how encompassing is the concept of 
everydayness. Certainly, the theorists to whom I refer do not have in mind the social lives 
of African Americans. Their referents and data are drawn in most instances from 
Europeans and their theories applied in a European context.294 Part of the objective of my 
investigation, therefore, is to show that these theories can be used because they address 
issues that are common to human experience in different contexts, and do so in a manner 
that is rich and adaptable, and thus may facilitate a more robust understanding of African 
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American religious experience than that associated with what I have referred to as the 
dominant interpretive model in African American religion; i.e., a hermeneutics of 
liberation. 
It is my contention that with an emphasis on forms of power that are macroscopic, 
often monolithic, and hierarchical, the dominant paradigm within African American 
religious thought has given markedly less "attention power" at the level of the 
microscopic; e.g., the microphysics of power, as represented in the micro and 
biopolitical. The term "microphysics of power," as I deploy the phrase, is most closely 
associated with the work of the historian, philosopher, and sociologist Michel Foucault. 
As will become readily apparent in the genealogical presentation related to the theories of 
the everyday, I am particularly indebted to the thought of de Certeau, characterizing his 
thought as the pinnacle of this intellectual tradition. 
What do I mean by the everyday? 
What is meant by the study of everyday life, or for that matter, by the 
"everyday"? Firstly, I maintain that it is an error to assume that there is one "everyday" 
or definition of "everyday life". For some, the everyday might best be described as the 
mindless, disengaged happenstance of the world, of some plenum, against which life 
shows up. In this respect, the everyday is at once associated with the most familiar and 
intimate aspects of our lives, while at the same time the most foreign, alien, or peculiar. 
Moreover, it is that which is routinely overlooked and missed. If an account of it is given, 
it is often categorized as the mundane, the banal, or the ordinary. In the introduction to 
Everyday Life and Cultural Theory, Ben Highmore refers to the many "guises" of 
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everyday life, and several other terms used by various scholars to refer to a similar 
phenomenon include: Alltagsleben, la vie quotidienne, lo cotdiano, run of the mill and so 
on. As such, I would argue that everyday life is at once the most prevalent way of human 
being and yet, the least present or accessible to us. The everyday consists of a myriad of 
experiences that people have, but which they may ignore for a various reasons that may 
be intentional or not. Once more, the everyday consists of the unremarkable, the habitual 
routines of "ordinary life." Thus, the everyday is simultaneously that which is most 
immediate and most elusive. Phenomenally, one might say that the everyday is always 
receding, always escaping from us. 
The realm of the everyday and everyday life became the subject of investigation 
and reflection among various scholars and intellectuals during the latter part of the 
nineteenth and the first part of the twentieth century. For the most part, their interest was 
associated with what they perceived to be a radical transformation of human societies 
associated with modernity. While the transition to modernity brought numerous 
benefits, it also created other problems, at the top of the list being the fact that our 
understanding of what it means to be a human being who experiences life in an "ordinary 
way" has changed. One arena in which this was the case, and that has been the subject of 
scrutiny among various scholars and social critics, is the transmutation of time. It is the 
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scholars' contention that time is one of the main victims of modernity, being effectively 
emptied of its meaning. With the development of the mechanical clock, the assembly 
line, and mass transportation of goods as well as people, the experience of time has 
undergone a mutation. Time - which previously was experienced as possessing ebbs and 
flows, of moving swiftly in one instance and almost standing still at another - has 
become homogenized, consistent, and uniform. The use of technology to increase 
productivity and efficiency became of greater import than creativity, and became more 
important than one's intimate and immanent relationship with the order of things: family, 
community, and the gods. 
Two commentators on such changes were Karl Marx and Max Weber. According 
to Marx, modernity (as identified with the industrial revolution and the rise of capitalism) 
brought into being "[t]he miserable routine of endless drudgery and toil in which the 
same mechanical process is gone through over and over again, like the torture of 
Sisyphus; the burden of toil, like the rock, is ever falling back upon the worn-out 
9 q / : 'JQ1 
drudge." Weber will refer to the "iron cage" of bureaucratic rationality. Weber's 
'iron cage' is everyday modernity as machine-like and bureaucratic. It is an everyday life 
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governed by asceticism. Yet, to see everyday modernity as boring or relentlessly 
routinized is to capture only one side of its general articulation. Alongside this, and 
overlapping with it, is the everyday as mystery. Writing about the ethnological 
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orientation, Nancy Bentley comments that the mysterious and banal intersect in the 
thought of Durkheim, Marx, and Freud. 
It is hard to overlook the fact that the writings of these three thinkers, for 
all their rational mastery, helped to make strange and almost unfathomable 
the territories of self and society that are usually the most familiar to us 
from everyday life. A certain irony obtains: ethnological analysis always 
makes partly alien what it masters.299 
A similar point is made by Johannes Fabian in his book Time and the Other: How 
Anthropology Makes its Object.300 In this work, he comments on the anthropologist's or 
ethnographer's practice of setting distance between the researcher and the people that he 
or she is researching. Fabian's specific concern is anthropology's creation of 
representations that placed the "other" outside the flow of time. Fabian offers the 
ethnographic portrayal of "coevalness" as a solution to this problem. For Fabian, the 
relationship of anthropology to its subject has always been organized in significant 
correlations of oppositions (such as here/there and now/then), which he associates with 
part of a distancing strategy/tactic between subject and object of ethnographic practice 
that he sees as the production of distance between "the West" and "Others." He notes that 
once there was the prevalent tendency of referring to "the Other" in relation to an 
evolutionary temporal axis with the locus of the ethnographer or anthropologist 
invariably being the more advanced. He also notes the structuralist tendency to categorize 
cultures "synchronically" as opposed to "diachronically." Fabian refers to such 
approaches as exhibiting an "encapsulating of time." According to Fabian, this involves 
the denial of coevalness; i.e., "the systematic and persistent tendency to place the 
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referent(s) of anthropology in a time other than the present of the producer of the 
3 0 1 
anthropological discourse." 
Subsequently, what is now called for is a kind of reversal or corrective of the 
normative gaze within modernity. In the contemporary context, analysts must take into 
consideration the insights of Ben Highmore when he asserts, "[I]t is the ability of 
'making strange' within a culture of rationalism and of finding the strange within 
3 0 9 
everyday life that is central to this study of everyday life and cultural theory." 
Unfortunately, though the nature and substance of the everyday has been a subject of 
scholarly inquiry, there persists a tendency within contemporary letters to relegate the 
"everyday" to the margins, to consign it to the domain of the incoherent, the insignificant 
- indeed, as a particular kind of ganz anderen. 
How then does one attempt to make "everyday life" vivid and apparent, a kind of 
everyday life that is characterized by ambiguities, instabilities, and equivocation? A 
cursory glance has one thwarted by an instrumentality and materiality of certain 
discourses for attending to everyday life that leave as a remainder or as superfluous 
301
 Fabian, Time and the Other, 3. 
302
 Ben Highmore, Everyday Life and Cultural Theory : An Introduction (London and New York: 
Routledge, 2002), 12. 
303
 It is interesting to note that this othering with respect to everyday life, again, recalls the othering of 
African Americans. Indeed, In Chapter 2 of the Black Atlantic, Paul Gilroy raises the issue of the absence 
of conversations on race and ethnicity from most contemporary writings on modernity. The irony is that 
racial slavery was integral to the development of western civilization (42-43). Further, as I have noted in 
my writings on Hegel and Du Bois specifically, as well as on the concept of race in the continental 
philosophical tradition, the Negro is relegated to the domain of nature, as opposed to history. This is 
particularly significant, as history is seen as the realm of spirit, mind, reason, and consciousness. 
Conversely, nature is the domain of the irrational, of the passions and the emotions. It is for this reason, 
asserts Hegel, that there have been no significant contributions to human civilization from Africa. Here, 
Hegel is following the convention of his time, which excises Egypt from the African continent. 
With respect to the relationship of "the other" in society and what it reveals about the divine as 
"Other," I would refer one to the association made by the eminent historian of religion, Charles Long, in his 
text Significations. With respect to this chapter, I will take up the discussion on the relationship between 
everyday life and religion in its own section. I would note that the phrase ganz anderen appears in the 
writing of the 20th century theologian Karl Barth in his reflection about the nature of God. Barth refers to 
God as the ganz Anderen (Wholly Other) that is also the Holy Other. 
134 
precisely that which one desires to make an intent of study. Indeed, theories and 
methodologies deployed in the study of certain phenomena may, in fact, obscure rather 
than help to render the everyday. In giving an account of everyday life in this chapter, 
there will be an emphasis on examining the everyday from a particular perspective. This 
perspective can be described as one that refuses to reduce everyday life to an arena for 
the reproduction of dominant social relations. While this is an important focus in some of 
the theorists upon which I, the leitmotif of this chapter is the everyday as a sight of 
resistance, with resistance understood as essentially a microscopic phenomenon that 
inheres in all beings.304 
In order to stave off confusion that will undoubtedly arise with my use of the term 
resistance, and the use or association of the term with the dominant hermeneutical 
paradigm I associate with much of African American religion, I will offer a preliminary 
statement of clarification. Indeed, "resistance" will be expounded upon as my 
investigation of the everyday continues. For now, I will say that the type of resistance of 
which I speak is not that associated with the intentionality of socio-political movements, 
although it may serve as a catalyst for such movements. For the most part, it is a 
phenomenological category such as donation or gift. Therefore, it does not represent a 
305 particular ethic. Rather it inheres as that which is primordial, an elan vital. 
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 1 will say much more about this concept in later chapters. At that time, I will lay out distinctives of my 
understanding of resistance and how it differs, and is fundamentally different from, resistance associated 
with a hermeneutics of liberation. This discourse, however, will benefit from first articulating the position 
of theorists such as Foucault and Bourdieu over against the likes of a de Certeau or an Agamben. Given my 
penchant for the metaphors associated with the physical sciences, I would refer one to the laws of 
Newtonian mechanics: (1) a body persists in a state of rest or of uniform motion unless acted upon by an 
external force - this is conventionally referred to as the law of inertia (2) force equals mass times 
acceleration (3) whenever a first body exerts a force F on a second body, the second body exerts a force ~F 
on the first body. F and ~F are equal in magnitude and opposite in direction. The last law is often simply 
stated that to every action is an equal and opposite reaction; i.e., resistance. 
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The "Everyday" and Religion 
It is my contention that the theories and methods associated with the study of 
everyday life are uniquely positioned with respect to the study of religion. In the 
articulation of this position, I am inspired by the work of Charles H. Long in his seminal 
text Significations: Signs, Symbols, and Images in the Interpretation of Religion. As 
noted in Chapter 3, Long attempts to address what constitutes religion and thus the study 
of religion. Long asserts that religion is an "orientation - orientation in the ultimate sense, 
that is how one comes to terms with the ultimate significance of one's place in the 
world."306 Thus, the scientific study of religion involves an exploration of this pursuit for 
ultimate orientation, the quest for the meaning of human experience. 
In his subsequent discourse on African American religious experience, Long 
proffers a relationship between those persons and cultures that have been "othered" and 
the sacred as the "Other." For example, in the essay "Interpretation of Black Religion in 
America," Charles Long states that in the oppression and destruction of blacks and 
indigenous peoples, America has concealed from itself rich and varied expressions of 
being in the world. Religiously, America has not opened itself to the possibility of the 
mysterium tremendum, only wanting — as it were — to experience the mysterium 
fascinans. Charles Long later associates this with a kind of quintessentially American 
desire for innocence that is reflected in its valorization of nature and space, and its 
despising of history and time. On the other hand, the experience of the absurd, the opacity 
of the real, and the tragic view of life, as well as the experience of Utopian and 
eschatological hope, has been present in the experiences of the oppressed.307 It is for this 
306Long, Significations, 7. Long goes on in great detail about this matter. 
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reason that Long values the contribution of theologies opaque - e.g., black and liberation 
theologies - for they bear witness to other experiences of the sacred and thus 
subsequently provide for a fuller understanding of that which is constitutive of human 
beingness. Indeed, in the essay "The Oppressive Elements in Religion and the 
Religions of the Oppressed," Long frames his discourse by referring to William James's 
Varieties of Religious Experience and Ernst Troeltsch's Empiricism and Platonism in the 
Philosophy of Religion and their investigation into religious experience. Long maintains 
that James's neurological-biological orientation that seeks to explain such occurrences in 
terms of individual psychology and Troeltsch's account that is "expressive of the 
historical situation in which Christians find themselves" are inadequate, particularly in 
their rendering of the negative or oppressive element of the mysterium.309 
I maintain that Long's observations of encounters of the status quo with those 
who have been socially, culturally, and historically othered (e.g., African Americans), as 
Long goes on in great detail, stating that Black folk were confronted with a reality 
Impenetrable, definite, subtle, and other - a reality so agonizing that it forced us to give 
up our innocence while at the same time it sustained us in humor, joy, and promise. It 
was a quality of experience "which through its harsh discipline destroyed forever a naive 
innocence, revealing a god of creation" — a god of our silent tears - a god of our weary 
years. This may be called a 'nitty-gritty' pragmatism (138-139). 
There are some interesting parallels in Long's assessment of the experience of the African American and 
the work of Eddie Glaude and Cornel West, which raises the issue of the tragic in American social life. 
Long, West, and Glaude see a locus of the tragic present in the experience of African Americans. It is 
important to note, however, that unlike West or Glaude, Long does not foresee the otherness of black 
experience being subsumed into the culture; it is his opinion that the resultant tension may be a prerequisite 
for understanding as it engenders the need for intellectual honesty and humility in the reflection on what it 
means to be human. Part of this humility for the academy means a reassessment of methodology, 
particularly the hegemony of Western Christian categories and thought models. 
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well as his observation of these people's encounters of the divine can and indeed 
promotes understanding with respect to the apprehension of the everyday. 
The 
everyday, as is the case for the holy or the sacred, is perceived as difficult to grasp, as 
elusive. When one believes that they understand it, or have it, it has the tendency to 
disappear. Maurice Blanchot notes, "Whatever its other aspects, the everyday has this 
essential trait: it allows no hold. It escapes."310 I would also note that this inability to be 
grasped, held, seized, or controlled is an important component of the concept of 
resistance as I use it in the context of the everyday, a use that is distinct from - not simply 
as a matter of degree or magnitude - the understanding of the concept of resistance 
associated with the hermeneutics of liberation paradigm. 
Moreover, in a comparison of the everyday and the sacred, there is also their 
relationship with notions of immanence and transcendence. The everyday as well as the 
sacred are both understood to be present in the midst of the ordinary, or even the banal.311 
Simultaneously, however, the everyday and the sacred are characterized as the 
exceptional. Both the notion of the everyday and the sacred suggest a desire for 
something more, for completeness or fullness. It is for this reason that Highmore suggests 
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"everyday life might be the name for the desire of totality in postmodern times." 
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As I mentioned in the introduction to the dissertation, however, there has been 
surprisingly little work done on the concept of everyday life as it relates to experiences of 
the sacred or the religious. One marked exception is a lecture by Michel Leiris to the 
College de Sociologie in January 1938, entitled, lLLe Sacre Dans La Vie Quotidienne 
(The Sacred in Everyday Life)," which was eventually published in the journal Nouvelle. 
He writes, 
What, for me, is the sacred? To be more exact: what does my sacred 
consist of? What objects, places, or occasions awake in me the mixture of 
fear and attachment, that ambiguous attitude caused by the approach of 
something simultaneously attractive and dangerous, prestigious and 
outcast - that combination of respect, desire, and terror that we take as the 
psychological sign of the sacred?... It is a matter of searching through 
some of the humblest things, taken from everyday life and located outside 
of what today makes up the officially sacred (religion, fatherland, and 
morals).313 
Leiris continues by invoking - as sites of the sacred for him in the midst of the 
everyday - loci such as the stove in his family's house, his parent's bedroom, the 
bathroom toilet, the racecourse, his father's gun, and various words and names. Thus, in 
the midst of Weber's "iron cage" of modernity, Leiris' experiences of the sacred and 
everyday life converge in the encounter of stories, myth, superstition, daily rituals, and 
practices. Several decades later, Foucault will allude to forms of power associated with 
language and discourses that seek to establish docile bodies within panoptic social 
structures, institutions, and practices. As I will elucidate to later, experiences of the 
sacred and everyday life often evince themselves as oppositional phenomena. 
totalizing desire. One must contend with the tendency of all grand narratives, theories, systems, to 
eviscerate or ignore whole swaths of human experience. This is not what is meant here by a desire of 
totality. It is akin to if not identical with construal of transcendence. 
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According to Denis Hollier, 
The College of Sociology cast its lot against life that would be exclusively 
quotidian. It was imperative to escape. The exception, that which eluded 
dailyness, was deemed sacred. The strength of Leiris' contribution, 
indicating how much he has to offer, is summed up in the wording of his 
title: 'The Sacred in Everyday Life' replaces simply antagonism by 
polemical inclusion. 
For Leiris, it seemed that the cultural difference had to collide in a way 
that couldn't be managed by the dominant accounts of 'civilization' for 
everyday life to become both vivid and 'other'.314 
One contemporary scholar who has called attention to the conception of 
everydayness as it relates to religion (in the Christian tradition particularly) is Charles 
Taylor. In The Sources of the Self: The Making of Modern Identity,315 Taylor asserts that 
to the extent that Christian doctrine prizes dailyness, it is primarily as a sphere where the 
adherent can display recognition of and obedience to God's purpose. For example, in the 
monastic tradition, the structuring of the day around times of prayer suggests a kind of 
harmony of the daily, mundane, and immanent, with the exceptional and transcendent.316 
Conversely, however, one must recognize a concurrent Christian tradition that 
associates the daily life with dispersion and distraction, as opposed to the provision of a 
kind of immediacy to the Divine. Returning to Sheringham, he associates this with 
317 
Pascal's notion of divertissement - literally, that the mundane is a kind of diversion. 
Thus, the everyday is antithetical to the higher realms of religion or the sublime. Where 
religious observance is part of the fabric of daily life for given groups and individuals, 
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faith is generally held to illuminate and transcend the daily round, rather than draw 
inspiration from it. 
A Genealogy of Everyday Life 
Even the lowest, intrinsically ugly phenomenon can be dissolved into 
contexts of color and form, feeling and experience, which provide it with 
significance. To involve ourselves deeply and lovingly with the even most 
common product, which, would be banal and repulsive in its isolated 
appearance, enables us to conceive of it, too, as a ray and image of the 
final unity of all things from which beauty and meaning flow. Every 
philosophical system, every religion, every moment of our heightened 
emotional experience searches for symbols, which are appropriate to their 
expression. If we pursue this possibility of aesthetic appreciation to its 
final point, we find that there are no essential differences among things. 
Our worldview turns into aesthetic pantheism. Every point contains within 
itself the potential of being redeemed to absolute aesthetic importance. To 
the adequately trained eye the totality of beauty, the complete meaning of 
the world as a whole, radiates from every single point.318 
'The everyday is not merely one topic among others that philosophers 
might take an interest in, but one that a philosopher is fated to ... 319 
I maintain that while extensive genealogies of the quotidian, or everyday life, are 
worthwhile - indeed, contemporary anthologies like those of Highmore and Sheringham 
are excellent resources - I wish to call attention to particular ideas. Unlike Highmore, and 
to a lesser extent Sheringham, I do not hope to avoid a presentation consisting of a 
heterogeneous mix of divergent interests. Rather, I hope to stress a coherence of the 
intellectual tradition in a manner that might be beneficial to those wishing to acquire 
theoretical and methodological tools conducive to the study of religion in general, and 
African American religion and religious experience in particular. In doing so, however, I 
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do not mean to suggest a normative view nor some inexorable progression/development 
leading to a coherent conception of the everyday. Rather, as I have noted at the beginning 
of this chapter, as a kind of genealogy I am interested in various confluences of 
influences and inspirations. 
One of the challenges to be faced has to do with applicability of rationalism to 
areas of life that are non-rational. Is such a course navigable, or does the everyday 
represent a wholly evasive terrain? Further, if the everyday necessarily exceeds attempts 
to apprehend it, can it be articulated, expressed, or represented, or should all such 
endeavors be called off or at the very least discouraged? It is perhaps for this reason that 
everyday life studies exist on the interstices and the gaps between representational 
categories. Moreover, that this species of phenomenon seemingly resists or circumvents 
efforts of systemization may be the reason that it is marginalized. Indeed, it presents an 
aesthetic that questions the suitability of 'system,' 'rigor,' and 'logic' that are very much 
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a part of the modern Weltanschauung. 
Philosophy for the Non-Philosophical 
One, if not the most significant, challenge which confronts the scholar who 
wishes to examine and interrogate the everyday has to do with how one goes about 
describing it. In the phenomenological investigations of Edmund Husserl and Martin 
Heidegger, there is the search or quest for meaning and understanding of the "primordial 
world" of daily existence, the "sphere of peculiar ownness,"321 the everyday and 
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undifferentiated character of "averageness" (Durchschnittlichkeit), the "public" we-
world, or one's own closest (domestic) environment, "ontically closest and well-known," 
and yet "ontologically the farthest and not known at all."323 
Husserl's phenomenology summoned philosophers to examine the Lebenswelt 
(lifeworld) - the state of affairs in which the world is experienced, in which the world is 
lived (erlebt).324 However, it is precisely the non-theoretical, unconceptual nature of this 
domain that is problematic for its entry into critical discourse. The lifeworld is the pre-
epistemological context, the world as immediately or directly experienced in the 
subjectivity/intersubjectivity of everyday life. However, as such, the lifeworld involves 
the introduction of the non-philosophical into the domain of the philosophical for it enters 
philosophical discourse precisely as that which is non-philosophical. 
Martin Heidegger's Dasein and the Everyday 
That which already shows itself in the appearance as prior to the 
'phenomenon' as ordinarily understood and as accompanying it in every 
case, can, even though it thus shows itself unthematically, be brought 
thematically to show itself; and what thus shows itself in itself . .will be 
325 
the 'phenomena' of phenomenology. 
Beginning with Being and Time, Heidegger offers a challenge to the Cartesian 
tradition of philosophy, particularly with respect to the problem of mind-body dualism. 
Indeed, Heidegger is in some sense refuting much of the Western philosophical tradition 
going back to Aristotle, who asserted that the human being was essentially a rational 
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animal. Descartes, centuries later, modified Aristotle's definition, condemning it for its 
vagueness and imprecision. As a preferable and more rigorous characterization, Descartes 
asserts that human existence is that of a thinking thing. According to Heidegger, 
however, this is a fundamental mistake, one that stems in large part to a misunderstanding 
of the human being in its lived, everydayness. Moreover, despite proffering the concept 
of lifeworld, the duality is one that persists in the work of his famous teacher, Edmund 
Husserl. 
Most important for my discourse, however, is that Heidegger offers one of the 
first great analyses of everyday, which, according to Heidegger, is inextricably linked 
with the very question of being. This does not subsume or circumscribe the extent of 
Heidegger's analysis; and, as I will point out, there is an aporia that inheres in 
Heidegger's articulation of everyday life. Yet, it is fitting to begin with him, and to note 
not only his linking of everydayness and beingness in his thought, but also that this 
'being,' as such, possesses attributes not so dissimilar than those I have already ascribed 
to everydayness - e.g., ubiquity, elusiveness, and yet self-evidence. 
In Being and Time, Heidegger begins with a statement regarding his intention to 
disclose the meaning of being and he proposes to do this through the 
phenomenological/ontological examination of the 'being' for which the question of being 
is important. This 'being' Heidegger calls Dasein and it becomes readily apparent that by 
this term, he firstly means 'human beings.' Often translated as being-there, or there-
being, Heidegger employs the term Dasein because it is his assertion that being-in-the-
world is a unitary experience. Being and world are constitutive of one another. Our 
primordial experience finds us already in the world, already situated in a history, a 
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culture, a society. Through an existential-ontological analysis of the structure of Dasein 
in its everydayness of being in the world, he will attempt to discover the meaning of the 
question of being. 
Through his fundamental phenomenology, he explores how the world appears to 
everyday Dasein. It is here that he talks about the world showing up as equipment, 
indeed, the world appears as a referential totality of equipment. Thus, for everyday 
Dasein, things do not show up in terms of a Cartesian duality of subject-object. In lieu of 
such nomenclature, Heidegger refers to much of what normally appears to Dasein in the 
world as ready-to-hand. Again, the point, according to Heidegger, is that Dasein finds 
itself always already engaged in the world, engaged in projects and tasks, to which 
Heidegger refers in his unique vocabulary as "for-the-sake-of-which(s)." 
A significant tool that Heidegger deploys in his analysis of Dasein is the concept 
of moods. Once more, however, one is required to reorient themselves with respect to a 
phenomenological assessment of moods. For Heidegger, moods are not internal 
phenomenon. Rather, one encounters moods in the world through a kind of attunement. 
One of the most important moods that Heidegger will use is Anxiety. Very much in the 
way that Kierkegaard will use Despair, Anxiety will reveal for Heidegger the essential 
structure of Dasein. One of the things revealed is what Heidegger refers to as Care, which 
he will later refer to as Concern. Heidegger will also talk about existential ways of being 
such as Guilt/Consciousness and "Being unto Death." 
In this move, one is also introduced to the temporal aspects of Dasein. Heidegger 
refers to Dasein's being-in-the-world, or Dasein's everydayness in terms of existence 
(future/projection), facticity (past/throwness), and fallenness (present/fallen). With 
respect to temporality, it is immediately evident that Heidegger is not referring to "wall 
clock time," i.e., elapsed time as determined by a chronometer, but rather to human 
perception or experience of time or how human beings exist in our everydayness. As 
previously mentioned, Dasein is engaged in projects and tasks, and thus has goals that 
epitomize a future orientation. At the same time, as Dasein, one is always already 
situated in a particular culture, at a particular time, and in a particular context that is not 
of our own genesis; one is thrown into a world that has a past. Finally, much of our 
everyday existence is one of immersion in the immediate, simply coping and dealing with 
that which we encounter in the world presently. Interestingly, it is precisely this last way 
of being where one encounters the aporra to which I previously referred. For it is in the 
confluence of the present that Heidegger's conception of authentic Dasein and 
everydayness collide. 
Again, one notices in Heidegger a move from the notion of a kind of Cartesian 
solipsism. Later, the existential phenomenologist Maurice Merleau Ponty will describe 
human beings as open heads turned towards the world. Such is the nature, the structure of 
human beingness, of Dasein. The Cartesian way of viewing the world and human beings 
in the world, which the scientific tradition inherits, in comparison is rather anemic. 
Indeed, for Heidegger, one has to strip away much of what it is to be a human being 
before reaching the insipid image of humanity that is the bequest of the dominant 
Western intellectual tradition. Indeed, Heidegger notes earlier in Being and Time in his 
analysis of experiencing the world as objective (present-at-hand), that 
phenomenologically, it is the result of one's relationship with the world breaking down. 
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If I were to convert this in terms of the language of everydayness, such schematizations 
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are intrinsically limited, as they represent a reified and diminished reality. 
There is, however, a kind of aporia or contradiction in the thought of Heidegger, 
particularly with respect to his articulation of everydayness, or everyday consciousness, 
and this is most evident in Heidegger's conception of authentic (eigentlich). Authenticity, 
for Heidegger, is Dasein being in the world in such a way that there is genuine human 
flourishing. The concept of authentic Dasein is indebted to Aristotle's concept of the 
phronimos (one who has practical wisdom -phronesis). While everyday existence 
provides a unique means of access to truth of being for Heidegger, he goes on to present 
average everydayness as inauthentic and deluded, given that everyday consciousness is 
non-philosophical and pre-ontological. Stated somewhat differently, while the study of 
Dasein in its everydayness provides insight into the essential structures of being, as 
being-in-the-world, everyday consciousness is apt, perhaps even predisposed to turn 
away from primordial being(ness), and towards inauthenticity. 
Thus, Heidegger's appropriation of the everyday (Alltaglichkeit) is complex. 
Authentic Dasein is revealed through the everyday, but it is the everyday as inauthentic. 
According to Sheringham, this is that remnant of the intellectual tradition that Heidegger 
•>97 
has imbibed from German romanticism. I would also note that I believe this may be 
even more attributable to Heidegger's theological training, and the ambiguous 
characterization of everydayness in the Christian tradition. Specifically, there is the 
Christian doctrine of the fall, which means the world as well as human nature is in need 
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of redemption. Humanity in its unredeemed form, which for Heidegger is also humanity 
in its non-philosophical and thus non-ontological way of being, is what he will refer to as 
Das Man, "they-selves," "the They."328 Synonymous with Nietzsche's "herd," "They" are 
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the antithesis of the philosophical attitude. Yet it is the philosophical attitude that is 
associated with the move toward authenticity. Indeed, Dasein has "fallen away from itself 
as an authentic potentiality for Being-its-Self."330 With such characterization of 
everydayness, Heidegger turns aside from everyday consciousness to a critique of that 
consciousness. Subsequently, his phenomenology becomes opposed to those qualities 
that are constitutive of the quotidian: the aimless, the haphazard, and the arbitrary. Thus, 
while Heidegger's schematization may provide a useful starting point for investigations 
of the everyday, in that it seeks to "express what philosophy otherwise does not find 
worth speaking about,"33'one should be wary of his characterization of the everyday as 
being a mode of "groundless floating" or uncanniness which is uprooted and 
unattached. Heidegger attempts to establish an "authentic existence" which is not 
something that is subject to the vicissitudes of "the They." To counter this, which he 
attributes to the non-philosophical and the non-thematizable aspects of the everyday, he 
seems in some respect to be looking for that in the everyday which is able to be regulated 
or made routine. Thus, while Heidegger does call one's attention to the "inconspicuous, 
unobtrusiveness, and non-obstinacy,"333 he asserts that phenomenology is a way of 
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"grasping and explicating phenomena in a way which is original and intuitive," which is 
directly opposed to the naivete of a haphazard, "immediate" and unreflective 
"beholding."334 
Thus, while challenging much of the philosophical tradition, Heidegger is still 
quite averse to the heterological aspects of the everyday. In the tradition of Hegel, the 
corporeal, the haphazard, the fleeting, the ephemeral and the unstable have been 
considered non-philosophical, relegated to Nature, not History.335 
George Perec's Aesthetics of Everyday Life 
In L 'Infra-ordinaire George Perec comments on the thematic oblivion of the 
everyday. 
What speaks to us, seemingly, is always the big event, the untoward, the 
extra-ordinary: the front-page splash, the banner headlines. Railway trains 
only begin to exist when they are derailed, and the more passengers that 
are killed, the more the trains exist. Aeroplanes achieve existence only 
when they are hijacked. The one and only destiny of motor-cars is to drive 
into plane trees.336 
One is instantly stricken by similarities in Perec's statement and Heidegger's analysis of 
"equipment" that is ready-to-hand as distinct from present-at-hand. Like Heidegger, 
Perec notes that one's consciousness of everydayness becomes apparent when things 
break down, when there are breaks and ruptures in the status quo. However, Perec goes 
farther than Heidegger in his extreme criticism of humanities' obsession with the 
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momentous and the unexpected. In our efforts to attend to the large, the grandiose, or in 
looking for some immutable, inviolate, essence, Perec notes that the "essential: the truly 
intolerable, the truly inadmissible" are overlooked.337 What really happens when what 
we actually live through is ignored? That which occurs each day, and which returns each 
day - "the banal, the quotidian, the obvious, the common, the ordinary, the infra-
ordinary, the background noise, the habitual" — how do we render an account of 
that? How do we interrogate it? How do we describe it? 
The problem is, as Perec observes, that we are not accustomed to such 
interrogations, precisely because we are habituated: 
"We don't question it, it doesn't question us, it doesn't seem to pose a 
problem, we live it without thinking about it, as if it carried within it neither 
questions nor answers, as if it weren't the bearer of any information. This is no 
longer even conditioning, its anaesthesia. We sleep through our lives in a 
dreamless sleep. But where is our life? Where is our body? Where is our space? 
How are we to speak of these 'common things'?340 
Perec suggests that what is needed is an alternative anthropology, an anthropology 
that would speak about us, which we will help. He refers to such a move as the endotic: 
an interrogation of the familiar or close examination of the interstitial world that we 
assume we know, but which is surprising foreign.341 Such investigations into the 
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"background noise" of our existence problematize the ordinary, transforming the 
overlooked into a series of questions.342 
Unlike the phenomenological approach of Heidegger, however, Perec's approach 
pursues an investigation of the quotidian via aesthetic expression. A contributor to the 
experimental journal Oulipo, Perec engaged in various forms of experimental writing as 
well as the making of inventories. According to Stephen Clucas, however, this involved 
the real risk of "narrativisation of the banal and the trivial risks becoming the banal and 
the trivial itself."343 
Theodor Adorno 's Representation of Everyday Life 
In his Negative Dialectics, Theodor Adorno argues for a "changed philosophy" as 
opposed to a "new anthropology" ala Perec this would achieve "a turn towards 
nonidentity," a philosophy which would avoid the "concept fetishism" of totalizing 
systematic philosophies - overcoming the metaphysical "autarky of the concept" by 
seek[ing] to immerse ourselves in the things that are heterogeneous to 
[philosophy]...without placing those things in prefabricated 
categories.. .adher[ing].. .as closely to the heterogeneous as the programs 
of phenomenology and of Simmel tried in vain to do; our aim is total self-
relinquishment. Philosophical contents can only be grasped where 
philosophy does not impose them. The illusion that it might confine the 
essence in its finite definitions will have to be given up.344 
342
 Perec, 210. 
343
 Stephen Clucas, "Cultural Phenomenology and the Everyday," Critical Quarterly 42, no. 1 (2000). 
344
 Theodor W. Adorno, Negative Dialectics (New York: Seabury Press, 1973), 13. One of the most subtle 
and difficult of Adorao's concepts; nonidentity does not simply mean the opposite of identity, that is to say, 
the non-equivalent, or what doesn't fit into certain categories, which is usually just a metaphor for a 
different identity which isn't the same as the first identity, but refers to what escapes or eludes every sort of 
identity, but which nevertheless exists in the shadow of identity, as the transitory reminder or glimpse of 
unrealized possibilities 
Adorno argued "that our emphatic interest will seek refuge in ephemeral objects 
not yet overdetermined by intentions... ."345 The everyday - as the domain the of the 
transient, arbitrary and aimless - despite its familiarity, is consistent with this notion of 
"ephemeral object." Adorno thus sought a way to allow everyday objects to invade 
consciousness rather than reducing them to preconceived formal concepts or categories. 
Adorno believed that it was possible to derive concepts from the objects themselves: "If 
thought really yielded to the object," he said, "if its attention were on the object, not on 
its category, the very objects would start talking under the lingering eye."346 
Interestingly, this idealized conception of the cultural theoretical gaze, the 
"interpretive eye which sees more in a phenomenon than it is - and solely because of 
what it is," is described by Adorno in quasi-religious terms as a "meditative 
contraction."347 These contractions would not add up to a system, but would form 
discrete reflections, a "philosophy in fragment form," which, despite its partial nature, 
would allow "conceptions, in the particular, of the totality that is inconceivable as such." 
The statements of this philosophy would be truthful to concrete experiences without 
making transcendental claims. Such thought models would take the "details" that 
systematic philosophy subordinated to its conceptual machinery, and allow them to enter 
philosophical discourse "without advance assurance" to the concept. "Not until then," 
Adorno argued, "would the steadily misused word of'truth as concreteness' come into its 
own. It compels our thinking to abide with minutiae. We are not to philosophize about 
concrete things; we are to philosophize, rather, out of these things."348 
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Thus, unlike Heidegger, Adorno endorsed a philosophizing out of that which truly 
presents itself, or is given. Yet Adorno also notes that such open consideration has no 
protection against threat of randomness. Adorno states, "Nothing assures it of a saturation 
with the matter that will suffice to surmount that risk."349 Like Perec, Adorno saw the 
danger of triviality as the price to be paid for a commitment to "open thought." Also, as a 
dialectical thinker, unlike Heidegger, the thingness of the everyday constitutes 
consciousness, but consciousness also phenomenalizes the things of the everyday, 
constituting them as reality. The thing and consciousness enter into a vertiginous 
(endless) dialectic. 
Further, Adorno's theoretical vision would suggest the possibility of intense 
"meditative contractions" centered on the inconspicuous environment, which are drawn 
from the things themselves and their phenomenal entrance into consciousness. These 
meditations would be strictly provisional "thought models," abandoning objects neither 
to systematic categorization nor to irrationalism, but charting instead the historical 
becoming of their concrete existence. Yet, with non-categorization and non-
conceptuality, there is the problem of representation. Adorno states, "not even extreme 
empiricism can drag in the facta bruta and present them like cases in anatomy or 
experiments in physics: no philosophy can pass the particulars into the text." 
Adorno rejects the possibility of an aesthetic solution to conceptualizing the 
heterogeneous in discourse.351 
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Henri Lefebvre's Dialectics of Everyday Life 
Like Adorno, Henri Lefebvre, in his La Vie quotidienne dans le monde moderne 
published in 1968, asked whether it was possible to use philosophy as a frame of 
reference for the study of what it terms the non-philosophical. Lefebvre's reflection led 
him to similar questions regarding the representability of the concrete and the 
quotidian.352 In his project (begun in 1946 and continued periodically through 1968) he 
sought to make everyday life an object of philosophical reflection. 
The everyday with which Lefebvre is obsessed is the everyday of the commodity. 
Lefebvre observed that life within the constructs of the modern everyday was lived 
•j r 
according to the "rhythm of capital." Such adaptations are inextricably linked with the 
commodification of all life, a theme echoed in the later Heidegger in his observations 
about life and technology.354 There are also unsurprising affinities in Lefebvre's thought 
here and that of Bataille and his understanding of economy in relation to the sacred, 
which was articulated in Chapter 1. For Lefebvre, the rhythm of capital exists in 
opposition to everyday life. While there are certainly rhythms associated with everyday 
life, they are not the rhythms associated with the monotonous or tedious. There are thus 
different temporalities: the temporalities of modernity, technology, and capital, which 
Lefebvre associates with linearity, the temporalities of the everyday, which are cyclical 
times of the cosmic; and the temporalities of biological, to which I would add the 
sacred.355 
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However, one of the unique features of the everyday for Lefebvre was that within 
it lay the potential to resist, oppose, or rebuff mechanism of control and the imposition of 
docility. Indeed, for Lefebvre, the possibility for transformation inheres in the 
phenomenon of the everyday. As noted by Highmore, "Secreted within the everyday 
were the elemental demands for everyday life to become something other [by which he 
means something more] than the bureaucratic and commodified existed imposed by 
modern or contemporary culture. 
As a philosopher, Lefebvre asserted that the everyday signaled a speculative 
attempt to register the social as a totality. In many respects, his work can be interpreted as 
a continuation of philosophical sociology of Georg Simmel. However, there is also that 
aspect of the everyday that is frustrated with philosophy as conventionally practiced, as 
an abstract, rational, systematic discourse. As an alternative, the move to the everyday for 
Lefebvre is an attempt to connect with the lived actuality of human beingness. 
Specifically for Lefebvre, this was to take place in the context of the growing 
consumerism within a modern capitalist society. As a thinker in the Marxist tradition, 
Lefebvre saw contemporary life as "exploitative, oppressive, and relentlessly 
controlled."357 However, from within his dialectical understanding, everyday life 
possessed the energies to overcome the various aspects of oppression. 
This understanding of the everyday will be particularly informative in terms of 
engagement with everyday life as it relates to African American religious experience. 
Over against the theories that tend to obfuscate the heterogeneous, for Lefebvre, everyday 
life was quite simply "lived experience." Together, modernity and everyday life 
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constitute a deep structure. An innovative aspect of Lefebvre's understanding, 
however, the everyday is both a deep structure as well as the 'surflux,' an excess that is 
left over, unsystematizable, and unschematizable. "It is what is left over after 
analysis."359 In some sense for Lefebvre, the everyday is at the same time too small as 
well as being too large, too trivial, and impossibly ambitious. For example, Lefebvre 
refers to those instances of intense experience in everyday life that provide an imminent 
critique of the everyday as 'movements.' Examples of such movements include 
sensations of disgust, of shock, of delight. 
With respect to the relationship of philosophy and everyday, Lefebvre notes, "The 
limitation of philosophy - truth without reality - always and ever counterbalances the 
limitations of everyday life - reality without truth."360 Thus, philosophy for Lefebvre is 
primarily a critical tool that can be used in the "attempt to shatter the natural appearance 
of objects and relations." As a collection of critical tools, Lefebvre is able to have an 
eclectic range of references in an effort to displace if not to deconstruct the appeal of the 
totalization.361 
In the centenary of Marx's death Lefebvre reasserts the centrality of everyday life 
for critical Marxism: 
The commodity, the market, the money, with their implacable logic, seizes 
everyday. The extension of capitalism goes all the way to the slightest 
details of everyday life... A revolution cannot just change the political 
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personnel or institutions; it must change la vie quotidienne, which has 
362 
already been literally colonized by capitalism. 
For Lefebvre, massive social changes are the material from which his critiques of 
everyday life emerge, with the chief adversary being alienation. For Lefebvre, the 
possibility for disalienation, by means of which the material and intellectual conditions 
are created for the gradual disappearance of all forms of alienation, is a potentiality 
within everyday life. 
Michel De Certeau and the Practice of Everyday Life 
If Lefebvre's Marxist dialectics brings one to the point of recognizing the 
everyday as the site of action - as agonistic - Michel de Certeau (influenced by a 
Foucauldian poststructuralism) posited the everyday as a realm of praxis. Indeed, de 
Certeau's main contribution to social theory may be the positing of practice as a ground 
of resistance to domination. In his seminal work The Practice of Everyday Life, he states 
that he is writing "To the ordinary man... a common hero, a ubiquitous character walking 
in countless thousands on the streets... [an] ambiguous hero. He is the murmuring voice 
of societies." Variously, de Certeau will refer to this figure as an "ordinary man," a 
"user," or even an "active consumer." He goes on to say that his essay "is part of a 
continuing investigation of the ways in which users - commonly assumed to be passive 
and guided by established rules - operate."364 To achieve this, he turns to everyday 
practices, "ways of operating" or doing things, viewing them not simply as "merely the 
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obscure background of social activity." De Certeau, then, is focused on investigating the 
internal logic and utility of those behaviors often dismissed by social theorists: the 
everyday acts of talking, reading, writing, walking, shopping, and cooking, etc.365 In 
these acts, he finds a political dimension. These cannot be described by formal analysis 
such as statistics. They feature bricolage and poiesis and are characterized by a lack of 
homogeneity. It is for this reason that de Certeau embraces heterology - the science of 
the heterogeneous, that which is other, which cannot be systematized, organized, or 
assimilated. Indeed, I would maintain that de Certeau wants to move away from such 
constructions as they invariably lead to a totality. In this sense, de Certeau ultimately 
rejects the major trajectories within modern continental philosophy: the systematized a 
legacy that is associated with Hegel the organized that might be attributed to the tradition 
of Heidegger; and the assimilated as the behest of Husserl. In contrast to those who 
described societies and histories by evoking homogeneities and hegemonies, de Certeau's 
emphasis was on the creative and disruptive presence of "the other" - whether it deemed 
one an outsider, a stranger, a foreigner, or one's neighbor - in the ever present tensions at 
the heart of all social life. 
De Certeau is interested in the "procedures and ruses" by which people operate 
within the dominant system to form "the network of an anti-discipline."366 In many 
respects, his project might be seen as a complement and a critique of the work of 
Foucault, who is also concerned with the microphysics of power. For de Certeau, 
however, the focus is networks and resources that help people resist and evade the 
discipline enforced by [unjust] institutions; or rather, the logic of modernity and all that 
365
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conforms to it. De Certeau is somewhat beholden to the earlier work of Pierre Bourdieu 
with respect to practice. Yet, like Foucault, it is de Certeau's opinion that Bourdieu's 
work masks the agency of the individual, despite his protestations to the contrary. 
According to de Certeau, while he agrees that one should focus on practice (namely what 
people do as opposed to what they might profess to believe or affirm), he believes that 
Bourdieu's concepts of habitus and doxa are "violently imposed truths." In looking at the 
social structure of the Kabyle society in Algeria, Bourdieu developed his theory with 
regard to how people acquire dispositions that result in their functioning and behaving in 
certain ways they take for granted, of which they are often unconscious. Bourdieu studies 
how practices facilitate such ways of being. De Certeau believes, however, that 
Bourdieu's categories and systematization homogenize the state of affairs. By focusing 
on social disciplines and practices that lead to reproduction of social trends, i.e., 
conformity, one notes only those forces that are involved in the malleability and 
mutability of human beings resulting in particular kinds of subjects.367 However, what of 
368 
nonconformity, associated with resistance that seems to inhere in human selves? It is 
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for this reason that de Certeau adopts a heterological method, for it is his contention that 
many everyday practices are ignored, overlooked, left out, dismissed, or deemed 
aberrations and anomalous because they resist systematization. 
To this end, de Certeau introduces a number of key distinctions by which he seeks 
369 
to describe different "logics" of practice. It is through such distinctions that he is able 
to describe the ways in which the lived experience of persons resists being reduced to the 
mere loci or manifestations of a Foucauldian "grid of discipline" that constructs or 
constitutes society. 
If it is true that the grid of "discipline" is everywhere becoming clearer and 
more extensive, it is all the more urgent to discover how an entire society 
resists being reduced to it, what popular procedures (also "miniscule" and 
quotidian) manipulate the mechanisms of discipline and conform to them 
only in order to evade them, and finally, what "ways of operating" form 
the counterpart, on the consumer's (or "dominee's"?) side, of the mute 370 
processes that organize the establishment of socioeconomic order. 
One of de Certeau's central distinctions is that between strategies and tactics. 
Strategies require a 'proper' place, which he describes as a regularized, rule-governed, 
and institutionalized location^ A place of "its own" is distinguishable from its environs. 
There must be a break between a place of one's own and the place of the other. In 
contrast, tactics are "calculated action[s] determined by the absence of a proper locus" -
they have no proper place of their own, but are always operating within the territory of 
the other. It must work in "the cracks that particular conjunctions open in the way of 
spirit is negated. But then, if the rebel is true to himself, he sets the limits to history by his defiant act and 
thereby affirms values common to all. Such authentic rebellion is the claim to unity but not conformity." 
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surveillance of the proprietary powers.. .In short, a tactic is the art of the weak." 372 Yet, 
de Certeau sees strength in this position. Tactics are opportunistic. They involve 
"clever tricks, knowing how to get away with things, maneuvers."374 Whereas a strategy 
is determined by the establishment of a place of power, a tactic is determined by the 
seeming absence of power. _ 
Everyday practices, which are clearly aligned with the tactical, are about space. 
Space "exists when one takes into account vectors of direction, velocities, and time 
variables."375 De Certeau's most famous example is walking in the city. A city as planned 
by urban planners is a place, but it is turned into a multitude of spaces by those who walk 
through it, as they wander from one location to another, often taking various routes to 
376 
arrive at a particular destination. Space is a practiced place, the site of alteration, 
377 
memory, story, and mobility. 
Though seldom explicit, it is my contention that de Certeau's heterological 
methodology and theory of practice obtain with respect to his engagement with religion. 
Though a French academic and social theorist, he was also a Jesuit priest. This 
commitment would lead to his study of the origins of the Society of Jesus. A central 
focus of the study was religious experience in the context of the historical crisis 
associated with the confrontation between religion and modernity. His most significant 
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works on these matters include The Mystic Fable: The Sixteenth and Seventeenth 
378 
Centuries (1995) and The Possession at Loudon (2000). 
In both of these works, de Certeau reads religious practices of the sixteenth and 
seventeenth century (one a case if mystics and the other a famed case of possession at a 
French convent) as reactions against specific totalizing discourses (scientific, political, 
economic, as well as ecclesiastical) spawned by the Enlightenment, each making 
independent claims to universality. The mystics, then, were reacting to "an 'explosion' in 
the arrangement and use of 'stable' elements, a phenomenon of social reinterpretation." 
Succinctly characterized by the theologian Graham Ward, "de Certeau notes that the 37Q 
words of the mystics emerge as one world order gives way to another." As religious 
experience, notes de Certeau, the expressions and practices of the mystics and the 
380 
possessed "effect displacements, they attract words and change them." Precisely, they 
create spaces, breaks, ruptures, and deviations within "the grid of power," the system of 
domination. They are assertions and affirmations of agency. The sacral action is marked 
by distinct "nonconformity" if not transgression. They are, in short, oppositional 
practices, tactical resistances created by the reaction of a group under siege to oppressive 
strategies imposed from outside, a situation I read as being not dissimilar to that of black 
religious experiences in America, which offer alternative social and political practice in a 
world structured on the Enlightenment and modernity. One could then go on to say that it 
is this kind of daily practice proposed by de Certeau that one finds in the different parts 
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of daily life and the world slaves created in respond to the racial organization of the slave 
world and its plantation. 
Excursus on the Microphysics of Power 
Having introduced the thought of Lefebvre and de Certeau, I maintain that a more 
thorough exploration of what is meant by power on the level of the microscopic, or more 
specifically the nature of the forces acting on individuals (selves, subjects, or bodies) and 
their properties is needed; i.e., the "microphysics of power." The nomenclature, 
"microphysics of power" is perhaps most closely associated with the scholarship of the 
late French historian, philosopher, and social scientist, Michel Foucault. The concept 
381 
arises in his analytics of power in works such as Discipline and Punish. In this work, 
Foucault begins to examine forms of power used in the shaping or construction of 
subjects. Such power, according to Foucault, is capillary, it is ubiquitous, and can be 
characterized as a network, web, or as a grid. Moreover, it is constitutive of society. As 
such, it is simultaneously systemic (macroscopic) as well as everyday (microscopic). 
Such power is often quite subtle and at times goes unnoticed because it is associated with 
the dominant discourses and systems of knowledge that one often takes for granted. 
In introducing Foucault, it is important to remember that as a radical thinker, 
Foucault sought to critique the dominant paradigms within society, initially through the 
interrogation of various institutions such as schools, prisons, and psychiatric facilities. 
For Foucault, "history" could be described as inherently contentious, and as such, there 
are no bare facts in history that are discrete, that are not embedded, formed, and informed 
381
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by social, cultural, and biological/organic factors. Indeed, Foucault avoids the term 
history because in the context of the West it is synonymous with a continuous, linear, and 
progressive narrative. Like Nietzsche, he uses the terms archaeology and genealogy, 
which are generally more rhizomorphic. 
Foucault also engages in the reversal of perspective. He chooses not to write from 
the position of the elite, but rather from the perspective of the exceptional. This is 
achieved principally by attending to those perspectives that are left out of the dominant 
discourses, from the perspective of those at the margins. He also writes without an 
assumption of rational continuity, that there is a particular telos to history that would 
allow it to be conducive to a narrative constituted by a beginning, middle, and an end. 
Foucault thus attempts to relate events in their materiality, with all their contradictions, 
irrationality, and erroneous assertions. 
Perhaps Foucault's most significant contribution to contemporary intellectual 
Weltanschauung has to do with his assertions regarding the relationship of knowledge 
and power. Anywhere one finds knowledge, one will find power. As I read Foucault, 
these form the conditions for the possibility of one another. Subsequently, "truth is 
undoubtedly the sort of error that cannot be refuted because it was hardened into an 
382 
unalterable form in the long baking process of history." 
Foucault argues that knowledge is not only comprised of institutions, but also of 
discourses and communications that function through rules of exclusion. Those people 
who have been excluded, those who have been deemed "other" during and subsequent to 
the Enlightenment and modernity, include non-Western persons — primarily persons of 
~ Michel Foucault, Language, Counter-Memory, Practice : Selected Essays and Interviews (Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University Press, 1977), 144. 
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color, the mad, the old, the infirm, women, etc. Such exclusion was a condition for the 
possibility for the dominant discourse. 
Thus, in some of his early works, e.g., Madness and Civilization, Foucault 
explores how the discourse of reason has excluded the mad. He notes that from antiquity 
through the medieval period, the fools, the mad, were seen as possessing important 
wisdom. In various instances, in various societies, they were held in high esteem as being 
individuals uniquely blessed by God or the gods. Yet, with a shift in the coding of reason 
vs. unreason in Western society, they were excluded. Moreover, this exclusion was 
premised on notions of being human (which also were inextricably linked with 
assumptions and assertions about what it meant to be human). This later point evolves 
into Foucault's rejection of the term or concept of 'human' as the subject of humanist 
discourses that emerge in the human sciences in the nineteenth century. For him, it is 
inherently exclusionary as opposed to being inclusive. 
Foucault asserts that reformers created a completely new disciplinary matrix 
around madness. This matrix constituted a system in which they were observed, 
processed, etc. The result was an expansion of the therapeutic zone, an expansion that he 
asserts possibly came encompass the whole of the social field. This is an example of 
control, associated with language and discourse. 
It is in Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison that he continues his 
analysis of disciplinary matrixes, by looking at the development of the modern Western 
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penal system.385 He begins with his now well-known depiction of the punishment of a 
person where punishment was a public spectacle. In this instance, the drawing and 
quartering of the criminal and the pouring of burning sulfur into his body are meant to 
illicit a confession from the condemned while also making amends for his acts of 
injustice. Moreover, it is also an expression of the power of the sovereign. Indeed, one 
might assert that the power of the sovereign in this instance is literally inscribed on the 
body. In the modern context, however, punishment is replaced by the notion of 
comprehensive qua universal body. In what is characterized once more as a humane 
gesture, punishment becomes public works. Thus, prisons become more like schools, 
where one is reformed or renormalized, in order that they might be reintroduced into the 
social body, if all goes well. 
In his analysis, however, Foucault notes that such reforms do not involve the 
abolition of power, but rather the transmutation of power. The body does not have to be 
"written on" in a large or grandiose fashion, but rather through the implementation of 
power on the level of the microscopic, bodies are meant to become docile. The reformers 
have not abolished power, but instead, have facilitated a microphysics of power. 
Deploying the metaphor of Bentham's panopticon, Foucault asserts that society has 
become a carceral body where the individual is controlled through instruments of 
surveillance as well as being "self-regulated" through various discourses. Such discourses 
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The key to any discussion of discipline in Foucault's sense is that human beings become 
subjects ('docile bodies') and subsequently monitor and constrain themselves. 
Other scholars have noted this phenomenon, although not necessarily framing 
their analysis in terms of power. Yet, the principle issue regarding the formation of 
subjects is present. Moreover, this is intrinsic in an analytics of the everyday. For 
example, I would assert that there are numerous affinities between Foucault's thought in 
this area and that of the sociologist Peter Berger, who explores how society defines and 
organizes reality and how individuals subsequently appropriate this reality into their own 
subjective consciousness as "the way things are." For Berger, religion is one of the 
formations in this overarching reality, which he calls the nomos?%1 What Berger offers 
that is different from Foucault, however, is that Berger reads the construction of reality 
and sacredness as a harnessing activity that takes everyday experiences as the behavior 
that sets up the normative and institutional aspects of social life. The norms and 
plausibility structures are not transcendental from the perspective that they are delivered 
from some place beyond human experience, but the harnessing of everyday experience as 
reality. 
In his first major work, The Social Construction of Reality, Peter Berger asserts 
that human beings confront the world without the guidance of instincts and thus need 
•500 
knowledge in order to survive . For Berger, individuals do not construct knowledge on 
their own. Knowledge is eminently social, always and at every level. This knowledge is 
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shared in community and is transferred through various interactions. The construction, 
maintenance, and transmission of this knowledge are a human affair; the systems and 
structures constitute a culture. While knowledge can grow, develop, and deteriorate, it 
does so only at the level of the community.389 
In The Sacred Canopy, Berger applied his sociology of knowledge to religion 
specifically.390 Here the nomos is achieved through a three-fold process that involves 
Externalization,291 in which people project their conception of the world out into the 
world; Objectivation,392 in which this projected conception is given the status of objective 
reality; and finally Internalization,392 in which this objective reality is re-appropriated 
into the mind of the individual as the representation of reality.394 This image of reality 
must be maintained against any number of possible assaults, which necessitates the 
presence of "plausibility structures." Such structures within a society include such things 
as educational systems, media, and literary canons. If plausibility structures are 
sufficiently strong, most people will accept the nomos as a given. However, plausibility 
structures may be weakened by the presence of competing nomoi or the appearance of 
credible contradictory evidence. Active threats to the nomos require the development of 
theodicies, or ways of accounting for counterevidence within the structure of the nomos. 
For example, death can be rationalized into the nomos by proper belief in an afterlife. 
Massive suffering can be understood as a moral punishment. If the theodicy ever failed, 
the result would be anomy, the collapse of the nomos. Most people would do anything to 
3 8 9 A s will be noted later in the section on de Certeau, within the thought of Foucault and Berger one is 
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avoid the meaninglessness and chaos that would result from this collapse. In general, 
individuals must be induced to accept the commonsensical nature of their society's 
nomos. One consequence of this is a kind of alienation such that there is a denial of 
ownership between persons and the worldview they created. In extreme cases of near-
total socialization, human beings exhibit "bad faith," meaning that they are so invested in 
the nomos that they simply cannot act against it. 
One other important theorist who provides insight into the perspective of power as 
it relates to practice is Pierre Bourdieu. Of special note and relevance to microscopic 
expression of power are his works Outline of a Theory of Practice?95 Distinction,396 and 
397 
the Logic of Practice. It is in these volumes where he introduces many of his key 
concepts (habitus, doxa, and cultural capital) that have come to a significantly influence 
on the humanities and social sciences. 
In the foreword to Outline of a Theory of Practice, Bourdieu is noted to have 
stated that his work is a "reflection on scientific practice which will disconcert both those 
who reflect on the social sciences without practicing them and those who practice them 
i q o 
without reflecting on them." For Bourdieu, practice; i.e., those things that people do as 
opposed to what they say, figures significantly in how he explains the processes by which 
social patterns of behavior reproduce social structures; namely, how do people contribute 
to the perpetuation/reproduction of social strictures and what is and is not possible to do 
in a particular cultural context? Bourdieu argues that the language of rules, codes, and 
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models are inadequate to the task of explaining social life, that they "cease to convince as 
soon as one considers the practical mastery of the symbolism of social interaction ... 
presupposed by the most everyday games of sociability and accompanied by the 
application of a spontaneous semiology."399 In Chapter 1, Bourdieu refers to the concept 
of honor among Kabylian men. He notes that dignity is accorded to the man deemed 
capable of "playing the game of honour, and playing it well."400 The game involves a 
challenge and riposte. While one may attempt to transcribe and identify a logic of the 
practice predicated on various corollaries or propositions, Bourdieu asserts that the 
scenario or events originate in a disposition, namely, the sense of honor. 
The cultivated disposition, inscribed in the body schema and in the 
schemes of thought, which enables each agent to engender all the practices 
consistent with the logic of challenge and riposte, and only such practices, 
by means of countless inventions, which the stereotyped unfolding of a 
ritual would in no way demand.401 
Moreover, while a logic or theory may retrospectively account for choices associated the 
game, this 
Does not imply that such practice[s] [are] perfectly predictable, like the 
acts inserted in the rigorously stereotyped sequences of a rite; and this is 
true not only for the observer but also for the agents, who find in the 
relative predictability and unpredictability of the possible ripostes the 
opportunity to put their strategies to work... even the most strictly 
ritualized exchanges, in which all the moments of action, and their 
unfolding,... have room for strategies.402 
Subsequently, one comes to understand that customs are also the product of 
schemes.403 As a consequence, laws and precepts are not the product of some 
"transcendent juridical code," but are deposited and thus reside in every member of the 
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group and are otherwise known as the dispositions of the habitus.404 A habitus is a set of 
dispositions that generate and structure human actions and behaviors. It shapes all 
practice, and yet it is not experienced as repressive or enforcing. Its effects on the 
individual typically go unnoticed. Another way of talking about the habitus is as a set of 
unconscious assumptions regarding the world.405 
Dispositions can be said to come into focus when social and cultural markers such 
as occupation, income, education, religion, and taste preferences (food, clothing, music, 
art) are juxtaposed against one another. It is once more important to emphasize that a 
habitus is not deterministic. In the words of Bourdieu, the habitus is "the durably 
installed generative principle of regulated improvisations."406 As such, an agent is able to 
respond accordingly to various demands placed on him/her in particular situations. It 
would be a mistake, however to assume that said agent is autonomous, independent, 
acting as if free from constraints. Rather, in practice it is habitus, acquired through 
practice, that forms and informs practice. The habitus is "history turned into nature," i.e. 
"second nature,"407 functioning on the level of the unconscious. Indeed, one comes to 
inhabit a habitus through one's lived experience, in one's body; e.g., how it is adorned, 
how one moves and gestures, what one eats. Again, Bourdieu notes that a significant 
portion of what governs one's behavior does not adhere to formal logic, but rather the 
fuzzy logic of practices.408 
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It is important to note, however, that Bourdieu is not only concerned with the 
process of socialization or enculturation into a set of practices, into a habitus, but he is 
also concerned with the power relations that exist between social classes, i.e., with how 
social inequality is perpetuated and maintained in this seemingly benign way of 
appropriating habitus. Habitus might then be seen as everyday practice or being-in-the-
world, if one returns to what I earlier implied to as a possible Heideggerian way of 
understanding everyday life. Habitus functions to distinguish one social class from 
another. Bourdieu goes on to assert that the dominance of one class over another occurs 
covertly, symbolic power is experienced, and the arbitrariness of the "social order" is 
manifest as natural. In those contexts where the 'objective order' and the 'subjective 
principles of organization' cohere, the natural and the social world are taken for granted, 
unquestioned, and unexamined.409 This state is what Bourdieu calls doxa, "so as to 
distinguish it from an orthodox or heterodox belief implying awareness and recognition 
of the possibility of different or antagonistic belief."410 
Further, in addition to the economic exchange system, which has been extensively 
studied, Bourdieu alludes to the use of the symbolic exchange system. This exchange 
system is controlled by the dominant class. Bourdieu talks not only about economic 
capital, but also cultural capital. This involves aspects like education, linguistic 
competence, etc. Cultural capital is used to maintain class distinction. In his subsequent 
work Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgment of Taste, taste is the category 
Bourdieu uses to describe how distinctions arise and are justified between high and low 
culture. It is here that he talks about French society and its various aesthetic and taste 
409
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preferences. Taste is related to cultural capital. "Taste classifies, and it classifies the 
classifier."411 
With respect to the application of Bourdieu's thought to the study of religion, the 
notion of habitus points to the manner in which religion might function to shape social 
behavior and power relations. Thus habitus may be useful for studying particular 
traditions, the dynamics between various religious groups, and how such groups are 
situated and function within a larger cultural context where everyday life is a construction 
of social reality as I have interpreted from the insight of Berger. 
Bourdieu is also useful for his functionalism. Namely, as noted in the first chapter 
on religious experience, it is clearly the case that an analysis of religion informed by 
Bourdieu's analytics would hold that it is not simply, or primarily, about those beliefs and 
practices that are explicit and conscious within a religious tradition or community. Just as 
important - if not more so - are the hidden invisible dimensions of habitus, doxa, tastes, 
and forms of cultural capital that operate to create cohesion and identity. Moreover, I 
would assert that a Bourdieuian approach to religion would be integrative with respect to 
the larger social structures and hierarchies of culture in which it is situated. Yet, as I also 
implied in Chapter 1,1 believe that an interdisciplinary approach incorporating both 
functionalist and substantive perspectives provides a more comprehensive and 
compelling explanation of religious phenomenon and religious experience. As I will also 
note again later (informed by the scholarship of de Certeau), though Bourdieu theory of 
practice restores a theoretical basis for agency that is expunged in the early scholarship of 
Foucault, his schematization of practice and his strict functionalism are still problematic 
because he seems to develop a theory of practice that remains highly structured, and an 
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explanation of social life in which agency remains highly circumscribed. However, one 
could bring a particularly deconstructive reading to Bourdieu's notion of practice that 
suggests an experience of the everyday that is more implicit (not to mention more 
complex) than it is explicit. 
The Resuscitation of Agency 
In opposition to such reproduction theorists, Michel de Certeau considers social 
space more porous and open to repurposing by the individual through his or her daily 
decisions and practices. De Certeau's 'ways of operating' "constitute the innumerable 
practices by means of which users reappropriate the space organized by techniques of 
sociocultural production."412 Indeed, de Certeau goes on to state that the ways of 
operating pose questions at once analogous and contrary to those addressed by Foucault 
in Discipline and Punish: 
analogous, in that the goal is to perceive and analyze the microbe-like 
operations proliferating within technocratic structures and deflecting their 
functioning by means of a multitude of "tactics" articulated in the details 
of everyday life; contrary, in that the goal is not to make clearer how the 
violence of order is transmuted into a disciplinary technology, but rather, 
to bring to light the clandestine forms taken by the dispersed, tactical, and 
makeshift creativity of groups or individuals already caught in the nets of 
"discipline."413 
In other words, de Certeau's central critique is that disciplinary control is overstated by 
Foucault. At the same time, however, de Certeau also warns against a false consciousness 
of "freedom" or autonomy. 
In later work, Foucault acknowledges his overstatement of disciplinary control. 
For example, in the essay "The Subject and Power" he talks about the construction of 
412
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oneself in a position of marginality.414 Indeed, it would be remiss to not acknowledge 
Foucault's development from his early "carceralism" to his work on governmentality as 
the management of conduct manifest in the modern liberal state, which Foucault 
summarized as "the art of government."415 Governmentality, as conducting conduct, 
included the "art" of encouraging people to manage their own conduct, in the absence of 
coercion or intervention by the state or its operatives. Subsequent to his exploration of 
governmentality, Foucault goes on to coin the term biopower, to describe a political 
technology of power that enables the control of populations by exercising power over 
other bodies. This power is described by Foucault as "an explosion of numerous and 
diverse techniques for achieving the subjugations of bodies and the control of 
populations."416 It is in this last move, as an intersection of his concerns about power, 
ethics, and subjectivity, that he deploys the concept of "technologies of the self ' (also 
referred to as care of the self and practices of the self). According to Foucault, 
technologies of the self are the forms of knowledge and strategies that "permit 
individuals to effect by their own means or with the help of others a certain number of 
operations on their own bodies and souls, thoughts, conduct, and way of being, so as to 
transform themselves in order to attain a certain state of happiness, purity, wisdom, 
perfection, or immortality."417 
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While the later Foucault certainly appears more open to the transformative 
potential of practice, there is still a question in my mind regarding the relationship of 
such acts or practices that might be deemed transgressive, oppositional, or resistant to 
dominant relations of power. On this point, I see de Certeau as a useful via media or 
tertium quid with respect to an understanding of power in African American religious 
thought, an understanding that tempers the grandiosity and mendacity associated with the 
dominant paradigm of liberation while preempting despair and the nihilistic threat. With 
respect to Foucault's later work, Slavoj Zizek notes that such a move in Foucault is a 
move in the direction of humanism: 
With Foucault, we have a turn against that universalist ethics which results 
in a kind of aestheticization of ethics: each subject must, without any 
support from universal rules, build his own mode of self-mastery; he must 
harmonize the antagonism of the powers within himself- invent himself, 
so to speak, produce himself as subject, find his own particular art of 
living.418 
Conclusion 
It is important to note that the analytics of power on the level of microphysics has 
not been completely overlooked by African American scholars of religion. For example, 
Charles H. Long refers to Foucault in Significations, calling upon how the mad/insane 
become the "other" through the acts of discourse and signification.419 He notes that there 
are similarities with respect to how such discourses affect these indigenous 'others,' e.g., 
women, peasants, criminals, or the mentally ill, and what eventually happens to enslaved 
Africans.420 Foucault has also been helpful for a scholar such as Kelly Brown Douglas to 
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question White patriarchal hegemony with respect to its effect and impact on issues of 
African Americans' experience of sexuality and the body.421 In addition, Anthony B. 
Pinn, in works such as Loving the Body422 and Terror and Triumph423 utilizes Foucault's 
thought with respect to the body as a social construction, particularly with respect to how 
discursive expressions of power constitute or construct docile bodies.424 
Nonetheless, among more than a few notable African American scholars of 
religion, an emphasis on a microscopic analytics or the microphysics of power is viewed 
with wariness. For example, Dwight Hopkins maintains that a microscopic analytics of 
power, particularly as it has been deployed in the deconstruction of the Enlightenment 
notion of the subject (specifically European subjects), has little to do with the substantive, 
palpable oppression of black folk. For Hopkins, such analysis may be useful to African 
American theologians to the extent that it calls them to examine their particular 
discursive practices, such as their "God talk," but little more.425 
Similar convictions are also expressed by Cornel West. In The American Evasion 
of Philosophy,426 West finds fault with theories that are preoccupied with the analytics of 
power associated with particular kinds of operation, specifically those by which human 
that "the study of religion grew out of the perceptions of otherness both within Western societies and 
beyond their boundaries." 
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427 beings are constructed into subjects. West goes on to say that one must be concerned 
about operations of power beyond those associated with conditions for the possibility of 
the construction of the subject. Such questions, West maintains, are "inextricably tied to a 
conception of validity that stands above and outside the social practices of human 
beings."428 
West is also concerned with the tendency of such theories and methodologies 
associated with the microanalytics of power and what he maintains is their devaluation of 
moral discourse. Conversely, for prophetic Christianity and prophetic pragmatism, 
projects West has championed over the course of his scholarly career, moral discourse is 
essential. Moreover, West maintains that one engaged in social, cultural, and political 
criticism as it relates to creating a just society must address macroscopic operations of 
power such as economic modes of production and nation-states 429 Moreover, the 
prophetic pragmatist and revolutionary Christians must dare to embrace a strong sense of 
human agency.430 
Therefore, it is not surprising that when looking to various intellectual traditions 
within the contemporary academy in "The Dilemma of the Black Intellectual,"431 West 
expresses concern about those who would follow certain forms of postmodern 
skepticism. For West, such a position is a bourgeois indulgence and an evasion of the 
suffering of the oppressed and disinherited. "It provides a sophisticated excuse for 
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ideological and social distance" and it leads to "the fetishizing of critical consciousness" 
which does not promote organic human relationships.432 
I contend, however, that a microscopic analytics of power has much to offer in the 
investigation of African American religious experience. Critiques of foundationalism, 
essentialism, and emphasis on difference are certainly needed with respect to the study of 
African American religious experience, particularly as it relates to such experiences in 
terms of the everyday.433 To minimize microscopic forms and manifestation of power as 
advocated by many "liberationists" is to choose not to confront potentially insidious or 
invidious forces. Further, I contend that the incorporation of microanalytics of power, in 
its various articulations, might reveal elements of African American religion and 
religious experience that have been ignored or deemed insignificant. What might one 
learn about what it means to be religious? I assert that it is in the unpacking of power, and 
the assertion of a microphysics of power that microscopic analysis becomes important. 
Moreover, such a move is also consistent with the concentration on the everyday lives of 
African American men and women as well as members of other oppressed communities, 
the principle referent of African American religious scholars who emphasize liberation. 
As asserted in the examination of the various theorists of the everyday, an attunement to 
the microscopic, precisely on the level of the microscopic, on the level that power 
associated with the construction of subjects and selves resides. Again, it is my contention 
that such an unpacking is necessary because it calls one to an engagement with lived 
experience ignored by theories and methodologies that emphasize macroscopic social 
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structures, forces, and institutions. While such analysis possesses merit, what is lost in 
such analyses are the little, seemingly unimportant aspects of daily life that could be 
harnessed and contribute to the "liberative" discourse. The institutionalization, 
systemization, totalization of religious discourse has obscured the power of the day-to-
day lived experience of many people. 
Granted, questioning one's fundamental assumptions about the nature and 
function of religion and religious experience as they relate to individual and corporate 
transformation is a process not without risk. It involves what I call a willingness to 
embrace the critic's paradox, which I understand as follows:At is often the case that the 
more powerful, nuanced, or complex an account of the world, the more hopeless people 
feel that they can do anything about their circumstances. Conversely, however, in the 
absence of such an accounting, people will underestimate or mischaracterize what they 
are confronting. 
Further, with respect to the criticism that the theorists whose work I have invoked 
have focused primarily on European subjects,434 it does not follow that because the object 
of investigation has not been people of color that the tools may not be of some benefit. 
Moreover, the line of argumentation I am pursuing in this thesis is, in no way, the 
uncritical appropriation of the thought of any of the individuals referenced. Rather, it is 
my objective to provide a compelling case for a cognitive repositioning. It is also an 
appeal for African American scholars of religion to expand their descriptive, 
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interpretative, and explanatory resources as well as to engage and to embrace theoretical 
and methodological innovation. 
Finally, as one initially trained as a physicist, there is a particularly helpful 
analogy to the type of posture that I am suggesting, which natural scientists hold between 
classical and modern physics. This analogy is called the correspondence principle. In its 
simplest articulation, the correspondence principle deals with the relationship between 
Newton or classical physics (mechanics and dynamics) and modern physics (specifically 
quantum mechanics and special relativity). While rooted in markedly different construals 
of the physical universe, one finds that in dealing with macroscopic objects the quantum 
equations collapse in such a way as to cohere with the classical equations. Likewise, at 
speeds that are substantially less than those of light, the equations associated with special 
relativity collapse and cohere to classical dynamic equations, hence the nomenclature of 
correspondence. The quantum or microscopic level, however, is an interstitial region. It is 
the realm of probabilities and potentialities, a place of indeterminacy. Once more, it is not 
my intention to promote only one perspective, but rather to promote an orientation, a way 
of looking at the world, that attends to the heterological, the ambiguous, and the 
oblique.435 
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Chapter 5 - Rethinking African American Religious Experience 
Introduction 
In Chapter 5,1 will demonstrate the advantage of an analysis of African American 
religious experience in terms of "everydayness" as opposed to the macroscopic liberative 
hermeneutical norm that is common. The data I will use in this analysis will consist of the 
three extensive phenomenological descriptions in chapter 2. 
Hermeneutic of Liberation vs. Explanations of Everyday Life 
As asserted in the introduction of this dissertation, it is my contention that the 
dominant theoretical and methodological approach to the study of African American 
religious experience is markedly lacking and inadequate with respect to its descriptive 
(phenomenological) and explanative depth. This paradigm, with its emphasis on a 
macroscopic understanding of power as well as its frequent articulation in an 
exceptionalist and exclusivist Christian guise, often does violence to African American 
religion and religious experience, broadly construed. In order to make this most evident, I 
bring together the philosophies and concepts of everyday life in dialogue with the 
dominant paradigm as conveyed by perhaps its most noted proponent, James Hal Cone. 
In chapter 3,1 attempted to present Cone's understanding of African American 
religious experience. There I noted that for Cone, Christ - as God incarnate - evinces a 
deity who is committed to the well-being of the weak and helpless in human society. 
Thus, God is active in the struggle to bring about an end to oppression for the African 
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American community.436 Cone argues that God "has made a decision about the black 
condition. He has chosen to make the black condition his condition! It is a continuation of 
his incarnation in twentieth-century America."437 For Cone, it is this notion of God as 
present in the African American condition that empowers the African American 
community to fight against a society that denies them their humanity. 
According to Cone, African Americans speak of God in light of the African 
American experience. Unfortunately, one is left to assume that under the rubric of black 
or African American experience is included African American religious experience, yet 
this is something that Cone does not make explicit. Moreover, it is not clear if it does 
include African American religious experiences, that it does so in a truly broad sense. 
Indeed, as read through the lens of Black theology, not all African American Christian 
experiences would seem to be valid, because a religious or Christian experience (if it is 
truly an experience of the God who is on the side of the poor and oppressed) must instill 
within them a desire to engage in the "liberation struggle." 
Given that the discipline of Black theology (as well as a majority of womanist 
theoethical discourse) retains such a strong apologetic and normative component - some 
might say prophetic component - ostensibly grounded in Christian exclusivist and 
exceptionalist claims, a truly broad and dispassionate analysis of African American 
religion in its heterological and variegated givenness is rendered impracticable.438 For 
example, when Cone talks about African Americans embracing and accepting the Christ 
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event in the context of what Jesus Christ means when they are confronted with white 
racism439; it appears he is making a claim as to intentionality. However, do such claims 
hold with respect to African American religious experience broadly understood? Even if 
one assumes the claim is meant to pertain only to African American Christians, is this 
indeed the intentionality evinced in the three case studies presented? If Cone is referring 
to the effects on Africana persons in a racialized society with respect to the constitution 
of viable selves, as was the case for Du Bois, Fanon, and Gordon, I believe the claim to 
have merit. Yet, elsewhere, Cone asserts that African American religious experience 
cannot be equated with notions of inwardness or feelings of absolute dependence - that 
such perspectives are indulgences that African Americans are not afforded.440 Yet, what 
if it is consistent with some African Americans' religious experience? Again, there is the 
troubling insistence on conformity and homogeneity of experience that is synonymous 
with Foucault's violently imposed truths. 
The ambiguity and imprecision of Cone's analysis of African American religious 
experience unfortunately persists throughout his oeuvre. In God of the Oppressed, 
perhaps the most systematic of Cone's texts, the work begins with a short spiritual 
autobiography of the author. In the first chapter, Cone writes richly about his early church 
experience that awakened his sense of vocation. According to Cone, at Macedonia 
African Methodist Episcopal Church 
I encountered the presence of the divine Spirit, and my soul was moved and filled 
with an aspiration for freedom. Through prayer, song, and sermon, God made 
frequent visits to the black community in Bearden and reassured the people of his 
concern for their well-being and his will to bring them safely home... Every 
Sunday the black brothers and sisters of Macedonia experienced a foretaste of 
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their "home in glory" when God's Spirit visited their worship, and they responded 
with thankfulness and humility, singing joyfully: 
I responded to the black Church experience by offering myself for membership at 
Macedonia when I was only ten and by entering the ministry at the early age of 
441 
sixteen. 
In another moment of reflection, Cone asserts that his theological orientation cannot be 
the same as that of his white colleagues at Union Seminary, again presumably because of 
racialization. 
They were not born in Bearden. They did not know about Macedonia A.M.E. 
Church, and how the Black Spirit of God descended upon that community when 
folks gathered for worship and praise to him who had brought them a "mighty 
long way." They could not know the significance of black prayer, because they 
had not heard nor felt the invested meaning of those familiar words as Brother 
Elbert Thrower invited the congregation to pray with him a little while.442 
Similar observations arise in later works of Cone such as in My Soul Looks Back. 
Cone says: 
As a source of identity and survival, the faith of the church was that factor which 
sustained the people when everything else failed. God was that reality to which 
the people turned for identity and worth because the existing social, political, and 
economic structures said that they are nobody.443 
Further, 
After being treated as things for six days of the week, black folk went to church 
on Sunday in order to affirm and experience another definition of their humanity. 
In the eyes of the Almighty, they were children of God whose future was not 
defined by the white structures that humiliated them. 
When the people of Macedonia had their backs up against the wall and all human 
resources appeared exhausted, they did not hesitate to turn to the Lord in 
441
 James H. Cone, God of the Oppressed (New York, NY: The Seabury Press, 1975), 2. 
442
 Cone, God of the Oppressed, 4. 
443
 James H. Cone, My Soul Looks Back (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1986), 23. 
444
 Cone, My Soul Looks Back, 23. 
185 
Moreover, Cone is critical of those who would deem such religious experiences as 
pathological. 
For some Marxists and other leftists who do not know existentially the black 
religious experience, the survival and identity emphasis of black religion will 
surely validate their claim that it is an opiate. There are of course many black 
churches that are vulnerable to the Marxist critique. But I would claim that to 
apply the label of opiate to black religion in Bearden during my early years is to 
be doctrinaire and superficial, neglecting to probe the depths of the black 
experience that gave birth to the church. 
Furthermore, labeling religion a mere painkiller ignores the black church as the 
source, not only of identity and survival, but of the sociopolitical struggle of 
liberation.445 
In examining these personal accounts of religious experience, it is interesting to 
note in Cone the absence of liberation discourse in terms of macroscopic, systemic, and 
structural transformation. Instead, he refers to the communication of personal value and 
worth before God in the context of community. He refers to identity and survival through 
a faith that sustained a person when everything else failed. In my estimation, such 
descriptions are more consistent with those noted in theories of the everyday, with 
oppositional tactics, practices, rituals, and technologies associated with the maintenance 
and creation of viable selves. It is also consistent with a characterization of religion as a 
quest for wholeness that I have previously presented. Moreover, it is a process that is 
episodic and transient. As Cone says, "After being treated as things for six days of the 
week," i.e. as other, as objects and not subjects, "black folk went to church on Sunday in 
order to affirm and experience another definition of their humanity," i.e. as selves, as 
subjects, as a people. As will become evident, such is consistent with what transpired in 
the experiences of Thurman, Crane, and Valeria. 
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Returning to For My People, Cone writes that the task of black theology is not to 
tell others what the gospel is, but rather to take as the content for black theology the 
"prereflective understanding of the gospel had by black Christians, in order to make their 
voices heard throughout the churches and society."446 In order to ascertain this 
understanding, Cone exhorts his peers to turn to the sermons, songs, and prayers of our 
grandparents, as well as other material that is embedded in the history of the black 
church. According to Cone, this material is waiting to be put into a theological language 
that can serve as a guide for contemporary effort to be faithful. Put slightly differently, he 
seems to be saying that the religious experience of our African American forebears 
should be the source material for contemporary constructive work that is black 
theology.447 However, this continues to beg the question as to how one assesses the 
religious experiences themselves. How does one evaluate, interpret, or explain the 
sermons, songs, and prayers? Indeed, there appears to be a disposition among many 
African American religionists that they are in possession of a special gnosis, that their 
engagement with subjects, artifacts, and data a certain need be predicated on no more 
than some intimacy and or urgency in their quest to valorize the experiences of the 
marginalized and the dispossessed. 
In many respects, the African American posture may also stem from a mistrust of 
the intellectual tradition associated with the field of religious studies. As mentioned in the 
introduction of this dissertation, this is associated with failings of the tradition, 
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liberation in the world. 
particularly with respect to various discourses that have perpetuated and instantiated the 
oppression of various peoples, most notably those who are non-European and non-
Western. Thus, many African American scholars, academics, and intellectuals, among 
them scholars of religion, have come to view theory with suspicion. Making a similar 
observation, Paget Henry asserts "the eclipsing of the rationality" of non-Western 
peoples - particularly people of African descent - by the Western intellectual tradition 
have made problematic the status of theory for those engaged in Africana and African 
American studies.448 Henry goes on to assert that this has led to the approach among 
many Africana scholars to engage in the amassing of "case studies" to be used as a 
rebuttal to the dominant theories, methods, and discourses viewed as authoritative by the 
West. Finally, he shares his experience with Africana scholars who associate theory and 
rational thought with Anglo-American/European (white) patriarchy.449 
One should recall that I presented various components of this "eclipsing of 
African and Africana people" within the Western intellectual tradition in Chapter 2. 
Similar critiques have been proffered by Cornel West in works such as Prophesy 
Deliverance (in the chapter "Genealogy of Racism") and by Paul Gilroy in The Black 
Atlantic (in the chapter "Masters, Mistresses, Slaves, and the Antinomies of Modernity)." 
I would also suggest that a consequence of this othering and its relationship to oppression 
has resulted in an emphasis among African American religionists on the ethical over 
against the often speculative and abstract disposition theorists. Indeed, the ethical or 
practical impulse in the American context is all the more probable due to the 
autochthonous philosophical movement of pragmatism. 
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It is my contention, however, that in so doing, there has been a lack of attention 
with respect to the strengths and weaknesses associated with the various disciplinary 
methodologies these scholars deploy, as well as a failure to interrogate their own 
assumptions.450 
In this respect, the conceptual framework that I espouse - theories of everyday 
life - is superior to that of the dominant paradigm because of its microscopic focus and 
ability to bracket systemization and intentionality of non-imposition of schematizations 
upon phenomenon. Again, this is in keeping with handling phenomena in their givenness, 
particularity, and distinctiveness. Likewise, in the context of the dominant paradigm, 
there is a tendency to equate African American experience with oppression, with an 
assault on black people, which is overcome through an act or acts of liberation, 
understood as historical, material, equality on a macroscopic scale. Again, Cone equates 
the African American experience with "a life of humiliation and suffering."451 Later he 
states "the true black experience in most cases is very concrete... sleeping in subways, 
being bitten by rats, six people living in a kitchenette."452 Yet surely, such a 
characterization is not synonymous with African American experience, let alone African 
American religious experience. This point was made by the African American ethicist 
Preston N. Washington, some forty years ago, in an article entitled "The Black 
Experience and Black Religion."453 Indeed, Williams offers "three typologies for 
grasping and explaining the black man's experience" and then illustrates them in terms of 
450
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"black religion."454 Of the three - victimization, assimilation-integration, and black 
awareness or black consciousness - the first, he asserts, has touched the life of every 
African American, though naturally not all African Americans suffer in the same way or 
to the same degree. In many respects, the concept of victimization that William notes that 
he borrows from the eminent sociologist St. Clair Drake resonates with the 
phenomenological category I call racialization in Chapter 2. 
It is my contention that inquiry into a phenomenon must begin with a thorough 
description of the phenomenon. Such is the raw data necessary for any process of 
reflection, whether it be functional or interpretive. It is from the description that one 
begins to perceive that the telos of African American religious experience has to do with 
a pursuit of wholeness, where one strives toward being an "I." Yet, as mentioned in 
Chapter 2 in laying out the phenomenology, the "I" or the "self ' is not a thing. To use the 
language of Sartre, it is "nothing." As Lewis Gordon notes in Bad Faith and Anti-Black 
Racism, the I is empty and unreflective; it is being without content - without qualities, 
states, attitudes, and any of the array of intentions associated with, say, a Cartesian 
conception of the I or the self. It eludes one's attempts to grasp it, to hold on to it. The 
same is subsequently characteristic of wholeness - that is it not a thing to be grasped, it is 
ephemeral; it is elusive, fleeting, and transitory. It is not a permanent state, albeit, there is 
often a longing to establish it as such. Yet, in the words of Sartre, human beings are 
haunted by visions of completeness, of being beings-in-itself or ens causa sui, rather than 
beings-for-itself.455 
454
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In a return to the phenomenon, it is evident that there are numerous instances 
where African American religious experiences do not seem to necessitate and certainly 
are not constituted by a longing for macroscopic liberation. Further, there is also not a 
necessary commitment to a particular metanarrative - namely the Christian narrative. 
Albeit from an historical context, the religious experience of African Americans is most 
consistently thematized through the Christian tradition. 
There is that aspect of the relationship between egogenesis and sociogenesis, of 
the self as immanently social, but this is not the same as the macroscopic in terms of 
power. As noted in chapter 4, this is power on the level of the habitus, associated with 
doxa and nomos as given in the analysis of Bourdieu, Foucault, and Berger. It is by no 
mean surprising that Durkheim would state that religion is an immanently social fact, as 
the self is again immanently social. Phenomenological analysis describes how the 
social/community aspect of a self can function as a source of alternative or oppositional 
discourses that facilitates the construction of identities that resist the fracturing and 
fragmentation to which one is subjected in one's everyday life. This fracturing and 
This is central to Sartre's argument in Being and Nothingness. The only being that is ens causa sui [the 
being that is the cause of itself] is God. Sartre is basically arguing that human beings are ventures, 
endeavors, moments, of trying to be God. We pursue the impossible ideal of being-for-and-in-itself. Sartre 
says 
Ontology furnishes us two pieces of information which serve as the basis for 
metaphysics: first, that every process of a foundation of the self is a rupture in the 
identity-of-being of the in-itself, a withdrawal by being in relation to itself and the 
appearance of presence to self or consciousness. It is only by making itself for-itself that 
being can aspire to be the cause of itself. Consciousness as the nihilation of being appears 
therefore as one stage in a progression toward the immanence of causality-i.e., toward 
being a self-cause. The progression, however, stops there as the result of the insufficiency 
of being in the for-itself. The temporalization of consciousness is not an ascending 
progress toward the dignity of the causa sui; it is a surface run-off whose origin is, on the 
contrary, the impossibility of being a self-cause. Also the ens causa sui remains as the 
lacked, the indication of an impossible vertical surpassing which by its very nonexistence 
conditions the flat movement of consciousness... And if we can raise the question of the 
being of the for-itself articulated in the in-itself, it is because we define ourselves a priori 
by means of a pre-ontological comprehension of the ens causa sui. Of course this ens 
causa sui is impossible, and the concept of it, as we have seen, includes a contradiction. 
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fragmentation exists for all persons. However, in the context of African American 
persons, the fracturing and fragmentation involves the experience of racialization that 
affects one on the level of the existential and ontological. It is the encounter with 
racialization that distinguishes African American experience, and racialization that 
disrupts the ordinary way of being in the world as a unitary experience, to borrow from 
Heidegger. Thus, the first and most significant problem with respect to the dominant 
paradigm is a fundamental misreading of the phenomenon.456 To take the phenomenon of 
African American religious experience seriously is not to construe it solely in terms of 
macroscopic liberation. The desire to organically link African American Christianity with 
the revolutionary impulse of the Civil Rights/Black Power movements is understandable 
given the period in which Cone developed Black theology, namely in the late 60s and 
early 70s. With respect to articulating, explaining, and understanding African American 
religion and religious experience, the social crisis as a lens is not a guarantor of distortion 
- free perception. 
Cone et al, may be commended for their efforts to construct a prophetic and 
transformative reading of African American religion for the black community. In so 
doing, they also called attention to the failings of the Western intellectual and spiritual 
traditions as well as the communities and institutions that perpetuated them. The raison 
d'etre of the liberation paradigm in this sense is explicable.457 Further, one could also 
456
 In the case of Cone, it is interesting that he does allude to the pre-reflective and the ontological that 
would suggest a phenomenological acuity, but the absence of such analysis. Instead, there is an 
interpretation of phenomenon and events that appear to be predicated on some unspecified inexplicit 
methodology, i.e., perhaps a special gnosis. 
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make an argument for certain language as a call for African Americans to consider the 
nature of their faith and what they might be called to do as a consequence. However, this 
is very different than interpreting, analyzing, or explaining African American religious 
experience in its givenness, as everyday practices in the lives of black folk. There is a 
danger in negating or dismissing those experiences that do not conform to one's 
particular norm. 
Perhaps to dissuade the voice of detractors of religion as intrinsically ruinous and 
harmful, Cone and others tread on such precarious ground in the characterization of 
certain expressions of African American religion as quietism or escapism. However, even 
more problematic, lying within certain proponents of the hermeneutic of liberation 
paradigm, is the assertion that authentic religious experience requires one to join God in 
the concrete struggle for liberation that is played out in history.458 
regarding racism, despite their university training or formal church affiliation, many African American 
Christians assumed that they had not been converted. In My Soul Looks Back, pp. 26 and 27, Cone says the 
following 
How could anyone claim an identity with Jesus and be for injustice? Because the 
behavior of whites blatantly contradicted the gospel, and because I thought that whites 
did such cruel things out of ignorance, I decided that I would inform them when the next 
appropriate occasion occurred... 
How could both black and white churches be Christian if they took opposite stands and 
both claimed Christ and the Bible as the basis of their views? 
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 Though theologically creative and courageous, with respect to his understanding of religious experience, 
on this point Cone's theology is critically flawed. Not only does it overlook or dismiss the experience of 
many black people, it also makes him susceptible to the well-known critique of William R. Jones. In Is God 
a White Racist?, Jones chastens Cone for asserting that God is on the side of the poor and oppressed 
without substantiating his claim. According to Jones, Cone's attempts to embrace the Exodus or the Christ 
event as definitively exaltative and liberative for black people fails to overcome the challenges of 
maldistribution of suffering of black people and the multievidentiality of historical events. What is lacking 
for Cone, as it is for other black theologians, is such an exaltative- liberative event on behalf of black 
people in history that reveals that God is "black." (See Jones pp. 20 and 22 for his commentary on 
exaltation-liberation event in general. With respect to his assessment of Cone, see pp. 100 and 113.) 
Cone's response to Jones's assessment, in the form of an extended footnote in God of the 
Oppressed (p. 267-68) is very telling. Cone begins by asserting that while Jones attempts to offer an 
internal critique of black theology, he is not part of the inner conversation with respect to black religion. 
According to Cone, Jones in fact engages in a dialogue as an outsider, primarily due to his disavowal of 
Such activities - indeed, such hopes, longings, and aspirations - must not be 
confused as synonymous with the religious experience of African Americans. To do so is 
to engage in the imposition of truth. Unfortunately, such truths - to paraphrase Foucault 
once more - are the sort of errors that are nearly impossible to refute because they have 
been hardened into an unalterable form in the long baking process of history.459 
As I stated earlier, I believe that the dominant liberation paradigm, as a 
conceptual framework for grasping the meaning and nature of African American 
religious experience, fails for want of a more robust understanding of religion and 
religious experience. In chapter 2,1 alluded to similar designations, such as Paget 
Henry's use of the term Africana or Paul Grlroy's heuristic of the Black Atlantic. In the 
context of this work, however, I am using the term African American in association with 
people of known and unknown African ancestry that are the direct descendants of captive 
West Africans who survived slavery within the boundaries of the present United States. 
With respect to their ancestry and culture, they reflect phenomena of hybridity and 
black Christians' experience of Jesus Christ as Liberator and Black Messiah. Yet, this in itself is troubling, 
because it assumes a normative religious experience among even African American Christians. 
Cone's response has been taken as an affront to some, yet I believe that it is not without merit -
particularly the issues Cone raises regarding the difference between an internal critique and an external one. 
While there are many possible ways to read what Cone says, I would suggest that one possibility is that for 
a truly internal critique, one must be able to point to a logical inconsistency within Cone's theology. If this 
is indeed what he is saying, it is a reasonable proposal. The problem, however, is that I am of the opinion 
that such an internal contradiction is present in Cone, and it is precisely and inextricably related to his 
inadequate understanding of religious experience in general, including African American religious 
experience. 
It is also my contention that Cone's mistake stems from his commitment to the significance of the 
Christ event as the decisive historical event for African Americans as opposed to the decisive religious 
event, at least for African American Christians. This is not to say, however, that a religious event does not 
have historical manifestations. In the case of black religious experience, I believe that institutions such as 
the black church; cultural artifacts such as sermons, hymns, and slave narratives; and social movements 
such as the Civil Rights struggle, witness to the power of black religious experience. It is my contention, 
however, that Cone tragically conflates the historical and the religious. Cone interprets what I see as 
quintessentially religious; i.e., Black people's experience and identification with Jesus's life, ministry, 
crucifixion, and resurrection, as a definitive-liberative historical event. This move allows scholars such as 
Jones or Pinn to offer critiques that are distressing to expressions of African American religious scholarship 
committed to the dominant paradigm's construal of the Divine. 
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creolization. It is a mistake, however, to assume homogeneity with respect to African 
American identity, as identity is not a fixed essence. At the same time, it is not some 
"vague and utterly contingent construction to be reinvented by the will and whim of 
aesthetes, symbolists, and language gamers."460 In the passage immediately following the 
above citation, Gilroy goes on to say: 
Black identity is not simply a social and political category to be used or 
abandoned according to the extent to which the rhetoric that supports and 
legitimizes it is persuasive or institutionally powerful... it is lived as a 
coherent (if not always stable) experiential sense of self. Though it is often 
felt to be natural and spontaneous, it remains the outcome of practical 
activity: language, gesture, bodily significations, desires.461 
I assert that Gilroy is referring to the attribute of metastability with respect to the 
Africana, Black Atlantic, or African American self. Coherent in this context means 
understandable, causally related, or ordered. Note that although identity appears or is 
"felt to be" natural and spontaneous, it is associated with practices. Gilroy recognizes 
language, gesture, bodily significations, and desires.462 Moreover, such practices point to 
an anti-anti-essentialism that sees racialized subjectivity as the product of the social 
practices that supposedly derive from it.463 
Again, I believe that Wayne Proudfoot is particularly prescient when stating, "It is 
possible to turn [a] protective strategy around and to use the warnings against 
reductionism as indicators of tacit criteria for what an author takes to be distinctive about 
the religious."464 Thus, if someone claims that any attempt to offer a natural explanation 
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of religious phenomena is reductive, one can infer that for this person the distinctively 
religious characteristic of those phenomena is that they elude natural explanation.465 
While the conceptual framework of material, temporal liberation is markedly 
insufficient,466 I contend that most of the failings can be overcome with the practices, 
concepts, and perspectives associated with theories of the everyday. Such an orientation 
is more encompassing and inclusive than that offered by dominant paradigm. They are 
accommodating to theistic or non-theistic perspectives, for they are predicated on an 
engagement with phenomena, practices, and events in their heterogeneous and variegated 
givenness. As such, the theories are open to the range of human experience from joy to 
sorrow, ecstasy and suffering, freedom and constraint, the grotesque and the sublime. 
Such is not the case for dominant paradigm. Thus, the theories of the everyday address 
issues of intimacy and immediacy that the dominant paradigm aspires to, but does not 
accomplish. 
In addition, as mentioned earlier, the dominant paradigm runs into serious 
historical veridical issues. Yet, the theories and methodologies of the everyday are more 
accommodating. For in the application or appropriation of theories and methodologies of 
the everyday, religious statements are deemed neither propositional truth nor need they 
represent some ultimate transcendent norm. Rather they are relative, particular, and 
455
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William R. Jones when he says, 
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contextual. There is no assumption regarding normative religious experiences or events. 
Doctrines, dogmas, and teachings associated with such events can be viewed as attempts 
to thematize the experiences of an individual or a community. However, in the case of the 
theories and methodologies of the everyday, great pain is taken not to define or 
circumscribe the limits of such experiences. As mentioned in Chapter 4, though I define 
the telos of religious experience as a quest for wholeness, the wholeness is not 
predetermined, the quest is open, and process oriented. It is fundamentally existential. 
Again, this is much more accommodating than totalizing theories whether "profane"; 
e.g., classical Marxism, Hegel, or forms of Africentrism; or "sacred"; e.g. versions of 
Christianity, Islam, and Judaism. 
With respect to the implementation of theories of the everyday and the 
interpretation/explanation of religious experience, there is a methodological 
functionalism that does not obtain with respect to the dominant paradigm. The emphasis 
is on the phenomenon itself, with no particular dogma being sacrosanct. There is again, 
the embracing of ambiguity and the heterological. 
As I stated in the introduction, when one looks at various African American 
religious communities, in the main, they are devoid of revolutionary or militant 
theologies. As bodies, they are neither chiliastic nor ascetic world transforming. The 
interpretive and diagnostic challenge for the religious scholar involves understanding 
their engagement with the world, whether it is the quite limited possibilities that many 
accord to the improvement of the present world, or the tendency toward the development 
of theodicies of reconciliation or redemptive suffering. The best theories and 
methodological approaches must be able to address the multifarious nature or 
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"messiness" of African American religious experience. I believe that the theories of the 
everyday uniquely fit such criteria. 
Howard Thurman 
Born just before the beginning of the twentieth century, Thurman's thought would 
have a significant impact on generations of individuals until his death in 1981. 
Particularly noteworthy were his teachings on race and justice in America during the 
period of the Civil Rights movement of the 1950's and 60's. Indeed, Martin Luther King, 
Jr. was known to carry a copy of Thurman's Jesus and the Disinherited with him during 
these particularly trying years. At the same time, to many students of African American 
religion, Thurman is often seen as an enigma.467 Although a Baptist minister, Thurman's 
presentation of "the gospel" was by no means conventional. Few of his sermons could be 
characterized as evangelical. Jesus, when referenced, is not portrayed as an instrument of 
atonement, but rather as exemplar of divine love and full humanity. 
There are numerous ways in which the religious experiences of Thurman fail to 
cohere with the dominant theoretical and methodological modalities deployed by African 
468 American religionists, both past and contemporary, albeit with a few exceptions. It is 
467
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for this reason, I believe, that a rather limited amount of attention has been given to 
Thurman, when compared to figures of comparable or lesser notoriety. 
Indubitably, when encountering Thurman, one is in the presence of a religious 
genius, whether it is his experience with nature, his reflection on questions of meaning, or 
ruminations on human relationships in works such as The Inward Journey469, The 
Luminous Darkness470, Deep is the Hunger47and Deep River and The Negro Spiritual 
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Speaks of Life and Death . In many respect, there is a wealth of information, 
knowledge, and wisdom to be gained in an engagement with one such as Thurman when 
talking about religious experience. Indeed, Thurman's accounts of religious experience 
have resonances with the descriptions of intimacy and transcendence given in scholars as 
disparate as Mircea Eliade and Georges Bataille. 
In the chapter on examples of African American religious experience, I made 
reference to Bataille and his notion of religion as a quest or yearning for the return to a 
lost intimacy. This intimacy for Bataille is synonymous with transcendence. That there 
has been an irrevocable rupture between the world of complete intimacy and the world of 
things, there does exist for human beings the capacity to break from the world of things if 
but ever so briefly, at least for Bataille, through events such as festivals and ritual. This 
phenomenon might be characterized as a second transcendence. There is, however, an 
important difference, I believe, that exists with respect to Thurman and Bataille, however, 
and that is that while for Bataille second transcendence is exceptional and extraordinary, 
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Thurman proffers what I would describe as a potential for "self surpassing" in a way not 
so dissimilar to someone that shares Bataille's intellectual genealogy, namely Henri 
Lefebvre. Both Lefebvre and Bataille share theoretical and methodological approaches 
indebted to structuralism and Marxism. Conversely, Thurman's thought has resonances 
with that of Eliade, an idealist. I maintain, with reference to the examples of religious 
experience from Thurman, that objects and actions are real to the extent that they 
participate in a transcendent reality. This is similar to statements of Eliade: 
Among countless stones, one stone becomes sacred - and hence instantly 
becomes saturated with being - because it constitutes a hierophany [an appearance of the 
sacred]... The object appears as the receptacle of an exterior force that differentiates it 
from its milieu and gives it meaning and value. This force may reside in the substance of 
the object or in its form.473 
I would also note that Thurman has the potential to be read as one introducing a 
via media or a tertium quid with respect to the Eliade and Bataille at least with respect to 
an understanding of religion and religious experience that might be relevant to Africana 
or African Americans. Thurman is not fully an idealist or a historical materialist. Thus, 
like Eliade, he would assert that human space and time, if they are to be meaningful, must 
reflect and be oriented in relation to the sacred, he does not valorize that which is archaic 
or primitive. Thurman will encourage a return to the center (The Centering Moment)474, 
to go deep (Deep is the Hunger), to examine one's heart (Meditations of the Heart)475, 
but it need not be a spatial or temporal center, and yet it is still in some sense for 
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Thurman, as it is for Eliade, the preeminent zone of the sacred, the zone of absolute 
reality, the axis mundi, the place where heaven and earth meet. Unlike Eliade, the sacred 
need not coincide with mythical time of the beginning (in illo tempore, ab origine). 
Ritual and rites are understood to connect one with the sacred, with the real, but it need 
not be associated with myths of a Golden Age or perfection. Calling upon a theme that I 
have used previously, Thurman attempts to appropriate both mythos and logos, while 
Eliade believes that the religious is essentially mythos and operates in opposition to logos. 
Thus, an archaic person, the exemplar of homo religiosus, is deemed by Eliade to reject 
history by all means possible. On the other hand, Thurman's religious economy is not the 
materialist one of Bataille, a materialism which he obtains from Hegel by way of 
Alexandre Kojeve. 
In addition, it is my contention that Thurman in both his accounts as well as his 
analysis of religious experience is focused on the phenomenon that I have referred to as 
the everyday. For Thurman, appearances or eruptions of the sacred define spatial and 
temporal reality. Indeed, for Thurman, there is a sense in which human beings do not 
construct their world so much as they discover, recognize, and orient themselves in 
relation to the sacred, the real, and the transcendent. Again, this is not so dissimilar to the 
phenomenological claim of Heidegger, although Heidegger is more than reticent to assert 
or identify that which is given or present to consciousness with the sacred or divine, 
despite his theological education. Likewise, for de Certeau, the sacred is evinced in its 
absence as opposed to that which is given.476 477 
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Throughout Thurman's corpus, particularly those works dealing with racial 
oppression, Thurman examines religion's role as one of those formations in society by 
which it defines and organizes reality, a reality that is subsequently appropriated by 
individuals on the level of their own subjective consciousness, i.e., Berger's nomos or 
Bourdieu's habitus or doxa. For Thurman, the Christian tradition provides a context and a 
structure to reality, as a sacred canopy, upon against or through which the world shows 
up. Thus, one way to frame Thurman's project is as an attempt to mend or repair this 
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nomos, or order of sacred meaning, given or revealed in the Christian mythos. 
Specifically, in The Luminous Darkness: A Personal Interpretation of the 
Anatomy of Segregation and the Ground of Hope, Thurman explores the figure of 
segregation in American society. An eminent pastor, theologian, and mystic, it is 
Thurman's assertion that segregation is antithetical to human beingness. For Thurman, to 
be fully human requires being in relation, one with another (as well as with all of 
creation). It is only in such a context, which necessitates the dissolution of walls and 
barriers such as those associated with segregation, that one might experience spiritual 
wholeness and freedom as well as life in authentic community. 
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For Thurman, segregation is a churning abyss, a wall, an insidious and pernicious 
virus that not only separates white from black, but also does significant damage to their 
psyches and souls as well as being a drain upon society as a whole.479 While the dignity 
and integrity of African Americans is assaulted and their humanity is denied, whites, 
though possessing more power and privilege, also experience a stunting of their humanity 
as they expend energy and resources to perpetuate racial oppression. Thus, Thurman goes 
on to say "human life is one and all men are members one of another. And this insight is 
spiritual and it is the hardcore of religious experience.480 
For example, Thurman refers to the original claim of religion, specifically the 
ethical insight brought into the stream of contemporary life by the Judeo-Christian 
481 
tradition in which the individual experiences himself/herself, as a human being. 
Unfortunately, he asserts, the trustees of this insight; i.e., religious institutions, "have 
singularly failed to witness to the insight."482 The result is the fractured nomos or sacred 
canopy. 
At the same time, Thurman is also concerned with logos to the extent that he deals 
with religion and religious experience as historically, socially, and culturally situated; 
e.g., as an institution. Thurman was an active member of the clergy, associated with 
ecumenical organizations such as the YMCA, as well as co-pastor of the first 
intentionally integrated congregation in America, the Church for the Fellowship of All 
Peoples in San Francisco, and a chaplain at both Howard University and Boston 
University. 
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Perhaps most relevant in terms of the line of argumentation pursued throughout 
this dissertation, however, is his interpretation of religious experience as an opening to 
the spirit, which he understood as the ground of one's ego or sense of "I." Returning 
again to the Luminous Darkness, Thurman says, 
The ultimate meaning of [religious] experience is felt in such a way that 
all of oneself is included. It is not the experience of oneself as male or 
female, as black or white, as American or European. It is rather, the 
experience of oneself as being,483 
Yet, according to Thurman, the brokenness of the nomos of Christianity, as 
evinced in systems of oppression and discrimination, resulted in and perpetuated an 
imbalance in the spirit/ego.484 With respect to the I, the self, or the ego of Africana 
people, as I stated in Chapter 4, this was due to the persistent and pernicious experiences 
of Africana people attempting to live in the racialized everyday world of America. The 
successful accomplish of such a feat required a considerable amount of effort on the part 
of such individuals. This was made all the more difficult, according to Thurman, because 
contagions such as racism had infected the Christianity as a nomos. Thus, as opposed to 
macroscopic, material and temporal liberation, Thurman's own religious experiences as 
well as his theological reflection is concerned with how the individual functions within a 
"diseased" society, that possess an impaired and flawed sacred canopy. 
It is part of the wisdom of Judaeo-Christian ethic that all men [sic] are 
enjoined to love one another. However ardently a man may hold to this 
attitude, his commitment is nevertheless threatened by the reality that he 
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still will admit categories of exception and extenuating circumstances 
which amend and sometimes nullify his respect for human life.. .This, in 
broad outline, indicates the moral climate in which Negroes and white 
persons have lived in the United States. The Christian ethic has been 
deeply influenced by this circumstance. For a long time the Christian 
Church has profoundly compromised with the demands of the Gospel of 
Jesus Christ, especially with respect to the meaning and practice of 
love.485 
As one who understood himself called to a vocation of healing, Thurman goes on 
to offer a prescription for wholeness. According to Thurman, segregation as a "mood," "a 
state of mind," and whose "external manifestation is external," must be engaged on a 
spiritual level. For Thurman, perhaps the greatest tragedy of segregation is that black and 
white persons alike do not know what it means to be human. According to Thurman, to 
be human is to experience one's fellows as human beings. This requires one transcending 
fears (of the other, of harm, humiliation, loss of status, one's self) as well as notions of 
kinship, ethnicity, race, and nationality. It means nurturing senses of belonging to life, of 
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being a part of existence. "It is to be alive in a living world." Again, for Thurman, this 
is the heart of religion. It is also a reality seldom grasped by the stewards of religious 
institutions. Yet, it is in such a context that one sees themselves and others as beings of 
infinite worth connected in being. As a result, "love has essential materials with which to 
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work" and to build a "friendly world under friendly skies." 
As I noted in Chapter 2, Thurman recalled that in his unique intimacy with nature, 
he found reassurance. This was a relationship that "could not be affronted by the behavior 
485
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of human beings."490 The ocean, the seasons, in their ebb and flow, in their cyclical 
rhythms, imbued him with a sense of being a part of something much more immense and 
enduring. Subsequently, Thurman identifies the ways in which the Africana spirit, i.e., 
self or "I" accommodates itself to such devastation such as the story involving the 
incident with the little girl. The key religious event there is the experience of wholeness 
in the encounter with his grandmother. 
Helga Crane 
In the case of Helga Crane, I present two religious events. They are disparate 
temporally and spatially, as well as the first being within a kind of evangelical and 
ecstatic African American Christian context, seemingly reminiscent of sanctified or 
holiness tradition. This is later followed, however, by what I referred to as a humanist and 
existentialist move, which is at the very least non-theistic, and possibly atheistic. 
However, when the events are analyzed phenomenologically that one can see that they 
are not so dissimilar with respect to their function, that indeed, they possess the same 
telos, what I called in the last chapter - wholeness 491 
It is readily evident that Helga Crane's religious experiences, and given the 
autobiographical nature of Larsen's writing - perhaps her own, does not cohere with the 
dominant paradigms articulated quest for material, temporal liberation on a macroscopic 
scale. This is not to say that Helga is not engaged in certain efforts that might have some 
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social or cultural impact. For example, Helga is introduced to the reader as an educator at 
an African American educational institution in the South. The narrative relates that 
Helga's desire to teach at this institution comes out of her personal longing or desire to 
assist in the uplift of her people by becoming involved in the education of African 
American children. Initially,, she is full of positive ideas, of hopes and dreams about how 
she can bring light to the dark lives of these youth. Indeed, she attempts to do so literally 
with the introduction of vibrant colors into the dress for girls. Shortly after her arrival, 
however, she begins to feel unwelcome by the community, because she is an outsider, an 
agent of change, and has no "place" within the established social structure of the 
community. 
Repeatedly, Helga attempts to find community, attempts to find a "place" where 
she belongs. She later aspires to be part of various movements of social uplift in an 
attempt to fulfill her responsibilities as a member of "the talented tenth." Yet, when she 
attempts to find a place among Harlem's middle and upper classes, she is once more she 
finds the way more than difficult. She soon becomes disenchanted with the machinations 
and idiosyncrasies of these groups, particularly their hypocrisy with respect to their less 
fortunate African American fellows.492 
Yet, while a cursory glance at her life might lead one to assert that Helga is 
motivated by a desire for systemic change and transformation, it quickly becomes evident 
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that Helga's is a personal, existential quest for her "self', for somewhere that she can be 
an "I", accepted as a subject. There is of course the intersubjective aspect of this process, 
the complexity of the self as an "I" and as a "we." However, the telos of the complex self 
or subject is the experience of wholeness or completeness. Such a telos is not 
macroscopic, temporal, material, liberation. While the pursuit of such may accompany 
the quest, it is an affectation of the journey; it is not a necessary component. Indeed, one 
way to characterize the distinction between the microscopic approach of the everyday, 
and the macroscopic approach of the dominant paradigm is the distinction between 
phenomenon and epiphenomenon. 
With respect to the microscopic analysis associated with the theories of the 
everyday, they provide a robust explanation for what transpires in the life of Helga. 
Again, as alluded to in Chapter 2, Helga's status as a mulatta effectively imposes upon 
her the designation of other with respect to the Euro-American community as well as to a 
lesser extent with respect to the African American community. Such standards are 
perpetuated through various discourses that formed and informed the social relationships 
during early twentieth century America. 
Borrowing again the language of de Certeau, within the life of Helga, the binary 
distinctions of strategy vs. tactics and place vs. space are always operative. In her quest 
for wholeness, as previously noted, Helga attempts to interpose herself among various 
strategies. Likewise, she was constantly in search of a place, and thus she journeys to 
Naxos, Chicago, Harlem, Copenhagen, Harlem, and finally to rural Alabama. However, 
as the novel reveals, Helga carries her problems and issues with her, everywhere she 
goes. Physical relocation does not bring peace. What she needs is not so much an 
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appreciation for places, expecting them in and of themselves to be transformative. The 
issues of identity and her pursuit of self are made evident when one turns to the 
microscopic concepts of tactics and space. The attempt to ensconce herself within 
strategies and places - the regularized, systematized, often hierarchical, and regimented 
domains of space - leaves her still wanting, with little relief from her persistent agonistic 
struggle. 
It is interesting; therefore, that the first religious experience I chose to reference 
comes in the context of her being in a distraught state after an experience of rejection. In 
addition to her emotional upheaval, there is also her immediate physical yet banal 
situation of being caught in a downpour. It is the latter that appears to precipitate her 
getting entrance into a storefront church. It is interesting to speculate whether Helga 
would have entered the sanctuary of a church with a more conventional facade. However, 
this was a church whose very existence seemed to be the embodiment of bricolage (from 
the French meaning to fiddle or tinker, to construct using what is available at certain time 
or place.)493 The original intention of the place was most likely retail, in an area of 
commerce, but it had through intervention of some group of people, become a space of 
their own, a space to encounter God. The ensuing events that grasp Helga are, from her 
perspective, not intended or planned. At work are the happenstance, the frenzy, pain, fear, 
dread, and joy. She experiences something different in this place, something real. For a 
short time, she has a sense of completeness that has eluded her up to this point. Yet, as 
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noted earlier, it is transitory, it is not permanent, a lesson that she comes to learn in what 
follows. 
Indeed, Helga does try to hold on to, or at the very least securing the means of 
accessing her sense of being an "I" whether it be associated with the a relationship with 
an affirming "other" in the form of community, the mysterium tremendum, or at the very 
least one who can provide or facilitate such events, which it seems that she secures by 
way of her marriage to Rev. Pleasant Green. In other words, I contend that Helga is 
attempting to hold on to "herself as a self." That is to say, she wishes to place in stasis the 
event of herself as an "I." But in keeping with the understanding of the self that I inherit 
from the phenomenological and existential tradition, this is to err, this is to reject the 
ambiguity, and transitory nature of human beingness. 
Unfortunately, Helga slowly comes to the realization of the problematic nature of 
her quest. Initially experiencing rejection and resentment from the Alabama community 
of Rev. Green, she does attempts to cope, through the everyday tasks of a homemaker 
and through modeling what she perceives to be the vocation of first lady of her husband's 
church; e.g., becoming involved in the mission board, Sunday School, etc. Moreover, 
having three children in less than two years, she attempts to fulfill her "role" as a good 
wife, as defined by her community.494 When things begin to become overwhelming, she 
tries to follow her husband's admonition to "trust the Lord more fully."495 Seeking advice 
from older women in the congregation, one Sary who had raised six healthy and 
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responsible children with very little in assistance, or resources, that she had to learn 
patience and forbearance.496 Though bereft of so much, she was able to find some solace 
in her faith. The reader is told that the weaker, the wearier she became, the more she 
relied on her faith. 
With the birth of the fourth child, however, Helga enters into a state of catatonia. 
Apparently unable to do anything, to respond to the child, to her husband, to those who 
assisted in the birth, Helga's consciousness seems to have fled from her body. Yet, this 
retreat also provides an opportunity, a space in which she examines her life; she confronts 
what it means to be over against non-being. She realizes that choice is a part of the 
human condition. Indeed, that her desire for certainty, surety, over against uncertainty 
and ambiguity had resulted in the denial of her humanity instead of embracing it. 
Helga is said to be in this state of catatonia for weeks. Read through a lens 
informed by theories of the like of Lefebvre and de Certeau, however, this is not fallow 
time. It is not submission. Indeed, in this state, Helga is free from the demands of her 
children, the demands of her husband, and a myriad of other responsibilities. Larsen 
writes that amidst the chaos that was around her, Helga was unconcerned, and 
undisturbed. "Nothing penetrated the kind darkness into which her bruised spirit had 
retreated... She was in a in an enchanted and blissful place [space] where peace and 
incredible quietness encompassed her." 497 
Finally, she comes back from her hiatus, back to face the hard realities of life, and 
yet, she has been changed. As it where, this is again, a second conversion experience, 
where she does not find God, but rather herself. While there are those would characterize 
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this event as a surrendered to the absurd, or a giving into a certain type of existential and 
ontological confinement, i.e. accepted a new and more docile existence? As stated in 
Chapter 4, however, this would seem to fall in to the early error of Foucault, the 
overstating of disciplinary control. Indeed, Helga does not resign herself to docility or to 
the false consciousness of freedom or autonomy. Instead, there is a taking responsibility 
for herself and her choices in her situatedness. Referring again to what I wrote in Chapter 
2, Helga's second conversion is described as an event of peace and joy.498 In the peace of 
oblivion, she had the opportunity to reflect, she had the time to ponder the events of her 
life. 
Her sickness also provided her relief from her husband. Now the subject of 
disdain and resentment, Helga's weakness proved to be a source of strength as her nurse 
at the slightest indication of her discomfort, could expel him from the room. It is also 
interesting to note that in a world that was conventionally hierarchical and patriarchal, 
that this domain of sick room seemed to be a place where women exerted power, a 
tactical kind of power, in the care of the sick and infirm. This is neither a notion of power 
associated with macroscopic transformation of society; it is not an assault of a 
superstructure associated with patriarchy or the oppression of religion. However, nor is 
Helga's posture indicative of docility. Rather, along the lines of argumentation pursued 
by de Certeau, these scenarios are about the creation of space for the care of self. 
A truly powerful scene in the novel occurs while Helga is convalescing. Learning 
about the death of her just born infant, instead of expressing grief, she almost seems 
relieved. One less "amber drop of humanity" that must suffer this mortal coil. 
Subsequently, her husband tells her that the church is planning a special service of prayer 
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and thanksgiving for her recovery. When asked if she had any requests, she all but smirks 
and answers no. Later, when she hears the sounds of religious fervor, she asks her nurse 
if she might read something. The nurse volunteers to read something to her. The selection 
is from one of Helga's books, containing a story entitled, "The Procurator of Judea." A 
story that mentions the religious practice of animal sacrifice, it briefly recounts the 
spiritual contributions of Africa and Asia. However, it is the conclusion that Helga 
aspires to hear, when the protagonist is asked about Jesus and responds, "Jesus, Jesus of 
Nazareth... .1 do not recall the name." The nurse summarily deems the story silly, but it is 
clear that the reader is to infer that this denial of familiarity or acquaintance with Jesus in 
the reading is of import to Helga. She once would have claimed Jesus as rescuer, 
redeemer, and sanctifier, but such belief she has now laid down 
On the level of the microscopic, one can once more identify what de Certeau 
referred to as tactics that are ensconced as a part of the everyday. In this instance, there 
are several. The first might be what de Certeau refers to as la perruque or the wig. Helga 
frequently adopts the posture of sleeping at the appearance of her husband. She is thus 
convalescing rather than avoiding him or others. In this instance where she does receive 
him and is informed of service to be performed on her behalf, she receives it impassively, 
and giving an intentionally ambiguous response that might be interpreted by her husband 
after a fashion to his liking. 
Helga then deploys the practices of memory and reading. Over against the 
boisterous praise she hears emanating from next door, her mind turns to a story that she 
recalls, a story that is in one of her books. Not only does she have access to memory, 
however, but through reading, she can directly access one of the catalysts of the memory. 
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Moreover, there is intention in this section with respect to what Larsen shares with her 
readers, for one does not have access to the text as a whole, but certain fragments of the 
story. Additionally, these fragments do not appear to be random, as each that is voiced in 
the narrative gives expression to religion and religious markedly different from that 
associated with the sounds wafting through her window from her husband's nearby 
church. 
Once more, of particular import are the last few lines of the passage Miss Hartley 
reads. Though some might suggest that the meaning of the passage is lost or is 
inaccessible apart from the rest of the Miss Hartley's recitation, Larsen informs her 
reader that this was truly the line that Helga longed to hear. To Miss Hartley, this is an 
end to a "silly story." For Helga, however, it is something more; i.e., a tactic, an 
oppositional practice, or an exercise of resistance against that which she now finds 
oppressive. Indeed, to once more make a Certeauvian connection, she is engaged in a 
tactics of reading as poaching, where reading is not merely passively consuming, 
absorbing, and reproducing but rather is a creative production involving the construction 
of meaning that very well may be transgressive."499 
In the end, Helga does not wholly see her initial religious faith and praxis as 
completely meaningless. She notes, as I stated in Chapter 2, that as a palliative, it did 
provide some protection, it could function as a shelter against the storms of life, 
particularly for the poor and oppressed, in this case, for African Americans. She in facts 
wishes that it had been more adequate, that it had not failed her, for though it was an 
illusion, she maintains, it was better in many respects to the reality. Unfortunately, while 
belief in God, specifically the "white man's" God, might have aided African Americans 
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in surviving as a source of hope and a bulwark against nihilism, it also left them 
vulnerable. According to Helga, the particular form of religion that seemed to flourish 
among African Americans often resulted in their being malleable (docile?) before 
systems and structures that had no concern for their well-being. Helga came to view the 
notion of deferred reward in heaven, pie in the sky, as repugnant and moribund. 
Quicksand ends, however, with her facing the terror of history with solely her 
humanity.500 
There are numerous analyses of the novel and the protagonists from various 
perspectives, particularly as it relates to issues of race or gender; e.g., Anna Brickhouse's 
"Nella Larsen and the Intertextual Geography of Quicksand,"501 Hortense E. Thornton's 
"Sexism as Quagmire: Nella Larsen's Quicksand," Debra B. Silverman's "Nella 
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Larsen's Quicksand: Untangling the Webs of Exoticism," Kimberly Monda's "Self-
Delusion and Self-Sacrifice in Nella Larsen's Quicksand,"504 and Charles R. Larson's 
Invisible Darkness: Jean Toomer & Nella Larsen.505 One of the more intriguing to me is 
Jeanne Scheper's "The New Negro "Flaneuse in Nella Larsen's Quicksand.506" 
In her essay, Scheper frames Larsen's text as an examination of black women's 
movements during the early part of the twentieth century. Such movement, she notes, was 
policed "by educational institutions, by racism, by Jim Crow segregation, by the race and 
gender ideologies of Empire, by the social strictures of white, black, and European 
507 
society, and by the institutions-of marriage and family." Scheper asserts that Larsen's 
is a critic of the various social, structural, and discursive attempts to contain and fix the 
identity of her female protagonist. Indeed, Scheper asserts, "Larsen's positioning of her 
protagonist Helga Crane as "leaving," only to "have to come back" signals neither failure 
nor resignation to the inevitable return home, but a strategy of resistance that many 
508 
modernist women adopted - mobility." .. Scheper notes that such strategies were 
adopted by a modernist African American women writer such Jessie Fauset. Appointed 
literary editor of the Crisis in 1919, Fauset traveled extensively domestically. Moreover, 
between 1925 and 1926 she studied abroad at the Sorbonne in France, obtaining a 
certificate for her work. Scheper also notes that a contemporary of Fauset and Larsen, 
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Josephine Baker, would in fact take up residence abroad to escape the memories of racial 
violence in her hometown of East St. Louis. 
Through the character of Helga, Scheper asserts that Larsen is engaged in an 
exploration the relationship between subjectivity and mobility and relocation. As a 
woman on the move, Helga Crane represents something at times imagined to be 
impossible, a modern flaneuse or female flaneur. By writing of the experience of black 
flaneuse, Scheper asserts that Larsen explores the promise and possibilities agency and 
subjectivity for African American women across and within multiple spaces and terrains 
(rural, urban, and international). 
Scheper points to various accepted interpretations of Quicksand, which point to 
some of the points I made earlier; e.g., Helga and indeed Larsen herself as the "tragic 
mulatta," which in its own way emphasizes the concept of split or divided subjectivity, as 
one, indeed, who might be seen as ontologically flawed. In the tradition of the genre, this 
subject is inevitably rejected, cast out, or dead. Indeed, this once more seems to mirror 
Larsen's own life, as she died in poverty and anonymity. With respect to Helga Crane, 
one might look at the characterization of her offered by George Hutchinson observes in 
The Harlem Renaissance in Black and White509, Helga is interpreted as a character 
lacking agency and possessing essentially the same dissonance with respect to her racial 
identity as her creator.510 
Scheper, however, argues that despite the incontrovertibly tragic ending, that the 
novel does not conform wholesale to the tragic mulatta genre either Active or as manifest 
in conventional wisdom. While Helga is often viewed as one who lacks agency, who is 
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"neither here nor there" and "neither black nor white," Scheper offers an alternative 
interpretation, namely that Crane's neither here nor there "produces a strategy of 
resistance through mobility that many modernist women adopted and that overpowers the 
novel's tragic conclusion."511 
Scheper identifies several influences with respect to this line of argumentation. 
For example, she quotes Jose E Munoz that such performance practices of resistance "are 
not a priori sites of contestation but, instead, spaces of productivity where identity's 
r n 
fragmentary nature is accepted and negotiated." Subsequently, Scheper asserts that as 
la flaneuse, Larsen uses Helga to explore the way that the material conditions of history 
shaped race and gendered realities. Moreover, as la flaneuse, Helga can be seen to move 
between geographic locations, psychic states, and performative modes, as agent and 
casualty of social forces, as spectator and spectacle, and as author and subject.513 
Though she does not invoke de Certeau, this is consistent with his articulation of 
the flaneur or wandersmanner in the well known chapter of the Practice of Everyday Life 
entitled "Walking in the City."514 For de Certeau, it is this wanderer who reveals the 
power of everyday life which takes place in the gaps and interstices of strategic 
constructs and discourses of governments or institutions that attempt to impose structures 
and disciplines of control. The walker or wanderer, however, is associated with the 
tactical, whose movement (an expression of agency) is never totally controlled, 
circumscribed, or constrained by maps or grids. Articulated for de Certeau in terms of a 
technical semiotic analysis, walking is a kind of rhetoric, 
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The long poem of walking manipulates spatial organizations, no matter 
how panoptic they may be: it is neither foreign to them (it can take place 
only within them) nor in conformity with them (it does not receive its 
identity from them). . . . Within them it is itself the effect of successive 
encounters and occasions that constantly alter it and make it the other's 
blazon: in other words, it is like a peddler, carrying something surprising, 
transverse or attractive compared with the usual choices.515 
Unfortunately, Scheper does not address the place or rhetoric of religion in the 
novel Quicksand, or how it may relate to the practice of a flaneuse. One author who has 
examined this particular narrative from a religious perspective is Michael Lackey, 
assistant professor of English at the University of Minnesota - Morris. In African 
American Atheists and Political Liberation: A Study of the Sociocultural Dynamics of 
Faith, Lackey argues for Helga's conversion experience to be interpreted as an act of 
"spiritual" or "psychic" rape. Lackey maintains that Helga's conversion is an event 
against her will. According to Lackey, this is clear from the language of possession 
throughout the scene, which denotes that Helga has been divested of her agency. In his 
interpretation, Lackey points to Larsen's language that is not only sexually suggestive, 
but also violent. According to Lackey, Helga is trapped, surrounded, "paralyzed, terrified, 
and disgusted." Further, "as Helga watched and listened, gradually, a curious influence 
penetrated her; she felt an echo of the weird orgy."516 
As for the Helga's seeming calm after her violation, he refers to it as evincing a 
retroactive traumatic experience as in the case of some instances of posttraumatic stress 
disorder (PTSD). He maintains that it is not unusual as in the case of Helga's 
conversion/gang rape, that she would be happy for some time afterwards, indeed, some 
years afterward. He argues that the incident is structured in such a way as the believers 
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who are participants in the rape, in the process of conversion, "strategically structure her 
inner life such that she interprets experience through the believer's epistemological 
lens."517 
It is my opinion, however, that Lackey's interpretation or explanation of what 
transpires is fundamentally erroneous for a number of reasons. Taking into consideration 
the observations of Scheper, Lackey thesis would appear to be only a slight variation on 
other depictions of Helga as a tragic figure from whom agency has been expunged. In the 
case of Lackey, however, there is also an added dimension of his understanding of 
religion and the religious as inherently flawed and ultimately damaging experience. This 
is most apparent in his analysis of Helga's conversion in the storefront church. 
In this scene, Larsen appears to try and grasp aspects of religious conversion as 
expressed in and associated with a segment of the African American Christian tradition; 
e.g., holiness and sanctified churches. In the music, the movement, the exhortations of the 
preacher, and the constitution of community recognizes elements of Southern, rural, 
African American worship as described by W.E.B. Du Bois in the essay, Faith of Our 
Fathers in Souls of Black Folk. Present are the frenzy as well as an atmosphere of terror, 
cio 
dread, and Pythian madness. Moreover, there is much in Larsen's narrative that 
suggests an encounter with the sacred, the Holy Other, the mysterium tremendum et 
fascinans, which attracts and repels. Indeed, according to the respected African American 
historian of religion, Charles H. Long, such is to be expected. 
One has only to read the accounts of the conversion experiences of blacks 
to see how this mysterium tremendum, in the life of slaves and ex-slaves, 
is never identified with the sociological situation or with the oppression of 
slavery itself; it is, in fact, a manner in which these human beings 
517
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recognize their creatureliness and their humanity, shall we say, before 
God, and it is this essential humanity which is not given by the slave 
system or the master.519 
From a phenomenological perspective as well as in keeping with Proudfoot's 
admonition against descriptive reduction, Lackey's association of the conversion 
experience with rape is one that I must reject. What transpires here, as alluded to in my 
analysis of the Thurman narratives, is an encounter with an "other" that results in the 
constitution or reconstitution of a "self ' or an 'I ' . This process is violent, in that it 
involves the destruction of one's former being; it is terrifying in that with the destruction, 
one is confronted with non-being; but as in the case of Thurman, and what I have 
identified as indicative of religious experience is an event of wholeness as opposed to 
fragmentation. Moreover, it is my contention that for Helga, this transpires with her 
conversion in the storefront - and then again later in her "resurrection" from her 
dissociative fugue. 
I would also note that conversion of Helga has significant resonance with the 
concept of the rite of passage; i.e., a death of an old identity and a rebirth into a new one 
that is also associated with the integration of an individual into a new level of 
community. With respect to the contemporary understanding, interpretation, and 
explanation of the rite of passage ritual, the most influential theoretical work has been 
520 
expressed in Mircea Eliade's Rites and Symbols of Initiation, Arnold van Gennep's Les 
521 
rites de passage ( The Rites of Passage ), and Victor Turner's The Ritual Process: 
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Structure and Anti-Structure 522 Through these works, one is made aware of the often 
brutal character of this process. Indeed, with respect to the conversion experience of 
Helga, a number of the insights offered by Turner are quite compelling. 
Building on the work of van Gennep's on rites of passage that emphasized the 
apparent transformation of social status associated with such rituals, Turner emphasizes 
"the inward, moral, and cognitive changes." This is particularly true with respect to 
what Gennep called the "liminal phase" of rites of passage, the state of ambiguity. Turner 
is concerned with the interiority of liminality, of liminal personae whose situatedness is 
frequently likened to death, invisibility, and darkness.524 Turner observes 
Liminal entities, ...may be represented as possessing nothing.. .as liminal 
beings they have no status, property, insignia.. .Their behavior is normally 
passive or humble; they must obey their instructors implicitly, and accept 
arbitrary punishment without complaint. It is as though they are being 
reduced or ground down to a uniform condition to be fashioned anew and 
endowed with additional powers to enable them to cope with their new 
station in life. 
Turner goes on to note that associated with liminality is the phenomenon of 
comitatus, "society as an unstructured or rudimentarily structured and relatively 
undifferentiated... community, or even communion of equal individuals who submit 
together to the general authority of the ritual elders.52*5 In later work, Turner notes that 
experiences or events of liminality such as rites of passage also arouse what he refers to 
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as "reflexivity," both individual and plural, where there is self and corporate cognizance, 
527 
investigation, interrogation, and exploration. 
Concomitantly, invoking the cultural phenomenological approach and ontology 
articulated in Chapter 2, not only is there an experience of an "I," but also a "We." In 
Helga's conversion narrative is the profound sense of finally belonging, of being a part of 
a community, of a people. Again, though there is a tendency to schematize religious 
experience individual, there is a tradition from Otto to Long that has asserted a 
schematization of religious experience as eommunal.528 As for Lackey's argument about 
the believers structuring Helga's inner life such that she interprets what is happening to 
her through their epistemological lens, I once more maintain that this a distortion and 
oversimplification of the discursive field. Returning to Chapter 1 of the dissertation, there 
is the acknowledgement that there are no unmediated religious experiences. Thus, the 
way that Helga comes to interpret her experience as meaningful is predicated on her 
situatedness in the world, her historical, cultural, and social context. Further, as 
referenced in Chapter 4, one's worldview, our nomos, is always being influenced by 
various discourses, through various plausibility structures, yet this does not eliminate or 
negate aspects of agency. Yet, because of what I maintain as his negative view of 
527
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religion, Lackey construes the conversion of Helga as her succumbing to the degradation 
of herself as well as her people. Nevertheless, I said above, that there is not simply one 
significant religious event for Helga, but two, as it where, a second conversion to what 
might be called a non-theistic position. 
As mentioned in Chapter 2, with her marriage to Rev. Pleasant Green and her 
return once more to the South, she soon finds herself with three babies, with another on 
the way. Surprisingly, despite her almost constant state of exhaustion, however, she does 
her best to maintain a positive outlook. Here again, I have difficulty with Lackey's 
characterization of the state of affairs between Helga and her husband. Helga's efforts, as 
he interprets them, are the direct result of the manipulation of the Rev. Mr. Pleasant 
Green of his vulnerable wife. According to Lackey, Green coerces Helga to fulfill the 
role of a submissive wife. He maintains that when Helga rebels, her husband tells her that 
she must trust more in God. This is what Lackey will attack as the God mentality529, 
declaring it as extremely dangerous. Yet, there is no rebellion that takes place on Helga's 
part in the narrative up to that point. Indeed, Helga persists in asserting to herself and 
others, that she is happy. What the text does say is rather that Green was "deferentially 
kind and incredulously proud of her - and verbally encouraging."530 The encouragement 
comes in the form of exhortations for her to trust in the Lord, and this is what she strives 
to accomplish. Moreover, even in the end when she rejects God, she does not surrender to 
the absurdity of life as pain and suffering. Helga does not resign herself to docility or to 
529
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the false consciousness of freedom or autonomy. Instead, there is a taking responsibility 
for herself and her choices in her situatedness. 
Valeria 
The third and final case study that I offered was the story of Valeria. The most 
contemporary of the three temporally, she is also perhaps the most conventional in terms 
of her faith expression, at least in terms of what one might find within the African 
Americaa Christian community. Therefore, she is important, in my estimation, as 
representative case in this study to examine African American religious experience in 
terms of the everyday and ordinary. 
As previously noted, Valeria's religious experience involves issues of health, 
namely hepatitis and chronic back pain. When one looks at Valeria's accounts, I believe 
that explanations that one might reach through the theories and methodologies of the 
everyday are markedly more compelling, coherent, and consistent than the distortion that 
must take place, in an effort to regularize or systemize them in a way amenable to the 
dominant liberation paradigm. 
In Chapter 4,1 made reference to the fraught and often contentious history that 
has existed within the African American community with respect to health care. As I 
write this chapter, the country is presently engaged in public debate regarding a course of 
reform of the system. Much of the rhetoric that is being deployed by those in opposition 
to such reform maintains that health care for all is simply too great a burden for the 
American society. Others express fear of a system that will bring about a rationing of 
care, the elimination of choice one currently has in selecting a physician, and an overall 
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reduction in the quality of care that is available to them.531 Ironically, this is often very 
much of the reality for existing segments of the population who are poor, uninsured, or 
live in areas and locales which place a great deal of strain on the health care system. 
Unfortunately, such experiences are not foreign to a significant portion of the African 
American community. Under-funded hospitals and clinics in the largely African 
American urban centers such as Harlem and Detroit might mean all day stays in waiting, 
a shortage of beds once one admitted, and a staff of health care providers stretched to the 
breaking point. Moreover, given insurance in this country is normally tied to 
employment; those communities with the higher rates of unemployment and 
underemployment also have large populations of uninsured and underinsured. 
In the case of Valeria, though we are told that she is employed with sites on 
retirement, one might assume that she should have adequate health coverage. Yet, she 
turns to her faith community and her personal spiritual practice for healing and relief. As 
noted earlier, Greater Faith is a megachurch, with the TV, radio, and internet ministries, 
proffering what might be best characterized as a "prosperity gospel." Using the classic 
categories developed by Baer and Singer, in African American Religion in the Twentieth 
Century: Varieties of Protest and Accommodation522, the congregation is in keeping with 
those deemed as Accommodationist, straddling the interstitial region between 
Conversionist and Thaumaturgical sects. These traditions emphasize individual salvation, 
political quiescence, Further, though they may support the acquisition of material, and 
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social prosperity, the mechanism by which such is achieved is through application of 
spiritual power. 
With growth in both African American megachurches as well as communities that 
promote prosperity teaching, a burgeoning field of recent scholarship has been 
undertaken to understand the phenomenon. One such study is that of Milmon E. 
Harrison's Righteous Riches: The Word of Faith Movement in Contemporary African 
American Religion.534 In this text, Harrison explores the Word of Faith Movement, also 
referred to as the Faith Movement. The core beliefs of this movement are an emphasis in 
knowing who they are in Christ; positive confession, i.e., affirming all that God has said 
about the faithful in Christ for them; and subsequently to experience prosperity in the 
form of divine health and material wealth.535 Indeed, God wants all people to live a life of 
health and wealth. 
A particular focus of Harrison is how racial, ethnic, and gender minorities 
appropriate and use the Faith Movement teachings to reach their goals. Harrison places 
the Faith Movement within the larger tradition of prosperity teaching in African 
American religion. He argues that it is a confluence of various streams that have existed 
within the African American community for several generations. Like Baer and Singer, 
Harrison points to the economic considerations that have been a historical concern of 
African American religious communities, across various denominations. As Baer and 
Singer note, however, there have been a myriad of ways in which this concern has been 
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manifest, some more particularity and individualism as compared to others that are more 
communitarian in nature.536 
Harrison's work is strengthened by the various accounts of members involved in 
the movement and how they exercise their faith. However, Harrison also engages in a 
macro level of analysis. He asserts that African American churches are particularly 
susceptible to Word of Faith theology because of their history of oppression which 
generated an ethic of survival: "To limit ministry to the spiritual realm was a luxury they 
could not afford given the legacy of slavery and their post-Emancipation experience of 
discrimination."538 Harrison also makes the argument that in the African American 
community, the contemporary expressions of Word of Faith ministries associated with 
figures such as Creflo A. Dollar and his World Changers International Ministries in 
College Park, GA; Fred Price of the Crenshaw Christian Center in South Central Los 
Angeles; and Keith Butler of Word of Faith International Christian Ministries in 
Southfield, MI; did not emerge in a vacuum. In many respects, according to Harrison, 
they have tapped into elements of urban religious movements associated with figures 
such as Elder Lightfoot Solomon Michaux, Father Divine, and Daddy Grace. Within the 
contemporary ministries can also be seen the influence of New Thought metaphysical 
pioneers such as Johnnie Colemon and Rev. Ike.539 
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Similar observations can be found in Shayne Lee's T. D. Jakes: America's New 
Preacher.540 According to Lee, there is something quintessentially American about these 
megachurches and prosperity leader. While I have a problem with Lee's designation of 
Jakes as "postmodern," (albeit he acknowledges his idiosyncratic use of the term) I do 
agree with his characterization of Jakes and his peers as innovators within the "new black 
church." Lee asserts that the new black church is distinguished by "their ability to 
combine an otherworldly experience of ecstatic worship and spiritual enlightenment with 
a this-worldly emphasis on style, image, and economic prosperity." 541 Continuing, he 
says, 
The genius of the new black church is the flexibility, sophistication, and 
ingenuity to use twenty-first-century technology to win twenty-first-
century souls. What separates the new black church from traditional 
churches is the savvy and willingness to contextualize Christianity for 
contemporary needs and culture, while not compromising a vigorous 
support for biblical authority... leaders of the new black church [have] a 
keen understanding of postmodern culture and an inexorable drive to 
produce spiritual commodities for mass consumption in an ever-expanding 
market.542 
Later, Lee asserts that such prosperity preachers like Jakes embrace consumer 
culture and express little concern for the unequal distribution of wealth or challenging the 
ways our social structure relates to exploitation.543 This observation is also made in a 
later article by Lee on Jakes and "prosperity theology"544 Lee contends that Word-of-faith 
teaching asserts Christians have the power to control their physical well-being and 
financial fortunes through their faith. The underlying assumption is that the death and 
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resurrection of Jesus Christ provided Christians with the ability to live in total victory, 
financial prosperity, and perfect health.545 However, God is constrained by our lack of 
faith and adherence to the basic biblical principles. Once believers strengthen their faith 
and live in accordance with biblical mandates, they will be blessed physically and 
financially. 
Lee also associates the phenomenon with the move of many African American's 
into middle and upper socio-economic classes in the 1980's. He asserts that due to the 
speed with which this happened, as a group, there was an absence of socialization and 
enculturation associated with the existing African American elites. Thus, "almost every 
city nationwide has at least one black neo-Pentecostal megachurch where middle class 
and wealthy African American's worship, network, and put their skills and talents to use. 
Prosperity teachings allow them to enjoy their wealth and consumerism as their rightful 
inheritance as God's faithful children.546 
In support of my own thesis of the inadequacy of a hermeneutics of liberation 
paradigm, understood in terms of macroscopic social, cultural, and economic 
transformation, Lee documents the criticism such churches have from the liberationist's 
tradition, specifically that to the extent that such churches might promote change, it is at 
the level of the individual, thus "liberation" is couched in terms of individual 
responsibility rather than calling into questions systems and structures that perpetuate of 
poverty and oppression.547 Indeed, Black neo-Pentecostal pastors, celebrity ministers, and 
heads of megachurches and national ministries are strong advocates of neo-liberal 
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capitalism and free markets as they sell books, videos, and tapes to increase their wealth. 
Subsequently, over the last 30 years, traditional African American congregations have 
lost much in the way of their position and prestige to neo-Pentecostal churches along with 
"Old Pentecostalism" that harbored anti-secular sentiments. Into the void has emerged a 
new Pentecostal movement that aggressively embraces technology, secularism, 
548 
capitalism, and popular culture. 
Finally, I would point to the work of Daphne C. Wiggins and her monograph, 
Righteous Content: Black Women's Perspectives of Church and Faith,549 An examination 
of African America women involved in the Black Church, this work explores black 
women's religiosity, which for Wiggins encompasses "an individual's beliefs and 
behaviors in relation to/or on behalf of the supernatural, as well as the consequences of 
this aspect upon the individual.550 
Consisting of in-depth interviews with 38 women in addition to observational data 
from worship services, Bible studies, and women's auxiliary meetings in two 
congregations, Wiggins provides a number of revealing insights and observation that 
challenge conventional wisdom as well as certain aspects of the dominant macroscopic 
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liberation paradigm. Of particular import to the thesis of my work is her challenge to 
claims of docility with respect to African American women and religious institutions. 
Wiggins calls attention to a persistent question for many outside observers as well as a 
number of those within institutional black churches, specifically, why women, who are a 
marked majority in most of such congregations - according to the famous study of 
Lincoln and Mamiya there are on average 2.5 to 3 women for every man in historically 
black churches551 - that church leadership at the congregational level as well as 
denominationally, is overwhelmingly male. 
Wiggins's emphasis is on the various ways that the church functions in terms of 
socialization and the supportive community for women. To quote the title of one of her 
chapters that derives from her interviewee Sister Lori, the church is the "fuel that keeps 
me going."552 Wiggins notes the work of sociologist as well as womanist theologians, and 
while noting that the grievances against the black church against women are to be taken 
seriously, women like Sister Lori and Valeria find hope, inspiration, and healing in the 
institution. Wiggins, therefore, rejects simplistic characterization of women as docile, as 
devoid of agency with respect to their religious life and how it functions even within the 
largely patriarchal power structures of the church. "Women attest to the enduring power 
of the church to define, foster, and affirm a sense of "somebodiness" among African 
Americans. Amid social situations that often denigrate and oppress black women -
racism, economic inequalities, sexism, pathological interpretations of black motherhood, 
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Eurocentric standards of beauty, physical violence, cultural stereotypes ranging from 
Jezebel to Mammy - churches provide alternative constructions of the self."553 
Consistent with my characterization and critique of the liberationist paradigm, 
Wiggins argues that 
Women are not taking an active role in instituting structural changes 
concerning women in their denominations. The conceptual divisions of 
reality into sacred and secular realms are operative among church women. 
Reliance upon these dualities informs their evaluation of what change is 
necessary and their assessment of strategies for implementing change.554 
She goes on to say, 
[T]he women I studied have not formulated a comprehensive analysis of 
sexism in the church and were not conversant with the works of womanist 
and feminist scholars who have offered critiques and alternative visions 
for the church.555 
With respect to the dominant model, with its emphasis on macroscopic temporal 
liberation, this Valeria's experience does not address the goals and objectives of a course 
promoting social/political transformation. While it may be the case that the lack of care 
available to her may be related to macroscopic issues, the telos of Valeria's actions are 
proximate, they are immediate and imminent. Once more, she exhibits traits, practices, 
and tactics meant to bring about wholeness as a self, as a "subject" or "I." 
In terms of everyday life, in Valeria's practice, there is the creation of a space 
within her day as she engages in a regular period of prayer and self-anointing. Within her 
busy schedule, she focuses on her needs, for her own healing. In this act of taking 
responsibility for her health, she is engaged in an alternative discourse, at least a 
discourse that differs from the dominant Western narrative that often involves invasive 
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procedures for the curing of ailments. Valeria's practice is in keeping with folk ways, 
particularly those associated with women in the African American community. 
Exposition 
Again, it is my contention that the theory and methodologies that I have laid out 
and associated with the "everyday", the ordinary, and the quotidian are superior in their 
explanatory power with respect to African American religious experience than those 
associated with the dominant liberative paradigm deployed among African American 
religionists. 
In the theories of the everyday, the focus is often on simple practices, on the ways 
operating or doing things, viewing them not simply as the obscure background of social 
activity, but rather as taking seriously the subtle and hidden logics associated with how a 
person or community live their lives, day in and day out. Such practices seldom succumb 
to analysis predicated on systemization and organization. They cannot be explained 
through statistical models that might mark trends among large groupings, but cannot give 
much comprehension with respect to the individual or the few. 
In the each of the examples: Howard Thurman, Helga Crane, and Valeria, one 
sees how everyday acts relate poiesis of "self ' that I have associated with the quixotic 
intermittent or fleeting experience of wholeness. Whether it is sitting in one's 
grandmother's lap, seeking the safety and security of one's bed, or praying and anointing 
oneself before the start of the day, such acts, such procedures, grant access to the lived 
experience of persons. In the terminology of de Certeau, they create spaces, breaks, 
ruptures, and deviations within "the grid of power." With respect to their application to 
the field of religious studies, I maintain that theories of the everyday provide access to 
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what is beneath and behind the conscious thoughts of people to find what is deeper or 
hidden, in an effort to identify the underpinnings of religion and religious phenomenon. 
This is different from substantive approaches, the purview of hermeneutics, where it is 
the assumption that religion is best understood in terms of the conceptual content, or 
ideas to which persons profess allegiance. 
Further, as I mentioned numerous times throughout the course of this dissertation, 
it is my intent to show the weaknesses and deficiencies of the dominant paradigm, and 
this has directed my line of argumentation as well as the selection of the accounts of 
religious experience that I have presented thus far. It is my contention, as I believe this 
chapter has attempted to demonstrate, that accounts such as those of Thurman, Crane, and 
Valeria do not readily succumb to the theoretical assumptions and methodological tools 
associated with what I have described as the dominant paradigm in African American 
religious studies, namely the hermeneutics of liberation with its emphasis on the 
macroscopic as opposed to the microscopic analysis offered by theories of the everyday. 
There are those, however, who might object to the selection of the case studies 
chosen for analysis. Thus, to show the power of theories of the everyday, I will look at 
two slave narratives to which the dominant macroscopic liberative analysis has been 
applied. 
The first is a famous conversion experience of an anonymous slave recorded by 
Clifton H. Johnson in his anthology God Struck Me Dead: Religious Conversion 
Experiences and Autobiographies of Ex-Slaves, "I am Blessed, but You are Damned." 
One day while laboring in the fields, behind a plow, this slave heard 
someone calling his name. Thinking it was his master, he become afraid, 
but then realized that no one was there. Upon hearing it again and seeing 
no one present, he began to run and the voice said, "Fear not little one, for 
235 
behold I come to bring you a message of truth!" All of a sudden, 
everything became dark and he fell to the ground. When he looked up 
again, he saw that he was in a new world. Then a voice said to him, "My 
little one, I have loved you with everlasting love. You are this day made 
alive and free. You are chosen vessel unto the Lord. Be upright before me, 
and I will guide you unto all truth. My grace is sufficient for you. Go, I am 
with you. Preach the gospel, and I will preach with you. You are 
henceforth the salt of the earth." 
The man says that he looked at his hands, and they were new, he looked at his feet 
and they were new. He began to clap and shout. About this time, his master came down 
the field. The slave was emboldened and answered him when he called. The master asked 
him very roughly, how he had come to plow up corn, for in the midst of his vision, the 
horse and plow had run away. The slave said that he had been talking with God Almighty 
and it was God who had plowed up the corn. He immediately began to preach, and all his 
master could do was to look on and tremble. After taking his leave, the slave proceeded 
to go after the horse and plow, but again he fell to the ground. This time, the voice said to 
him, 
"Go in peace, fearing no man, for lo I have cut loose your stammering 
tongue and unstopped your deaf ears. A witness shalt thou be, and thou 
shalt speak to multitudes, and they shall hear. My word has gone forth and 
it is power. Be strong, and lo, I am with you even until the world shall end. 
Amen." Since that day, he preached the gospel to all persons.556 
It is from this narrative that the constructive black liberation theologian, Dwight 
N. Hopkins draws the title from one of his earliest works, Cut Loose My Stammering 
557 558 
Tongue. In a subsequent text, Shoes That Fit our Feet, Hopkins says that enslaved 
Africans "yearned for the freedom to name themselves and determine the space around 
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them. As they press toward this mark, they seek a spirituality of full humanity." Yet later 
he states that this synonymous with a militancy leading to a quest for emancipation. 
I maintain that such an analysis does not possess the subtlety necessary to 
apprehend such a religious experience. I would argue that this conversion narrative is 
fundamentally about an understanding of self and identity, and is best understood via the 
theories of everyday life. It is in the midst of the mundane that the enslaved African 
experiences this revelation. As with de Certeau's mystics, one does see how the 
technologies of the sacred; e.g., conversion, ecstatic worship, kerygma; oppose the 
dominant discourse and system of oppression that marginalize, exploit, define, and in 
some instances destroy black bodies and souls. It is these aspects that Hopkins and other 
proponents of the dominant paradigm latch on too, but err in their efforts of systemization 
and routinization, extrapolating it to the macroscopic domain of economic, social, and 
political liberation 
Perhaps an even more explicit example of this distortion is found in Hopkins 
book, Shoes That Fit our Feet: Sources for a Constructive Black Theology. Hopkins 
asserts that objective of this text is to penetrate the core of poor African Americans' 
religious convictions in order to gather up lessons and sources for a constructive black 
theology today. He goes on to say "to construct a black theology, one has to highlight 
important trends within the black setting and from these trends, draw out their theological 
significance for the African American community's justice concern."559 In so doing, 
Hopkins asserts that African Americans have developed a liberation tradition in which 
"God ruled with unquestioned omnipotence and realized release for total captivity."560 
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Thus ultimately and definitively, "Yahweh brings freedom" which is interpreted as the 
radical overthrow of all that oppresses."561 
As sources for his project, Hopkins utilizes narratives, spirituals, and folklore, 
which he argues, support this liberative point of view. Due to the constraints of time, I 
will recount (only one example), his analysis of an incident involving the beating of one 
Aunt Susie Ann. As Hopkins relates the story, the overseer whipped the elderly black 
woman "till the blood run off her on the ground." He goes on to say, "Aunt Susie faked 
unconsciousness, fell to the aggressor's feet, and after the white overseer had put away 
562 
his whip, Aunt Susie grabbed his weapon and 'whips him till he couldn't stand up.'" 
Hopkins then says 
[SJingle acts of resistance were not isolated attempts of black loners who 
fought politically in an individualistic manner. Neither could one black 
slave succeed against the monstrosity of the slave institution from a 
practical standpoint. Nor was the African American definition of humanity 
limited to an individual's singular rebellious nature. In fact, the resistance 
of politics connected individual opposition to communal insurrectionary 
support...No one person, no matter how self-reliant, could sustain himself 
or herself in an absolute condition of isolation from the protective eyes 
and ears of fellow slaves if he or she wished to succeed in political 
resistance.563 
I would argue, however that such an assertion, though making a claim to value the 
practices of the poor and oppressed, robs these individual actions of their intrinsic 
integrity as an ontogenic-egogenic event. 
Moreover, the analysis given involves the insistence on codification, 
systemization, or themetization on the heterogeneous. Indeed, according to Hopkins's 
interpretation, it is to the extent that one's actions contribute to a comprehensive project 
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that it is significant. It is my contention that such a hermeneutical norm distorts black 
experience in general and black religious experience in particular. In its stead, I would 
suggest a Certeauvian influenced method of analysis. In this story, Aunt Susie feigning a 
blackout brings a cessation to her punishment. This tactic, gives her the occasion, the 
space, to act, and in this in a way that might be consistent with a framework of resistance 
amenable to liberationists. Indeed, in his description of what he calls "The Culture of 
Resistance," Hopkins points to various practices such as taking-not-stealing and 
employing a "false display." While Hopkins associates them with a larger liberation 
struggle, in my estimation, they are more consistent with microscopic expressions of 
power associated with issues of agency, in an effort to create space for expression and 
creativity, i.e., tactics, as opposed to organized and systemic resistance, i.e., strategies. 
While some might argue that the only difference between the position that I have 
laid out with respect to an appropriation of theories of the everyday, and their application 
to the study of religious experience and that of the dominant liberationist paradigm is one 
of scale, I maintain that such a characterization stems from several fundamental 
misunderstandings with respect to 1 concepts such as power, particularly as it relates 
understandings of resistance and terms such as docility. As I asserted, throughout this 
work, I find macroscopic models of power to be inadequate in their association with 
methodologies ill suited for the study of certain phenomena, i.e., they do not possess the 
subtlety and flexibility to grasp events on the level of everyday life. Further, and perhaps 
less clear, I am not an advocate of simply any and all models that profess to bring a 
micro-analytical approach to the study of power. A case in point with respect to the latter 
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is the understanding of power articulated by Michel Foucault in his earlier works, 
particularly as expressed in the oft cited Discipline and Punish. 
Thirdly, I and to a certain extent, perhaps the most significant conclusion that I 
draw from an application of theories and methodologies of everyday life, is that any 
discourse of religion as liberative, oppositional, or resistive, with respect to practice, must 
be circumscribed. While Lefebvre sees the potential for social transformation on the level 
of everyday, such potentiality exists dialectically with actuality. In the case of de Certeau, 
opposition and resistance as it relates to practices occupies a domain between the Scylla 
of modernist assertions of agency and the Charybdis of Foucauldian docility. Inspired by 
this tradition as well as my training in physics, I would describe religious experience in 
terms of practices that may circumvent, evade, or opposes oppressive dimensions of 
power indicative of stochasticity, understood as a lack of any predictable or definitive 
outcome. A stochastic process is one in which a system's subsequent state is determined 
both by the process's predictable actions and by a random element.564 
All forms of power are not the same. All forms of resistance are not the same. I 
believe that it is an error to assume when liberationists speak of resistance, that it is the 
same as that of someone theorists like de Certeau. This stems again from the type of 
power with which he is concerned verses the type of power which concerns liberationist. 
It is not simply one of scale, which is what I was trying to get at with respect to some of 
my physics analogies. When I refer to paradigm shifts in an area such as physics with 
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respect to the understanding of quantum mechanics and classical mechanics, it is not just 
a matter of scale. On the classical scale, one may get answers for macroscopic 
phenomena that are correct, but it is because the errors in the fundamental assumptions 
about the laws/theories of physics that are in error (matter and energy are distinct and 
discrete, temporality and spatiality are independent, etc) result in insignificant 
perturbation. On the microscopic scale, however, the classical model leads to gross 
inaccuracies (matter and energy are phases; temporality can be treated as a coordinate 
along with spatial geometries).Quantum mechanics, however, works regardless of the 
scale. It is interesting to note that quantum mechanics, as statistical and probabilistic, is 
also stochastic. The perturbations (randomness), however, which they introduce to the 
phenomena on the macroscopic scale, however, are able to be ignored. Now, this analogy 
is not a perfect one with respect to social/technical power and how it works with respect 
to human beings individually and collective. 
Perhaps one of the most important differences between me and proponents of 
liberation is that at best I wish to be agnostic with respect to whether the type of social 
transformation which they espouse is possible. While I do affirm the active presence of 
human agency, albeit greatly circumscribed, the likelihood of it potentiating the kind of 
large scale social transformation that is the telos of liberationists, remains highly dubious. 
More likely, African American agency and subjectivity function as a bulwark against the 
nihilist threat, the loss of hope, the loss of a sense of identity and meaning against 
overwhelming and crushing odds. These earlier "stalkers after meaning" (to employ a 
phrase borrowed from the late Dr. James Melvin Washington), found this hope and sense 
of identity through their religious experiences. I believe that such an understanding of lies 
at the heart of what Howard Thurman says, that "life is its own restraint." According to 
Thurman, life abounds, persists, in all variety of resources and resourcefulness.565 In 
terms of a theoretical reflection, there is also coherence with Italian philosopher Giorgio 
Agamben in his book Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life.566 Agamben holds 
that life exists in two capacities: one is natural biological life, life as a property of 
organisms (Greek: zoe) and the other is political life, as an "object of a technique" in a 
Foucauldian sense, a way of living, life tinted with custom (Greek: bios). This zoe is 
related by Agamben himself to Hannah Arendt's description of the refugee's "naked life" 
r / r-7 
in The Origins of Totalitarianism. According to Agamben, the law, the order of things, 
the constituted state of affairs associated with modernity mirrors that of the concentration 
camp where one has bare life, but is legally dead. Thus, "fundamental categorical pair of 
Western politics is not that of friend/enemy but that of bare life/political existence, 
zoe/bios, exclusion/inclusion". 
Agamben goes on; however, to note certain paradoxes with regard to power. With 
respect to the nature of sovereignty, it exists be both inside and outside of the juridical 
order. As such, the sovereign exists in a state of exception with respect to the rules to 
which he/she is guarantor. Moreover, the sovereign has the power to exercise the 
exception as a ban that can be inflicted on his/her subjects. The incarnation of this subject 
is the homo sacer. Such persons have been relegated by the sovereign to be outside of the 
law, they are people who cannot be sacrificed (i.e., they can't have the privilege of being 
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sacrificed to something greater), but who can be killed.569 As "bare life", the homo sacer 
finds himself submitted to the sovereign's state of exception, and, though he has 
biological life, it has no political significance. Homo Sacer and the Sovereign are 
juxtaposed as representing two sides of the same object: "At the two extreme limits of the 
order, the sovereign and homo sacer present two symmetrical figures that have the same 
structure and are correlative: the sovereign is the one with respect to whom all men are 
potentially hominess sacri, and homo sacer is the one with respect to whom all men act 
as sovereigns." Yet, while Agamben notes that in the contemporary context, the entire 
concept of life has been called into question, there is some sense, at least in my 
estimation, that bare life persists, that as he says in his earlier work, The Coming 
Community571 ; - ~ -
If human were or had to be this or that substance, this or that destiny, no 
ethical experience would be possible... This does not mean, however, that 
humans are not, and do not have to be, something, that they are simply 
consigned to nothingness and therefore can freely decide whether to be or 
not to be, to adopt or not to adopt this or that destiny (nihilism and 
decisionism coincide at this point). There is in effect something that 
humans are and have to be, but this is not an essence nor properly a thing: 
It is the simple fact of one's own existence as possibility or potentiality... 
As I asserted, throughout this work, I find macroscopic models of power to be 
inadequate in their association with methodologies ill suited for the study of certain 
phenomena, i.e., they do not possess the subtlety and flexibility to grasp events on the 
level of everyday life. Further, and perhaps less clear, I am not an advocate of simply any 
and all models that profess to bring a micro-analytical approach to the study of power. A 
case in point with respect to the latter is the understanding of power articulated by Michel 
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Foucault in his earlier works, particularly as expressed in the oft cited Discipline and 
Punish. 
In his seminal work, After Virtue572, Alasdair Chalmers Maclntyre offers his 
famous critique of relativism. Extrapolating from the discourse between philosophers of 
science, Imre Lakatos and Thomas Kuhn, Maclntyre asserts that an explanation that can 
explain why and when another explanation works well in certain situations, when the 
converse is not true; the former is better than the latter. The inferior conceptual 
framework is the one that cannot explain the other. Even more than that, the superior 
conceptual framework can explain why the inferior fails to explain the things that it 
cannot explain. 
Such is the case with respect to theories and methodologies of the everyday in 
relation to the dominant paradigm with respect to their explanatory power regarding 
African American religious experience. To the extent that they seem to provide an 
explanation of religious experience, it is to the extent that everyday practices function 
oppositionally. Unfortunately, the dominant paradigm fails, however, on numerous 
counts. Most notably, it fails to account for African American religious experiences such 
as those represented in the three case studies presented in the last two chapters. At its 
worst, the dominant paradigm, does not simply fail to account for certain religious 
experiences, in its deployment, it deigns to deem them as invalid, inauthentic, and 
pathological. It does this at the same time that it claims to take seriously the lived 
experience of everyday "black folk." 
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For some neigh forty years, the dominant paradigm has exerted considerable 
influence on those who wish to study African American religion and religious 
experience. In presenting an alternative way of approaching similar subject matter, I 
suggesting that it is time for a change in paradigm. 
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Chapter 6 - Conclusion: A New Paradigm 
I shall begin with a recapitulation of what I have presented thus far before 
offering a final assessment of my investigations. Firstly, in Chapter 1, "An Overview of 
Religious Experience," I provide critical reflection on the manner in which religious 
studies has explored the nature and meaning of religious experience to date, with 
emphasis on the particularly influential contributions of Schleiermacher, Otto, James, 
Eliade. I subsequently offer an informed critique of this tradition, one particularly 
indebted to Wayne Proudfoot. I end the chapter by offering a definition of religious 
experience to function as a heuristic, deployed after the fashion of Aristotelian or 
Heideggerian formal indication in order to provide a context for inquiry. 
In Chapter 2, "Examples of African American Religious Experience," I offer in 
the tradition of Du Bois, Fanon, and Gordon culturally informed phenomenological 
descriptions of religious experiences associated with the lives of three African 
Americans. I maintain that this approach is exceptional for the presentation of religious 
events and/or experiences in that phenomenological accounts emphasis engaging the 
world as it reveals itself, in its givenness. The objective is a fuller, more complex 
description of the everyday, and subsequently, a better picture of how religious 
experience shapes, alters, modifies, and influences the lives of African Americans. 
In Chapter 3, "Current Approaches to the Study of African American Religious 
Experience and their Shortcomings," I provide critical reflection on the manner in which 
numerous scholars of African American religion have explored African American 
religious experience. This review places particular emphasis on the characterizations of 
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African American religious experience as given within the theological, ethical, and 
hermeneutical traditions. 
In Chapter 4, "Preamble to an 'Alternate Approach' to the Study of African 
American Religious Experience," I present theoretical and methodological approaches 
associated with the pursuit of "everyday life", "the quotidian," and "the ordinary". It is 
my contention that such conceptual frames of reference - theories - as well as the 
accompanying apparatus of investigation - methods or methodologies - are markedly 
superior to the dominant analytic or logic among African American religionists; i.e., "the 
hermeneutic of liberation," where liberation is understood primarily as macroscopic and 
substance. Informed by intellectuals such as Heidegger, Adorno, Perec, Lefebvre, and de 
Certeau, I maintain that a-concentration on everydayness ; e.g., coping practices, 
survival techniques, habits, and tactics, is indispensable for any sincere comprehension of 
the lived religious experience of "black folk". 
In Chapter 5,1 make evident the advantage of an analysis of African American 
religious experience in terms of "everydayness" as opposed to the macroscopic liberative 
hermeneutical norm. The data used for comparative purposes consists of the 
phenomenological sketches presented in Chapter 2. 
There is much to my mind to commend in the reading of African American 
religion and religious experience through the lens of the "theories of everyday life." In a 
conceptual framework that embraces everydayness, there is necessarily an openness and 
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appreciation for ambiguity, alterity, and the heteronomous. There is a rejection of 
epistemological foundationalism, as well as the rejection of universal rationality. Instead, 
the reasonable and the rational are contingent upon the prevailing narratives, forms of 
life, and ontic regions of a particular assemblage, society, or culture. 
Concomitantly, theories of everydayness are equitable, thus uniquely attuned to 
diversity. I contend that such attributes are indispensable in an analysis of African 
American religious expression and experience, in its givenness. Unfortunately, with 
respect to the African American community, acknowledgement of extant diversity and 
plurality is often complicated and contentious. This phenomenon has been noted by 
sociologists such as Orlando Patterson574 or ethicists such as Peter L. Paris575 where there 
is a social push toward harmony, coherence, and conformity. Thus, practices or beliefs 
deemed aberrant may well be summarily dismissed or become the recipient of derision. 
Yet, there exists a myriad of expressions, both those that might seem passive or inward 
focused as well as. those that are active or demonstrative. In terms my appropriation of the 
lens of everydayness, however, "religious quietism" and "religious militancy" are little 
more than modalities on a continuum of human expressions, actions, and practices in the 
pursuit of wholeness, as opposed to being radically disparate. One expression is not 
inherently more valid or authentic than another from a logic or analytics of everyday life. 
It is here that the postmodern influence in my argumentation is perhaps clearest. There is 
574
 See for example, Orlando Patterson, Ethnic Chauvinism : The Reactionary Impulse (New York: Stein 
and Day, 1977). In Chapter 2, he references the anthropological distinction between the rebel and the 
revolutionary in society. In many respect, the revolutionary may well be a conformist 
575
 Peter J. Paris, The Spirituality of African Peoples : The Search for a Common Moral Discourse 
(Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1995). Throughout the work, Paris speaks to the importance of community 
for African people. "The corporate community always assumes priority over individual members. Thus, 
under certain conditions the person may be sacrificed for the well-being of the corporate body." ( I l l ) 
248 
a rejection of a comprehensive scheme.576 There is no claim "Truth", but rather truths. No 
"History," but rather histories. Though often the subject of critique in this thesis, I am in 
agreement with Foucault's assertions that discourse is inextricably linked with power, 
thus universal truth claims are simply masks for ideology and the will to power, or in his 
invocation of Nietzsche, "Truth is undoubtedly the sort of error that cannot be refuted 
because it was hardened into an unalterable form in the long baking process of 
history."577 
It is my contention, however, that religious experience in general, and African 
American experience in particular, can be more faithfully analyzed and explained, with 
respect to matters of their complexity, through approaches associated with the theories 
and methodologies of the quotidian over against the liberative hermeneutical paradigm 
578 
that not so infrequently imposes homogeneity and normativity on human activity. 
Moreover, I contend that when applied to certain data or artifacts; e.g., narratives and 
biographies, sociological data, anthropological/archeological spaces and historical 
materials; the theories and methods of the everyday will provide insights into African 
American religion and religious experience, some of which have been ignored, dismissed, 
or distorted due to its inability to conform to assumptions, expressed or otherwise. 
Indeed, an interpretation or explanation of African American religious experience in 
terms of everyday life and practice may serve as a heuristic by which one examine the 
challenge of Africana peoples in terms of egogenesis and sociogenesis in relation to 
racialization as well as other phenomenon. 
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It is important to note that in asserting the primacy of theories and methodologies 
of the everyday, I do not deem the scholarship of those who identify with the 
"hermeneutic of liberation" illegitimate. Both trajectories offer important critiques of 
modernity. Both profess suspicions of various metanarratives and social foundations. 
Nevertheless, the "hermeneutic of liberation" tradition as it has been implemented has 
serious flaws. Firstly, in its privileging of a perspective emphasizing gross structures and 
systems of oppression associated particularly with white supremacy, and to a lesser 
extent, to prevailing discourses such as monopoly capitalism, sexism, heterosexism, and 
imperialism it has as interpreted African American religion and religious experience as 
embodying strategies that ostensibly will result in the realization of radical freedom. As 
such it is also bound to totalizing, overdetermined interpretations of history as well as the 
triumphalism indicative of "modernities" whether they are secular or religious (qua 
Christianity). Yet, as I have argued, such a posture is associated with a 
mischaracterization or overstatement of human agency. Moreover, as traditionally 
rendered among African American theologians, there is an assumed Christian normativity 
to African American religious experience. 
With a turn to theories and methodologies such as those I espouse, such problems 
and conclusions can be averted. A focus on "everydayness" is attentive to the 
microphysics of power, the heterogenous, to tactics the common person, the folk Further, 
there is a rejection of normative claims and the privileging of certain religious 
experiences and expressions over others, at least at the level of the 
explanative/interpretative. Rather, in terms of the telos of African American religious 
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experiences, I proffer a formal indication of a perpetual quest for wholeness, understood 
as assertions of agency, creativity, and human flourishing. 
As mentioned in the last chapter, the extent that one might characterize such 
tactics as oppositional practices, which possess a potential to resistance, circumvent, 
evades, or opposes oppressive dimensions of power, there is some mutuality with the 
schematizations of African American religious experience in terms of liberation. Yet, it is 
my contention that the distinctions that do exist are significant and substantive. With 
respect to the dominant paradigm, the African Americans subjectivity and agency is 
distorted, exaggerated for some, and muted ifnot effaced for others.579 Ironically, this is 
579
 Baer and Singer, African American Religion : Varieties of Protest and Accommodation. The focus of 
their study is on the role of religion as an adaptive response to the changing economic forces and 
institutional arrangements that have confronted African Americans. It is their assertion, that while some 
religious leaders have protested against racial oppression and challenged socioeconomic exclusion, most 
African American religious groups have, often inadvertently, buttressed the hegemony of the capitalist 
system. In other words, they have accepted the standards presented by the status quo. 
The study moves forward to examine the various forms of protest and accommodation among four 
broad types of African American religious groups. Firstly, mainstream churches such as such as Baptist and 
Methodist denominations (African Methodist Episcopal, African Methodist Episcopal Zion, Christian 
Methodists Episcopal, and the various National Baptists and the Progressive National Baptist Conventions) 
promote political reformism and African American social and economic integration. For the most part, such 
denominations are for instrumental, material goals and social status with acceptance of beliefs, attitudes, 
and values of the larger society. According to Baer and Singer, such bodies fail to link racism with 
capitalism and therefore often reinforce, rather than challenge, the oppression of African Americans. 
Secondly, Conversionist sects such as Holiness/Pentecostal groups like the Church of God in 
Christ emphasize individual salvation, "otherworldliness," and political quiescence. According to Baer and 
Singer, Holiness and Pentecostal movements combine expressive social action with negative attitudinal 
orientation. Thus, they fail in terms of offering an effective critique of racism and capitalism. The authors 
judge them as primarily apolitical; their focus being on individual sanctification, strict moral code, 
concentrating on heavenly rewards. 
Thirdly, Messianic-Nationalist sects associated with various expressions of Islam, Judaism, and 
"liberation theology"; e.g., Nation of Islam, Black Hebrew Israelites, and the Pan-African Orthodox Church 
of Christ link religious belief with the struggle for African American cultural and institutional autonomy. 
Thus, they support instrumental, material goals and social status, but reject the beliefs, attitudes, and values 
of the larger society. According to Baer and Singer, such groups are generally founded by charismatic 
individuals perceived as God, messiah, or prophet. While they challenge racism and offer a sharp critique 
of society, their popularity ebbs and flows in relation to economic stability of African Americans. During 
times of economic stability or prosperity, they lose members, and often soften their protest, thus 
undermining their counter-hegemonic potential. 
Fourthly, Thaumaturgical sects such as Spiritualists; promote the attainment of socially desired 
ends - for example, prosperity, prestige, health - through the acquisition of esoteric knowledge or 
participation in magico-religious rituals designed to provide spiritual power. They are characterized by 
expressive social action strategies combined with a positive attitudinal orientation. They tend to eschew 
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antithetical to the articulated objectives of scholars engaged in such research, who wish to 
give voices to the voiceless. 
Also, as I allude to in Chapter 2,1 have serious reservations about the 
hermeneutical traditions attempts to define the methods and processes whereby what is 
meaningful is made meaningful (whether one is referring to a text or one's experience of 
the world. I have a greater affinity for the critical tradition, which seeks to develop 
critiques of the methods, theories, and politics of appropriators of the "meaningful." Once 
more invoking the posture of a postmodernist, I find that the assumed holism (the 
guarantee that meaning can be discovered) that resides at the heart of the hermeneutical 
tradition presumptive. Conversely, the presupposition of the critical tradition is that 
meaning is always historically embedded, is always caught up with the exercise of 
individual and institutional "will to power". The presupposition of hermeneutics is that 
universal meaning exists independent of, but is accessible through, all local expressions 
of meaning. The presupposition of the critical tradition is that meaning is constructed -
that it is dependent on the systematic framework we use to structure our experience (ala 
Kant), and by our language (ala Derrida). Contrary to being discovered, "meaning is 
created and invested with value within certain cultural matrices," which the critical 
tradition wishes to interrogate.580 
In addition, one of the attributes of the "hermeneutics of liberation" is the 
conflation of theology and ethics, often alluded to as the "theoethical." I maintain that in 
protest in favor of accommodation. They view positive thinking, incantations, voodoo, and occultism to 
alter unfavorable circumstances. Like Conversionist, their focus tends to be individualistic. For Baer and 
Singer, as well as those committed to the liberationist paradigm there is marked preference for the 
Messianic-Nationalist goals and objectives, particularly over against those of the Conversionist and 
Thaumaturgical sects. 
580
 Graham Ward, Theology and Contemporary Critical Theory (New York, NY: St. Martin's Press, 1996). 
Xv. 
terms of analyzing, describing, or explaining African American religious experience. 
Ethics as ethos when referenced in terms of religion is dealing with what motivates 
people to act in certain ways, with an intentionality of "the ought" over against "the is." 
Theology, generously construed, involves an examination and exploration of a worldview 
as represented by various symbols, metaphors, and categories. While possessing different 
disciplinary commitments, in general, I find ethics - as a normative approach -
particularly ill suited as a tool of discernment with respect to nature, character, or 
substance of religious experience, African American, or other. 
In a similar vein, the work of Robert Orsi is of particular relevance here. Orsi is 
noted for his attempts to move the discourse about religion beyond characterizations of 
CO 1 
good or bad for the people who practice it. In Between Heaven and Earth, Orsi makes 
the case that positive or negative assessments of religious practice are beside the 
point. For him religion, religious practices, and religious experience are primarily about 
relationships. In Between Heaven and Earth, Orsi begins with an exploration of the 
relationships between humans and holy figures and the consequences of said "for the 
everyday lives of men, women, and children." Orsi notes, however, that for most 
modern people and scholars in the West, religion is understood as a medium or method 
for explaining, interpreting, or representing "reality." When religion and religious 
practices are seen as networks of relations "between heaven and earth," between the 
diversity that constitutes humanity and the many and varied sacred figures, one sees that 
they mirror the complexities of relationships between human beings with "all the hopes, 
581
 Robert A. Orsi, Between Heaven and Earth : The Religious Worlds People Make and the Scholars Who 
Study Them (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2005). 
582
 Ibid. 2. 
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COT 
evasions, love, fear, denial, projections, misunderstandings, and so on." Orsi later 
states, 
Before introducing or reintroducing moral questions into our approach to 
other people's religious worlds, before we draw the lines between the 
pathological and the healthy, the bad and the good, we need to excavate 
our hidden moral and political history. Otherwise, the distinctions that we 
make will merely be the reiteration of unacknowledged assumptions, 
584 
prejudices, and implications in power. 
Invoking the work of David L. Haberman with respect to the problematic of moral 
judgment in a world where human beings experience a multiplicity of realities and 
there from draw a multiplicity of meanings. Because each of our views are 
relative; i.e., dependent on our particular world, location, social situation, there is 
c o r 
no objective or normative frame of reference. 
However, I am not alone in my criticisms of the liberation tradition. For example 
Victor Anderson asserts that categories such as "ontological blackness" and its 
concomitant heroic racial aesthetic tend to "distort far too much of the conditions of 
c o / 
African American life and experience in the United States.'"00 While an advocate for 
individuality and diversity, achieved through displacing, decentering, and transcending 
the determinative transactions and practices of African American lived experience, 
Anderson does not offer much in the way of promising theoretical or methodological 
trajectories that might facilitate the more inclusive rendering that he advocates. 
The sentiment that I have expressed with respect to the dominance of the 
hermeneutics of liberation among African American religionists is not dissimilar to that 
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expressed by Theophus Smith in his influential work Conjuring Culture: Biblical 
Formations of Black America5*1 In the chapter entitled "Theological Perspectives", he 
speaks of the need for redirecting the trajectory of contemporary black theology and 
c o o 
"religious philosophies." Smith goes on to say that his own scholarship, as constituted 
by the work presented in the very same monograph, while dependent or even indebted to 
the larger tradition, is nevertheless, also critical of it, particularly with respect to the 
concept of liberation. 
Indeed, Smith states 
I concur with liberation theologians, on the one hand, in the recognition of 
theology as a mode of reflection that is inevitably related to issues of 
power and empowerment. In this connection I have been greatly 
instructed, and spiritually disencumbered by liberation theology's critique 
roQ 
of Western theologies and of their systemic complicity in racism. 
Smith goes on to declare that he owes much of his own sense of vocation and 
mission in the field of religious studies to black theology, and yet 
I find that, in the turn from critique to construction, black liberation 
theology has become enamored of, and stereotyped by its own positivism 
or "ideology" of intraethnic religious empowerment. In the interest of such 
empowerment, I judge, liberation theology as a discipline systematically 
abstracts and privileges selected contexts of liberation and oppression over 
against other forms of experience... Earlier critics too have charge that 
black liberation theology so privileges the experiences of oppression (its 
import and significance) that it tends to displace or supplant people's 
multifaceted religious experience with its one-dimensional interest... 
Black religious experience, however, is not reducible to the experience of 
suffering and oppression, nor to the quest to overcome suffering and 
oppression.590 
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Finally, I would call attention to the work of Eddie Glaude's In a Shade of Blue: 
Pragmatism and the Politics of Black America. Glaude applies his interpretation of 
Deweyan pragmatism to the politics of African America. Consistent with Dewey's 
concern for history, Glaude moves the reader from the period of the Civil Rights 
movement to the contemporary context to which he attaches the nomenclature "post 
soul."591 Glaude believes that a critical reading of African American experience - "the 
shade of blue" - referred to in the title - is critical for America in general and African 
America in particular, as we reflect on the type of society we aspire to create. According 
to Glaude, "Our primary responsibility is to act intelligently in order to ensure, as much 
592 
as humanly possible, that this future is better than our present." 
As a Deweyan Glaude embraces reflective practice in the light of personal 
experience, asking the question "how does our doing impact our action and experience in 
the present." Glaude's goal is to help us live a "history whose aim is 
life" that may 
help us accept an often cruel and repressive past. It is not surprising in this sense that one 
of phenomena that Glaude engages is memory.594 Glaude talks about the significance of 
America's loss of memory, referring to its affinity for engaging in nostalgia which he 
characterizes as the identical twin of progress.595 
With respect to religion, Glaude asserts that it does not function simply as an 
opiate or simply as a revolutionary force. It has a more complex life as a tool that enables 591
 The term "post-soul" is a neologism that seems to have been first coined by Nelson George. 
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discourses deployment of power. This is noted in the work of Foucault and de Certeau. Memory is not 
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the kind of everyday agency that may or may not be liberative but is certainly directed 
toward survival. It is his assessment that as a discourse, Black theology simplifies, 
essentializes, and reifies black religious experiences. While Glaude recognizes the vital 
importance of Black theological scholarship, he asserts that the invocation of history is 
less than critical. What he proposes is that Black theologians, et al should read back into 
history the "contingency and instability."596 
Thus, along with small yet burgeoning community of dissenters, I offer an 
approach informed by theories of "everyday life" as one that might open new horizons 
within African American religious scholarship. It is my hope that scholars of African 
American religion will avail themselves of such resources that have the potential for 
greater precision and rigor in research. 
Where do we go from here? 
In addition to the concepts of the everyday, my research has opened avenues to 
further work with cultural phenomenology, particularly as it relates to religion and 
religious experience in general, and African American/Africana religion and religious 
experience in particular. As noted in Chapter 4, some work along this line has been 
carried out by James Bryant and Paget Henry. In 2006, their paper on Howard Thurman 
596
 There are clearly affinities in my work and what Glaude touches on with respect to religion. There are 
however, several differences: 
• Identity is not as much of an issue for me as it is for Glaude. This again is central to Glaude and it 
is why there is this allegiance to the American project and the exploration of the theme of 
American belonging that he identifies and pursues in the literature of Baldwin and Morrison. 
Again, identity is not a concern for me explicitly. Religious experience is integral to notions of 
identity, but it is not the same thing. 
• As one would expect, there is a moral component to his analysis, in keeping with the Deweyan 
and Jamesian commitment to amelioration. 
• The emphasis of Glaude's discourse is the creation of an effective politics. I am not interested in 
this. 
presented to the Phenomenology Roundtable at Temple University might be seen as a 
nascent contribution among Africana phenomenologists attempting to take seriously 
African American religious thought. In their work, unlike Henry's cursory engagement 
with religion in Caliban's Reason, the theo-poetic language of Thurman is framed in a 
way as to provide phenomenological insight into African American consciousness in a 
racialized society. The paper focused on only one of Thurman's works, The Luminous 
Darkness, but there are surely other materials to be mined within his oeuvre. Moreover, 
there are surely resources of other theologians, divines, and religious persons within the 
African American community, past and present, waiting to be plumbed. Further, it might 
be fruitful to bring the work of such individuals in dialogue in a comparative fashion with 
contemporary philosophers and phenomenologists who are exploring questions of a 
religious nature. For example, I am particularly intrigued about bringing together the 
ideas of Thurman with the likes of the French phenomenologist and theologian Jean Luc 
Marion. 
Conversely, asit relates to theory and method in the study of African American 
religion and religious experience, a closer look is owed to the African American legacy in 
philosophy of religion. An analysis of the works of individuals from the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth century such as Patrick Francis Healy, Alexander Crummell, Lewis 
fQT 
B. Moore, Gilbert Haven Jones, Alain Locke , and Cornelius Lacy Golightly, to more 
contemporary scholars such as J. Deotis Roberts and William R. Jones is certainly past 
due. Further, as noted in Chapter 2, literature opens up a world suitable for 
phenomenological analysis as well as exploration in terms of everydayness. In the 
597
 Alain Locke: Faith and Philosophy by Christopher Buck is but a superficial analysis. A much more 
scholarly study by someone familiar with philosophical and religious discourse is needed. 
context of the dissertation, I chose the novel Quicksand by the Harlem Renaissance 
author, Nella Larsen. It is my contention, however, that much can be gained in deploying 
the theories and methodologies evinced in my analysis of Quicksand to any number of 
African American literary sources. 
One work containing what I find to be intriguing and compelling religious themes 
and expressions that I considered for the dissertation is Ralph Ellison's Invisible Man. In 
particular, I was drawn to a character that the reader encounters, but never actually 
'meets,' in the novel - Rinehart. Rinehart is the consummate changeling, a master of 
disguise, the quintessential trickster, who uses his invisibility to great advantage. In de 
Certeauvian language, Rinehart is a master of tactics and space. He assumes and discards 
identities as a preacher, a lover, a number runner, a police informant, and a pimp. 
Moreover, compared to all the other characters in the novel, particularly the protagonist, 
whose perception of the world is under constant assault, Rinehart seems virtually 
unscathed and unaffected by his environment, adapting to what is given. He has few if 
any qualms about deploying procedures and ruses to fashion a life of his own, that is an 
expression of his will and creativity. 
Several literary commentators on the character of Rinehart are particularly 
interested in the significance of the name. Is it Ellison's intention to convey that as "rind 
and heart," Rinehart is a whole being, a being that does not need others to validate his 
existence? When confronted by the phenomenon of racialization, does he become 
undone, does he face the terror of non-being. Perhaps, as a changeling, as one who does 
not adhere to ontological essentialism, non-being does not fill him the anxiety indicative 
of most others. 
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When the narrator of the novel accidentally adopts the attire of Rinehart, it is a 
moment of revelation for him. When people look at him, he is aware that they see what 
they want to see, what they expect to see. Who he "is" is not important to them. Indeed, 
at one point he asks himself the question, "Do they see a Negro or a spook?" Is he a self? 
rqo 
Is he a projection of their repressed fears, or is he some other kind of phantom? 
Within the African American tradition, there are numerous myths and folk tales 
about trickster characters. These characters are simultaneously revered as well as subject 
to suspicion. Yet, they are frequently seen as possessing some unique wisdom, which 
they might share with others. One such character in African American folktales is the 
signifying monkey, which can be traced back to Yoruba mythology and is associated with 
the orisha Eshu (other names include Exu, Esu Eleggua, Esu Elegbara, Eshu Elegbara, 
Elegba, Legba, and Eleda). Here the trickster is also the mediator between humans and 
the divine, between the mundane and the sacred.599 
A study of the trickster or the changeling in African American literature might be 
particularly fruitful in attempts to grasp African American understandings and construal 
of the self as well as the relationship between the sacred and the mundane.600 There is 
598
 1 am greatly intrigued by the phenomenology and the language here, particularly the term spook. Spook 
has long been a derogatory term for African Americans. It is used to refer to spies - hence the interesting 
double entendre associated with the novel The Spook Who Sat By the Door, about an African American 
nationalists/freedom fighter infiltrating the CIA. 
Moreover, spooks, ghosts, spirits, haunts, etc. exists between worlds. One is never really sure 
whether they are here or not, at least not fully. 
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 Once more, the work of Turner is of relevance. The trickster is a liminal entity and personifies attributes 
associated with liminality and rituals such as rites of passage, "invisibility, ambiguity, bisexuality." Eshu is 
a "deity" associated with transitions and intersections, most notably, the crossroad. 
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 There are other tricksters in both folk literature, e.g., Brer Rabbit, as well as contemporary literature 
such as Toni Morrison's Song of Solomon and the character of Pilate Dead. Moreover, though it is not the 
focus of this dissertation, the concept of a kind of changeling has some interesting implications for ethics as 
seen in the work of Edith Wyschogrod, Saints and Postmodernism : Revisioning Moral Philosophy, 
Religion and Postmodernism (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990). In a move away from ethical 
theories, in a critique reminiscent to my early comments about theorizism, Wyschogrod indicates that the 
ethical is more adequately rendered in terms of imperative rather than indicative speech. Thus, from ethics 
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also a great deal more that might be done with respect to the phenomenology of sight, the 
visible, and the invisible, which is also a reoccurring theme in African American writing. 
A new paradigm? 
As one whose first love was science, throughout this dissertation, there have been 
allusions to disciplines such as physics, particularly with respect to the relationship 
between classical mechanics and dynamics associated with the likes of Newton and 
Hamilton, and quantum and relativistic theory, associated with names such as Planck, 
Heisenberg, and Einstein. In his now classic work, The Structure of Scientific Revolution, 
Thomas Kuhn presents the model of the paradigm shift to express the transition from one 
conceptual framework to another as it relates to theories in science. In this work, Kuhn 
calls into question science as a rational enterprise, at a time when it was held as the 
archetypical rational field. Prior to Kuhn, the most respected model for the scientific 
method was that of Karl Popper, which viewed science as an inductive process that 
proceeded on the basis of categorical falsifiability.601 Kuhn notes, however, that there are 
as rational schematizations, she directs one to an examination of the lives of saints. Saintly lives are 
compelling; there is an imperative quality about them (243). 
According to Wyschogrod, radical alterity is constitutive of moral discourse and practice, and it is 
just this sense of radical alterity that informs saintly practice (71). The notion of radical alterity presupposes 
the repudiation of agency and subjectivity, on the grounds that agency 'as such is a property of the self in 
its efforts to maintain its own interests' (63) For the saint, however, the self disappears in the face of the 
needs of the Other. As such, the saint is the consummate deconstructer of the self. The saint surrenders to 
the vortex of the Other, displacing self with the insatiable lack of the Other. (3) The saint, therefore, is a 
metamorph, the quintessential changeling. Subjectivity withers away before alterity. In Wyschogrod's 
view, a moral theory that promotes the conditions of agency for others betrays alterity in that it presupposes 
the other as a 'second self to whom the conditions of agency are to be extended. See also Mark C. Taylor, 
Erring : A Postmodern a/Theology (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984). For Taylor, subjectivity 
disappears, giving way to the emergence of the 'trace.' I realize, however, that treatment of alterity in 
Wyschogrod and Taylor, along with their refusal to refigure subjectivity in terms of a more democratic and 
empathetic mode of relationship between mutually recognized and recognizing subjects, poses some 
significant if not disquieting implications persons from historically oppressed and marginalized groups and 
communities. Yet, this should not negate inquiry in this area. 
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frequent discontinuities and irregularities in the development of science. Indeed, that 
there are certain research programs, e.g. Newtonian physics, that begin to degenerate 
because they are no longer able to answer the problems they generate, e.g., how objects 
operate on the microscopic level or at relativistic speeds. For a time, scientist attempt to 
account for the anomalies within the framework they are using at a particular time. 
However, as time goes on, they begin to collect more and more anomalies that do not fit 
within the paradigm. Finally, the scientists undergo what Kuhn refers to as a 
"conversion" to a new paradigm. The old one is discarded; a new one is taken on. 
While there have been criticism of Kuhn's thesis, particularly with respect to the 
incommensurability between paradigms,602 his epistemological model has Jiad a profound 
impact on multiple disciplines and fields, including areas of the humanities. It is my 
contention that the prevailing paradigm used in the understanding of African American 
religious experience, the "hermeneutics of liberation" is not able to address the numerous 
problems that have amassed over the last four decades, and thus, African American 
religionist are in need of "conversion." This conversion would be evinced in receptivity 
to new conceptual frameworks, such as I have suggested in this exposition. 
602
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chapter 5. 
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